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Abstract
The thesis explores the role of human understanding in R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy. I 
examine four major areas: the role of psychology, the unity of mind (i.e. unity of thoughts and 
emotions), the role of art and the case of fairy tales as a source of historical knowledge. These 
themes taken together expound a coherent way to see human understanding: with psychology 
Collingwood suggests the form that human understanding cannot assume; the unity of mind is 
Collingwood’s idea of how we experience an activity, that is, as an undivided whole of 
emotions and thoughts (and in some respects sensations or feelings too), that exist in every 
activity as elements that cannot be distinguished or separated. When we come to the forms 
that an activity can take 1 argue, using art and fairy tales, that human understanding in 
Collingwood’s system should be seen as a shift from the knowledge of the united spirit (as 
propounded in Speculum Mentis) to the knowledge of the historical consciousness. The 
knowledge of the united spirit is achieved through a dialectic scale of the different forms of 
experience, which individually, in isolation from one another, are not epistemologically valid. 
In the historical consciousness the forms of experience are epistemologically autonomous and 
are found within history, all being manifestations of the historical mind.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about Collingwood’s philosophy of history and human understanding.1 Human 
understanding is central in Collingwood’s philosophy. In Speculum Mentis he maintains that 
“We try to understand ourselves and our world only in order that we may learn how to live” 
(p. 15). His philosophy, like Giambattista Vico’s and Wilhelm Dilthey’s, is highly 
anthropocentric.' Man is the focus of philosophical reflection and the study of human conduct 
ensues in the understanding of him: what it is that he does; why he does what he does; why 
sometimes he fails and sometimes succeeds. This understanding is for Collingwood the role 
of history.
The engagement with human understanding, in the way that Collingwood proceeded, 
is an important endeavour. It is an endeavour understood in terms of a constant effort towards
1 For some general books on the philosophy o f  history and some useful classical philosophical 
expositions o f  the problems o f  history see: W.H. Walsh. 1951. An introduction to philosophy o f  history. 
Hutchinson. London (3rd rev. ed. 1967); B.A. Haddock. 1980. An introduction to historical thought. 
London, Edward Arnold; R. Martin. 1977. H istorical Explanation, Re-enactment and practical 
inference. Cornell University Press; R. Klibansky and H.J. Paton (eds.). 1936. Philosophy & history: 
essays presen ted  to Ernst Cassirer. Oxford Clarendon Press [also Collingw ood’s review o f  that book in 
1937 in English H istorical Review, vol. 52, pp. 141-146 (reprinted in CS, vol. V, 1998, pp. 145-151)];
I. Berlin. 1960. ‘The Concept o f  Scientific History’, in History and Theory, vol. 1, no 1, pp. 1-31; F.H. 
Bradley. 1874. The Presuppositions o f  Critical History, (reprinted in C ollected Essays, 1969, pp. 1-70. 
Oxford Clarendon Press. This book was first published in 1935 in two volumes).
“ For more details on the work o f  Vico see: G. Vico. 1968. The New Science o f  Giambattista Vico. 
(revised translation o f  the third edition (1744) / Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch)
Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press; G. Vico. 1944. The autobiography o f  Giambattista Vico. 
(translated from the Italian by Max Harold Fisch and Thomas Goddard Bergin) Imprint Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press; B. Croce. 1913. The Philosophy o f  Giam battista Vico. Translated by R.G. 
Collingwood. London; I. Berlin. 1976. Vico and Herder: Two studies in the history o f  ideas. The 
Hogarth Press; I. Berlin. 1979. ‘V ico’s Concept o f  K nowledge’, in Against the current: Essays in the 
History o f  Ideas (H. Hardy ed.), pp. 111-119 (originally published in 1969); I. Berlin. 1979. ‘Vico and 
the Ideal o f  the Enlightenment’, in Against the current: Essays in the H istory o f  Ideas (H. Hardy ed.), 
pp. 120-129 (originally published in 1976); I. Berlin. 1990. ‘Giambattista Vico and Cultural History’, 
in The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity: Chapters in the H istory o f  Ideas (H. Hardy ed.), pp. 49-69 
(originally published in 1983); B.A. Haddock. 1986. Vico's Political Thought. Swansea; L. Pompa. 
(ed.). 1982. Vico: Selected Writings. CUP; L. Pompa. 1990. Vico: A study o f  the ‘New Science’. CUP; 
B.A. Haddock. 1995. ‘Vico, Collingwood and the Character o f  a Historical Philosophy’, in PHC, pp. 
130-151. Also F. Copleston. 1960. A History o f  Philosophy, (Vol. 6). Bums & Oates (Part III “The rise 
o f  the philosophy o f  history”, pp. 150-179. On Giambattista Vico pp. 154-163).
For more details on the work o f  Dilthev see: W. Dilthey. 1883. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. 
(Introduction to the Human Sciences, edited, with an introduction, by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof 
Rodi, 1989, Princeton University Press); M. Ermarth. 1978. Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique o f  
H istorical Reason. Chicago; J. Owensby. 1994. Dilthey and the Narrative o f  History. Ithaca, N Y ; T. 
Plantinga. 1980. H istorical Understanding in the Thought o f  Wilhelm Dilthey. Toronto; H.P. Rickman. 
1961. M eaning in History: W. D iltheys's thoughts on history and society, (edited and introduced by 
Rickman) London: Allen & Unwin; H.P. Rickman (ed.). 1976. Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings. 
Cambridge; H.P. Rickman. 1979. Wilhelm Dilthey: P ioneer o f  the Human Studies. London.
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the possibility of knowledge about man. Furthermore such knowledge is the necessary 
prerequisite, without which any further attempts of comprehending meaningfully other 
aspects of human life are ill founded. In his Autobiography Collingwood contends that the 
inability to control human situations was the reason for WWI and he believes that only 
“understanding of human affairs” (A, p. 92) will provide such control. It is no coincidence 
that Collingwood in NL adopted the structure of Hobbes and began with a section on man: the 
understanding of man comes first. The importance, therefore, of human understanding is that 
it serves as the foundation and the necessary condition of a civilised life. And it is historical in 
nature and Collingwood argues that “A scientific society will turn on the idea of mastering 
people (by money or war or the like) or alternatively serxing them (philanthropy). A historical 
society will turn on the idea of understanding them.” (HS, p. 432).
Implicit in the above situation is the acceptance that the pursuit of such knowledge is 
possible. Any scepticism, that almost every philosophical position acknowledges, should only 
serve to help the enquiry proceed unhindered, without taking certainty for granted. Thus 
scepticism is a tool but not a destination or a philosophical doctrine. For the challenge that 
thought poses to us is that every instance of scepticism should give birth to an instance of 
success and advancement of our study. Any philosophical project on human understanding 
that from the outset declares such a task impossible, makes a serious compromise. Because if 
the sceptic decides that knowledge about man is impossible or uncertain then everything else, 
that depends on this knowledge to be understood and explained, will be permeated by the 
same uncertainty. Our inquiry will reach a standstill.
Collingwood in EM described, in effect, this attitude. He called it the irrationalist 
movement or the propaganda of irrationalism, “a kind of epidemic withering of belief in the 
importance of truth and in the obligation to think and act in a systematic and methodical way” 
(EM, p. 135). Collingwood’s main focus of criticism was psychology because of its inability to 
admit and employ rules or criteria by which something could be judged to be good or bad, 
logical or illogical, true or false and so on. The non-criteriological character was for 
Collingwood a serious mistake since it implies a sceptical or relativistic attitude towards the 
attainment of truth. Thus psychology as the science of thought and human understanding is, 
Collingwood argued, erroneous and a serious danger to civilisation. Collingwood was 
concerned with this state of affairs when he was writing that “The fate of European science 
and European civilization is at stake. The gravity of the peril lies especially in the fact that so 
few recognize any peril to exist” (EM, p. 342).
Collingwood's ideas and conclusions about irrationalism are still pertinent today, as 
many aspects of the prevailing intellectual conditions can be reasonably seen as an extension 
and continuation of the situation he described in EM. We could see them originating from two 
main directions. One one hand there exist various manifestations of what can loosely be
2
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defined as the post-modern view that, in different guise, reiterate the old position of 
scepticism. The denial of fixed meaning, objective knowledge, reality and truth sees human 
condition and understanding as formless and subjective, thus leaving out the normative, or 
criteriological, approach. This view produces a fragmented human understanding, a highly 
individual construction with indiscernible variations of merit between different 
interpretations.
On the other hand we have explanation models based on a modem version of 
materialism. There are various areas such as neuroscience, cognitive psychology, 
evolutionary psychology and so forth, that interact with philosophy. These empirical fields do 
not constitute a uniform effort to explain human behaviour and the mind and between them 
substantial differences exist. What, however, they have in common is that they explain the 
reasons for human actions using a mechanistic, naturalistic framework. These reasons are 
found to be outside human control or intentionality and pertain to biological desires and 
appetites, survival mechanisms and so on. The idea of human actions as a vast, intricate 
complex of motives, intentions, beliefs, duties etc., is left virtually untouched.
These two ways to approach human understanding have substantial similarities with 
irrationalism as Collingwood defined it. The post-modem interpretations explicitly refuse the 
concept of truth and thus any subsequent inquiry doesn't include it in its pursuits. The modem 
materialism, because it is based on the naturalistic methodology, implies the same disregard 
for criteria and rules that Collingwood argued are essential in judging the success or failure of 
thought. Moreover both post-modernism and materialism strongly contend humanistic 
thought, the reliance, that is, on human rationality and the belief that thought is a free, self- 
creating process. The anti-humanistic tendency of both these movements is, in effect, a 
reaction against fundamental assumptions and presuppositions on which the idea of society 
and civilisation rests.
The are various reasons for advocating positions that seem to impede instead of 
fostering understanding and not always are these reasons easy to discern. The irrationalism, 
for instance, that Collingwood described in EM was not, he thought, the product of conscious, 
sinister motives but rather a product of misunderstanding of the nature of the inquiries.3 This 
is certainly true when the subject of an inquiry is of philosophical nature and thus complex 
and prone to erroneous judgements. Every piece of writing about human understanding 
should, therefore, appraise, and if necessary remedy, the existing state of affairs before further 
clarify the investigation. This is what Collingwood did. He emphasised the need for a 
methodical and systematic way of enquiring about human understanding and tried to show 
why the scientific methodology, when applied to man in his capacity as mind, presents
3 EM, p. 135 and pp. 342-343.
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serious flaws and compromises. At the same time he provided his analysis of why history is 
the correct method to understand man.
The aim of my thesis is to provide the necessary material for addressing his position 
on human understanding and appreciating the significance of his arguments. What he presents 
us with is human understanding as a rich, multifaceted and multi-layered experience, as 
opposed to the dry, formulaic and pedantic to which other philosophical attempts have 
reduced human experience. Collingwood's analysis is important because his emphasis on 
history favours a detailed and attentive process for the study of man and the attainment of 
knowledge and understanding. In his approach many aspects of human experience, that had 
been suppressed, ignored, forgotten or derided, receive consideration as important elements of 
understanding. Hence emotions, art as knowledge, magic and fairy tales are in Collingwood's 
explanation essential features of culture, civilisation and human understanding. The broader 
intellectual significance of Collingwood's arguments can be found in his conviction that 
human understanding is always possible and can be approached by a historical method which 
will critically explore a wide spectrum of human experiences. It is a painstaking and perhaps 
slow enterprise, but the only one that will do justice to the human mind.
My thesis is placed closer to the exegesis of Collingwood's work, which emphasises 
the dialectic element and thus treats his philosophy as a whole. In that respect I find that the 
interpretations by Rubinoff and Mink provide a helpful framework and I am too of the 
opinion that SM is a very important and illuminating book, the value of which was also 
testified by Collingwood himself in his Autobiography. In view of seeing Collingwood's 
philosophy as a dialectic, interpretations that favour a rigid periodisation of his output tend to 
be rather restrictive. This can also be said for Donagan who, although examined 
Collingwood's later philosophy as a unity, only dealt with the works after 1933. Donagan's 
interpretation also rests on the idea of a planned series and on changes in Collingwood's 
philosophical conception that they were based on the planned series. As, however, van der 
Dussen has argued4 even the idea of a planned series is not without problems. On the whole 
Donagan's interpretation, although it provides interesting views in his effort to challenge 
Collingwood's position, suffers from a selective approach. My reading also significantly 
diverges from Knox's, who devised a strict categorisation of Collingwood's writings. 
Moreover, his assertions about Collingwood's alleged historicism and scepticism have been 
challenged by most Collingwood scholars and Knox's view is regarded, at least, heavily 
idiosyncratic. One more viewpoint is that of Dray, who expressed his concerns about 
interpretations that attempt to answer larger questions. He argued that the examination of
4 HS. p. 5.
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Collingwood's philosophy as a system might obscure what Collingwood had to say about 
particular issues, especially history.5 But Collingwood's philosophy is the attempt to explain 
experience as a whole and it does so through the eyes of history. My thesis, therefore, treats 
Collingwood's philosophy as a system and uses the idea of dialectic. In my interpretation 
Collingwood's dialectic is the ongoing interaction between the different forms of experience 
with a view to establishing their relationship with each other and explaining their general 
function. I contend that from the dialectic of the united spirit that we find in SM, Collingwood 
concluded in the historical consciousness or the dialectic of history. In this dialectic all forms 
of experience operate within history but are also autonomous. For that it is necessary that they 
are also forms of knowledge, epistemologically valid, and thus I argue against interpretations, 
like Mink’s for instance, that deny the status of knowledge to art.
For the purposes of the thesis I have identified certain themes in Collingwood’s 
philosophy that I have treated in successive chapters. These themes are: the place of 
psychology in human understanding; the unity of mind; the character of art and its relation to 
history; and the use of fairy tales and magic as historical evidence. My treatment of 
Collingwood's ideas follows a chronological examination and exposition. I have found this 
way of exploring Collingwood’s philosophy helpful because of the nature of his thought. 
Collingwood's thought is not characterised by dramatic or radical changes. His ideas are 
consistent, with no sharp contrast between his earlier and his later views. However since, for 
most o f his life, he was preoccupied with the same set of problems, his ideas can be seen as 
being in constant modification and refinement. In the process of this modification some of the 
previous tenets seem for a moment to disappear, only to resurface at a later point. Thus in 
order to understand his doctrines we need to pay attention to these vicissitudes and I have 
tried, where possible, to explain or give reasons for them.
Dealing with psychology I begin in the negative, examining, that is, what 
Collingwood thought human knowledge and understanding is not and why. The discipline of 
psychology is very important in Collingwood’s philosophy. His ongoing effort to define the 
boundaries of psychology in relation to philosophy and history was valuable in formulating 
what the mind is and how it is to be studied. Collingwood responded to the claim by 
psychologists of his time that psychology is the science of the human mind. The new 
discipline came as a contestant to study something already within the purview of what 
Collingwood called philosophical sciences (later to become criteriological sciences with a 
strong historical character): ethics, logic, aesthetics, economics and so on. Whatever direction
5 Dray, pp. 3-4.
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psychology investigated, a philosophical science already existed exploring it. And where 
different disciplines study the same field, they could only do it by using different methods. 
Collingwood asserted that psychology, as an aspiring naturalistic science, was committed to 
the scientific methodology, and thus it put forward an erroneous claim to the study of the 
mind. His treatment of psychology in his writings was to show why it couldn’t do what it 
purported to be able to do and to reveal the dangers of misconceiving psychology’s 
boundaries.
We can distinguish two main phases in Collingwood’s ideas about psychology. In his 
early writings psychology was found to be entirely erroneous. In his later writings psychology 
is a very useful discipline as the study of feelings. Collingwood finds the origins of this 
psychology in the 16th century. It was a genuine, legitimate study up until the 19th century, 
where Collingwood locates the assertions of a new psychology, that apart from feelings can 
also study thought. The fact that contemporaneous psychology was no longer just the science 
of feeling precipitated his direct criticism of the new way to perceive psychology as the 
science of the mind, which was for him an absurd claim. But in his later ideas the psychology 
of feeling has a valid position. The reason why Collingwood dismissed psychology altogether 
in his early writings but finds a place for it later on is to be found in his philosophy of mind. 
Collingwood’s conception of psychology rests on his theory of mind and his views about the 
mind change and are reflected in his views on psychology.
Human knowledge and understanding is all about the mind. For Collingwood the 
study of the mind and the study of history is the same thing. History, for him, is nothing other 
than self-knowledge of the mind. It is thus essential to know what Collingwood subsumes 
under the term mind in order to know the boundaries of our exploration. It is this element of 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind that I am here concerned with, to see what he regarded 
mind’s constituents to be. I maintain that Collingwood throughout his philosophy understood 
the mind as a unity of the different elements that it was traditionally divided into. In his early 
writings these elements are the thinking activity and what comes under the various names of 
feeling, sensation, perception, intuition and so on. In other words we have the immediate 
experience (sensation) and the mediating, reflective side of this experience (thought). These 
elements Collingwood regarded as forming a concrete whole, a unity that cannot be separated. 
The idea that we actually give different names to these elements is an abstraction, a false 
belief that these elements exist separately. In SM Collingwood complained about the claims 
of the different modes of experience to be able to attain knowledge autonomously and not 
communicating with each other. His attempt was to reunite them dialectically, where each 
mode of experience is not knowledge, but instead contributes to the knowledge that only the 
united mind can attain.
6
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The idea of mind’s unity is something that we find in almost all Collingwood’s later 
writings with the notable exception of IH. IH and some writings from the late 1920’s present 
the mind in a rather different way. Although Collingwood in the late 1920’s writings is 
ambiguous about the exact nature of mind’s elements, he sees it as having conscious and 
unconscious activities, only the former being part o f history’s subject matter. In IH he 
maintains that the mind is divided into rational and irrational elements, such as emotions and 
feelings. These, although still mind and not body, belong better to what can be termed psyche 
and they can be studied by psychology, not history. Collingwood argues that the irrational 
elements are part of the conscious experience of human life and form the basis for our reason 
but are not part of it. I have tried to show that the reason why Collingwood in IH saw the 
mind in such a different way was the doctrine of re-enactment.
Collingwood’s philosophy of art is not so much a canon for judging the aesthetic 
qualities, or the absence of them, in a work of art. Someone wishing to use Collingwood’s 
aesthetics to do so will no doubt find some assistance in Collingwood’s writings. But if art is 
seen as the attempt to achieve knowledge, then it is a part of the human condition, not just an 
activity of the artist. Collingwood’s philosophy of art is, therefore, part of his philosophy of 
mind and closely connected to history as knowledge of the individual.
That Collingwood wanted to show that art is knowledge or expression, is something 
that occurred early on. Contrary to the usual interpretations, I maintain that his early ideas, 
however slight and brief, introduce art as expression of feelings or emotions. The view of art 
as imagination is supported by some of his writings during the 1920’s, but during the same 
period we find some of his writings have a hybrid nature combining both art as imagination 
and art as expression. From the late 1920’s the character of art as expression is established 
and remains so throughout Collingwood’s late writings. Imagination still plays a role but not 
as prominent as before.
In the direction of clarifying art’s character we can place the examination of the 
relation between history and art, a theme that we find to be long-standing in Collingwood’s 
philosophy. Aristotle's6 position that “poetry is more philosophical than and superior to
6 For Aristotle’s Poetics I have used the Greek edition (Translation by S. Menardos. Introduction, text 
and interpretation by I. Sykoutris. Athens 1937, Academy o f  Athens, Greek Library series). In a very 
interesting introduction Sykoutris -a  remarkably competent classicist o f  the early 20th century- talks, 
among other things, as to what prompted Aristotle to compare poetry with history. Sykoutris argues 
that this was due to the conception o f  ancient Greeks, where there was not a clear and firm distinction 
between the mythological and the historical events. In this conception the mythological events also 
belonged to the past and were used almost indiscriminately as historical, both for the survey o f  the past 
and in the discussions o f  seasonable, practical issues. Even the ancient historians didn’t distinguish 
between historical and mythical periods. The ancient poets too (with the exception o f  the ones who 
wrote comedy) used the same mythological and historical material for their works, although admittedly
7
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history”, is taken by Collingwood and, like Croce7 before him, revised considerably. The 
comparison between art (or poetry) and history is a correct one but between them there is no 
competition. Instead both are doing the same thing by constituting knowledge of the 
individual. Thus history becomes art and all the other attempts to explain history otherwise 
become obsolete: on the one hand the claim of history as a science of the individual and the 
subsequent effort to explain how such a science is logically possible, a contradiction in terms 
as Schopenhauer argued;8 on the other hand the positivistic conception of history as a proper 
science that produces general laws like any other physical-natural science.
The changes in Collingwood’s theory of art occur because of the way he came to see 
the character of knowledge in his writings. In SM, which is the main exposition of his early, 
complete, philosophy, the modes of experience are not autonomous and only all of them 
together can yield knowledge. But later on each mode is independent and epistemologically 
sound in its own right. The importance of art, in that respect, is in showing this 
epistemological change in Collingwood’s ideas. It is also o f interest in showing that, by 
treating initially art as expression, very early on Collingwood intimated a different theory of 
knowledge than the one he pursued in SM, a theory that was to become and form his 
epistemology later on.
In the areas of fairy tales and anthropology Collingwood finds himself very 
comfortably placed. Trying to show how everything men have made can be used as evidence
they made a more liberal interpretation o f  the historical events than the historians. For the entire 
analysis o f  Sykoutris on the comparison between poetry and history see pp. 68-76.
Croce’s philosophy o f  art is very useful for Collingwood’s ideas. I will only refer to very few o f  his 
works. For more see: M.E. Brown. 1963. ‘Croce’s Early Aesthetics: 1894-1912’, in Journal o f  
Aesthetic and Art Criticism , vol. XXII (Fall), pp. 29-41; H.W. Carr. 1917. The Philosophy o f  Benedetto 
Croce: The Problem o f  Art and History. Macmillan and Co; E.F. Carritt. 1953. ‘Croce and his 
Aesthetic’, in Mind, N.S. vol. LXII, pp. 452-464; B. Croce. 1928. ‘Aesthetic’, in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 14th ed., (translated by R.G. Collingwood); B. Croce. 1921. The Essence o f  Aesthetic. 
Translated by Douglas Ainslie (The Italian original Breviario di Estetica  was published in 1912) 
William Heinemann: London; B. Croce. 1966. Philosophy, Poetry, History: An anthology o f  essays. 
Translated and introduced by Cecil Sprigge (The Italian original Filosofia, Poesia, Storia was 
published in 1951), Oxford University Press; B. Croce. 1981. Poetry• and Literature, an introduction to 
its criticism and history. Translated with an introduction and notes by Giovanni Gullace (The Italian 
original La Poesia  was published in 1936. This translation is from the 6th edition, 1963), Southern 
Illinois University Press; A. A. de Gennaro. 1956. ‘The Drama o f  the Aesthetics o f  Benedetto Croce’, in 
Journal o f  Aesthetic and Art Criticism , vol. XV (September), pp. 117-121; K. Gilbert. 1927. ‘The One 
and the Many in Croce’s Aesthetic’, in Studies in Recent Aesthetic, North Carolina U; B. Mayo. 1955. 
‘Art, Language and Philosophy in Croce’, in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. V, pp. 245-260; M.E. 
M oss (ed.). 1990. Benedetto Croce, Essays on Literature and Literary Criticism. State University o f  
New York Press; G.N.G. Orsini. 1961. Benedetto Croce: Philosopher o f  Art and Literary Critic. S. 
Illinois U; G.G. Seerveld. 1958. Benedetto Croce's earlier Aesthetic Theories and Literary Criticism. 
Kampen, Netherlands.
8 A. Schopenhauer. 1819. Die Welt als W ille und Vorstellung. (English translation: The World as Will 
and Idea. First published in 1883, translated by R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp). {Especially vol. Ill, pp. 
220-230, On H istory}.
8
INTRODUCTION
for yielding historical knowledge, he chooses to study fairy tales and proceeds in full 
conviction of their epistemological worth. The choice of fairy tales is important in showing 
how a rather surprising area for philosophical investigation can indeed be treated 
philosophically. It is also an important choice because of the element of magic. For 
Collingwood the world of fairy tales is the world of magic (particularly enchantment), which 
is what the historian needs to understand in order to use fairy tales as historical evidence. 
Magic is an emotional activity. It is in that respect very close to art, but also different from 
art. Both activities are necessary for the healthy life of man but they contribute to that end in 
different ways. Art discovers the emotions by expressing them. The expression of emotion 
brings about the self-knowledge of man and thus a sense of liberation. Magic deals with 
emotions in another way, by channelling our energy, that we find through these emotions, to 
the successful accomplishment of our practical concerns.
For Collingwood the negative connotation of the word magic has entirely 
disappeared. The broad definition he attaches to it renders magic a very important element in 
the human condition; most activities of our everyday life are o f a magical character. Thus 
magic is essential for human understanding. More so because of its emotional character. 
Magic is, of course, not just an emotional activity but a thinking one as well. But 
Collingwood’s emphasis on the emotional nature of magic was a necessary exaggeration in 
order to re-address the importance of emotions at a time when he perceived the over 
rationalised and utilitarian attitude -with their suspicion towards the emotional sides of life— 
to present a serious peril for our civilisation.
The reason why I have chosen the above themes is that together they expound a 
coherent way of seeing human understanding in Collingwood’s philosophy. Psychology is, 
for Collingwood, an erroneous way to approach human understanding. The unity of mind is 
Collingwood’s scheme of how we experience an activity. That is, as an undivided whole of 
emotions and thoughts (and in some respects sensations or feelings too), that exist in every 
activity as elements that cannot be distinguished or separated. But apart from how something 
is experienced there also seems to be as what, the form or the mode that an activity can be 
experienced. Thus we can experience -and come to know- something as religion or art or 
science or history and so forth. In his early philosophy Collingwood explored all these forms 
of experience as an epistemological system. However later on he was mainly interested in the 
modes of art and history. Let us now see more about this change and, thus, understand how 
art and fairy tales fit in my presentation of human understanding in Collingwood’s 
philosophy.
Human understanding is in effect the attempt to explain human experience. The 
problem with such an undertaking is the unfolding, ongoing process of experience and thus
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the difficulty of seeing a point of vantage from where to begin. Often we find ourselves 
surrounded by schemes already in place and we adopt them -however tentatively- in order to 
proceed with our enquiries. These schemes are, of course, temporary and imperfect and our 
responsibility is to use them cautiously and modify them if they need to be. One of these 
schemes is the classification and division of experience in various modes or provinces, each 
one with purportedly special characteristics that distinguish it from the rest. According to 
such a scheme one way to advance is to examine each province of experience and then to see 
if these provinces interact together and if so to ascertain what comes out of such an 
interaction.
Something similar to what I have just described was the task that Collingwood set 
himself in SM.9 He identified five provinces of experience, art, religion, science, history and 
philosophy. From the outset he is convinced that the number of provinces is immaterial, since 
even the idea of dividing the experience -the human spirit- is only a working hypothesis and, 
as such, arbitrary. Arbitrary, therefore, are also the number of provinces that experience is 
divided into. The reason why experience was thought to be divided was the claim of each of 
the provinces to be epistemologically autonomous. Collingwood investigated this claim and 
found it problematic. Every individual province is not knowledge but instead it contributes to 
the life of the spirit which only when united is knowledge. The error of failing to see the 
human spirit united occurs when we direct our attention to one province and abstract it from 
the whole. When, that is, by giving a name to this province we believe we have given it 
identity and independent hypostasis too.
SM shows that Collingwood from early on in his philosophy saw the mind as a unity. 
This was to remain in his philosophy with the exception of some of his writings where the 
doctrine of re-enactment had a prominent position. What changes, however, is that the unity 
of mind after SM becomes a unity not of modes of experience but of the emotional and 
cognitive elements that these modes consist.10 The forms or provinces of experience do not 
any longer follow a dialectical scheme any but they are autonomous. Thus, contrary to the 
conclusion of SM, different areas of experience can be found and each of them has 
epistemological validity. This shift in Collingwood’s philosophy had as a result that his 
theory of art moved from art as imagination to art as expression, since expression is in effect 
the attainment of knowledge. It also resulted in the stronger and stronger character of history. 
These two forms of knowledge, history and art, are what Collingwood defined as the
9 I think a similar task was Michael Oakeshott’s book, Experience and its M odes (1933, Cambridge).
10 In SM this is also the case. Even art, the lowest form o f  experience in the life o f  the spirit, is not just 
an emotional activity but has cognitive elements too.
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knowledge of the individual. As such they differ from science" -the knowledge of the 
universal- and in that respect science falls outside the endeavours directed to attain human 
knowledge and understanding. One notable absence from Collingwood’s epistemological 
concerns is that of religion.1'  After RP and SM the philosophical discussions of religion are 
very scarce13 and it does not receive the attention that history and art did. It is not very likely 
that Collingwood's interest in religion as a mode of experience ceased to exist or that he 
stopped believing that religion has a significant role in the life of man. In his 194014 essay it is 
the “vital warmth at the heart of a civilization ... Religion is the passion which inspires a 
society to persevere in a certain way of life and to obey the rules which define it” (p. 168). 
The concern of that essay was to contribute to the understanding of the dire conditions that 
facilitated the advent of Fascism and Nazism. Collingwood argued that the catalyst, which 
produced the death of civilization, was the diminishing religious energy -mainly in the form 
of Christianity- in the life of certain countries. It is my contention that the reason why 
Collingwood in his later writings did not treat religion as extensively as history and art, is not 
that he didn’t any longer consider religion an epistemologically valid form of experience. 
Instead it seems that the implication of the new way to see knowledge rendered the exhaustive 
treatment of the individual modes of experience not necessary.
This brings me to a final point: what is the implication of this new way of seeing 
knowledge? I maintain that even with this shift of emphasis, the philosophy of spirit that 
Collingwood expounded in SM is not profoundly affected. Collingwood himself says, for 
instance, that there is much in SM that “needs to be supplemented and qualified [but] not a 
great deal that needs to be retracted” (A, p. 56, ft 1). What needs to be qualified is, I believe, 
how from the dialectical and epistemologically incomplete Forms of Experience in SM, we 
move to the autonomy of history and art -and potentially religion- without disturbing the 
unity of spirit. In SM all forms of experience are in the end identical. Later by becoming 
individual epistemologies it seems that they cease to contribute to the unity. But this is not so.
11 Cf. R.G. Collingwood. 1922. ‘Are History and Science different kinds o f  Knowledge?’, in Mind, 
vol. 31, pp. 433-451 (reprinted in Debbins, 23-33). In this essay Collingwood argued that history and 
science are not different kinds o f  knowledge. This position was very soon to change, as for instance we 
find in his essay just one year later, R.G. Collingwood. 1923. ‘Science and History’, in The Vasculum, 
vol. 9, no 2, pp. 52-59 (reprinted in CS, vol. IV, 1997, pp. 197-205).
J *>
“ For the treatment o f  religion see mainly RP and SM. Also R.G. Collingwood. 1918. ‘Christianity in 
Partibus', in The Challenge, vol. IX, no 232, 4th October 1918, p. 323 (reprinted in CS, vol. VI, 1999, 
pp. 166-171. Compiled and introduced by James Connelly and Peter Johnson); L. Rubinoff. 1968.
Faith and Reason: Essays in the Philosophy o f  Religion by R.G. Collingwood. Chicago; L. Rubinoff. 
1972. ‘Religion and the Rapprochement between Thought and A ction’, in Krausz, pp. 79-112; D.M. 
MacKinnon. 1995. ‘Faith and Reason in the Philosophy o f  Religion’, in PHC, pp. 79-91; L. Rubinoff. 
1997. ‘Review Article: R.G. Collingwood, Religion and Philosophy', in CS, vol. IV, pp. 157-182; J. 
Connelly. 2001. ‘R.G. Collingwood: Approaches to R eligion’, in CS, vol. VIII, pp. 144-151.
13 Collingw ood’s lectures on topics related to philosophical religion stopped in 1925. He had lectured 
on the philosophy o f  religion in 1915 and from 1920 until 1925.
14 R.G. Collingwood. 1940. ‘Fascism and Nazism ’, in Philosophy, vol. 15, no 58, pp. 168-176.
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The mind -the spirit- that seeks to know itself will do so historically. That is, through what it 
has done and what it is capable of doing. History, thus, becomes or is mind. The new unity of 
mind has been effected through history. This is where psychology for Collingwood becomes 
irrelevant to mind’s self-knowledge. The historic mind is an ongoing activity, a self-creating 
process and not an object that can be observed and studied. To overlook or deny this element 
is to misunderstand what the mind is. To try to study a process as an object is impossible.
Now, art, religion and so forth are not outside but within history. They have in 
common that they operate historically and thus have been synthesised into the unity of the 
historical mind. They also differ in that they are independent epistemologies. In themselves 
they are not incomplete forms of knowledge and they do not depend on a dialectical scale to 
become knowledge. Instead the mind can know itself in various ways, all of them 
autonomous and all of them necessary. How many such ways exist is, perhaps, superfluous or 
impossible to ascertain. The mind as an activity can manifest itself in various forms, as 
Collingwood meant to show by his use of art and fairy tales. These forms can be 
unpredictable, at a constant state of flux and even evade classification. What matters is that all 
of them are expressions of the historical consciousness.
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Chapter I: Philosophy, History and Psychology
§ 1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to consider Collingwood’s position regarding psychology.1 The 
significance of this theme has to do with Collingwood's perception of psychology as 
antagonistic to philosophy and history in the study of the mind. Collingwood's endeavour to 
define the boundaries of psychology also resulted in a clearer idea of what the mind is and how 
it is to be studied. His ideas on psychology have, therefore, a direct consequence for his 
philosophies of mind and history. Moreover his criticisms came at a time when psychology as 
the science of the mind and knowledge of man was becoming more and more accepted and 
consolidated. Collingwood saw various dangers coming from a credulous attitude to 
psychology's claims and his critique tried to show where and why psychology erred and what 
are the implications if the misconceptions about psychology’s function continued. His 
evaluation of psychology is of current interest too. The problems he identified appear in 
various forms today and psychology's approach still presents unsatisfactory answers to human 
understanding.
One of the major problems that Collingwood recognised, in his effort to define the 
historical understanding, was the claim of psychology to be the science for the study of the 
human mind in its entirety. Such a claim would put psychology in direct confrontation with 
history as Collingwood had conceived it. Moreover psychology appeared as a very forceful 
contender primarily by taking an oath of allegiance to science and the naturalistic methods of 
inquiry, an allegiance, he thought, that history ought to avoid. The scientific methodology, 
compared to history, had created a pedigree of remarkable accomplishments and psychology 
could position itself safely by being categorised within an established and respected milieu. In 
a sense it could be argued that psychology was getting considerable strength for its claims just
1 For some useful commentaries on Collingwood’s views on psychology see SPT, pp. 237-239; HS, pp. 
364-368; Donagan, ch. VII, pp. 157-172; D. Boucher. 2002. ‘Collingwood and Anthropology as a 
Historical Science’, in History o f  Political Thought, vol. XXIII, no 2, pp. 302-325, esp. pp. 312-314 
(Hereafter abbreviated as AHS); J. Connelly and A. Costall. 2000. ‘R.G. Collingwood and the Idea o f a 
Historical Psychology’, in Theory & Psychology, vol. 10(2), pp. 147-170 (Hereafter abbreviated as 
CHP); J. Connelly. 1994. ‘Writings on Psychology: Collingwood’s Attack on Psychology’, in CS I, pp. 
182-193 (Hereafter abbreviated as Connelly). In this article three reviews o f Collingwood on psychology 
books are reprinted, all published in 1923.
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by having adopted or aspiring to a naturalistic epistemology.2 However the study of the mind 
during the nineteenth century was within the boundaries of philosophy, at the time a discipline 
with higher standing and reputation than history which was still in its infancy. Thus 
psychology was conceived as trying to trespass upon an established field of learning. Many 
philosophers saw psychology with growing scepticism, suspicion and, in some cases, 
antipathy.3 Collingwood started developing his criticisms on psychology within this 
atmosphere, long before working out his position with reference to history as the self- 
knowledge of the human mind. The early writings of Collingwood saw psychology as the 
antagonist of the philosophical sciences of the mind such as logic and ethics.
Of Collingwood’s position two phases can be recognised; each one depends on and 
corresponds to the view of the mind he was developing at the earlier and later periods of his 
writing. I maintain that, essentially, Collingwood throughout his career saw the mind as a unity 
between its various faculties or activities (thought, emotion, sensation, will etc.). However the 
initial strong unity, present in his writing until the late 1920's, later becomes the subject of 
further inspection, resulting in the recognition of elements that do not properly belong to the 
mind but constitute the irrational psyche. According to this philosophy of mind, Collingwood 
treated psychology in two different ways:4 the first is a total refutation of psychology as the 
science of the mind; the second is the recognition of psychology as the science of feeling but 
not of thought.
In his early writings, mainly RP and SM, Collingwood refers to psychology as the 
scientific study of the mind as a whole. Therefore if, given this condition, psychology’s claim 
to be the science of the mind is found wanting then the refutation is total. In his early writings 
he doesn't make any reference to the psychology of feeling. I maintain that he could not have 
acknowledged such discipline because at that time he had conceived the mind as something 
indivisible: it can only be studied as a whole or not at all. The psychology of feeling, the 
discipline whose origins Collingwood traces back in the 16th century, is the discipline that
“ For instance: “the prestige o f naturalistic methods, with their well-deserved reputation resting on what 
they had achieved since the late sixteenth century, being used to enforce exorbitant claims, now against 
the growing, but immature science o f history, now against the ancient sciences o f logic and ethics” (PH,
p. 88).
For the beginning o f scientific psychology and its reception by philosophers, especially in Cambridge 
and Oxford, see Connelly, pp. 182-3 and CHP, pp. 147-149. It has been suggested that the relatively 
recent reconciliation between philosophy and psychology “has largely been possible through serious 
relegation by some philosophers o f their critical duties regarding the absurdities o f modem cognitive 
theory” (CHP, p. 166, n. 3).
4 Collingwood himself didn’t distinguish between these two different ways. However I maintain that the 
implications o f his philosophy o f mind logically require this view o f psychology.
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receives his approval in all his later writings. The psychology of feeling was, however, a 
discipline that Collingwood identifies with a traditional meaning of the word. It was not 
current in his times. What existed instead was the psychology he criticises in RP and SM, a 
psychology that studies not just feeling but also thought. For Collingwood this was a pseudo 
science and he is dismissive of it.
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind is, therefore, necessary in order to understand the 
changes that occur in his views on psychology. If the mind is seen as a unity psychology has 
no valid claim to study it. The naturalistic methodology of psychology treats the mind as 
matter and this for Collingwood is an erroneous way to perceive the mind. Psychology in this 
instance is dismissed altogether. But if the mind is seen as having elements (i.e. the feelings) 
that can be treated naturalistically, then psychology becomes the perfect discipline for this 
study. Why Collingwood saw the mind in different ways is, I believe, the result of the 
introduction of the doctrine of re-enactment, which I will discuss in chapter II.
The fact that Collingwood distinguished between two different meanings -and in 
effect two different disciplines- of psychology and that he did so not from the very beginning, 
are significant factors in understanding his assessment of psychology. Firstly, they show that 
he was not hostile to psychology as such but only to certain, recent claims of it.5 Secondly, that 
by the passing of time he softened his attitude towards psychology by recognising it as the very 
useful science of feeling. His idiosyncratic way of writing should not distract us from the fact 
that in his late writings he was prepared to allow much more credibility to psychology than in 
his early ones.
The scholars who have written on Collingwood are in agreement as to his ideas on 
psychology. They recognise that his position is very critical when he treats psychology as the 
study of thought. Also that his criticisms do not affect what he held to be valid psychology, the 
science of feelings. What, I believe, they have not touched upon is the implication that the 
unity of mind has, in his early writings, for psychology: the total refutation. In this respect my 
interpretation adds a dimension to our understanding of this aspect of Collingwood’s thought.
In what follows I will describe the two phases of Collingwood’s view of psychology: 
the first in his early writings where the refutation is total, and the second in his later writings 
where he recognises a valuable psychology for the study of feelings. I will also present his
5 van der Dussen, for instance, maintains that it would be “a misconception ... to think that Collingwood 
was against the science o f psychology” (HS, p. 365). Rubinoff argues that Collingwood’s attack on 
psychology “does not invalidate what Collingwood regarded as the proper concept of psychology” 
(Rubinoff, p. 389, n. 7). Also AHS, p. 313. Collingwood’s criticism o f psychology cannot thus be seen 
as “intemperate” (S. Toulmin. 1978. ‘Introduction’, in R.G. Collingwood's An Autobiography. Oxford 
Clarendon Press, p. xii, note 1).
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historical explanation of why psychology in the 19th century claimed a different subject matter. 
If we consider his ideas in such a way, we should apprehend Collingwood's understanding of 
psychology more fruitfully.
§ 2. Psychology's total refutation in Religion and Philosophy
The formation of a notion about psychology occurred early on in Collingwood’s teaching and 
writing career. There are, for instance, his 1913 ms notes prepared for his first lecture in 1914 
on De Anima of Aristotle.6 This is one of the first indications7 of a written reference with 
regard to psychology. There, Collingwood understands psychology as an experimental, 
empirical, a posteriori science that differs from the philosophical sciences of logic and ethics 
on grounds of method: the philosophical sciences ask questions about a good and a bad act, a 
true and a fallacious argument, while psychology is concerned with averages and inductive 
generalisations.8
The first significant treatment of psychology, I believe, occurred a little later. 
Collingwood himself testified as to the emphasis he attributed to that period:
If this claim [i.e. psychology as the science of the human mind] never for a moment 
deceived me, that is a benefit I owed to my early studies in theology... This... work... stood 
me in good stead (A, p. 93).
The outcome of those studies was the book RP that Collingwood published in 1916. I 
believe what he asserts in his autobiography is in harmony with what that book actually set out 
to achieve and how important it was in manifesting Collingwood's views on psychology. In RP 
Collingwood, in effect, did three things in relation to psychology and its claim to study the 
human mind: he proclaimed the philosophical sciences (later to be characterized as 
criteriological sciences) as the right way to tackle the human mind; he distinguished between
6 See HS, p. 433 and p. 445. The lecture was delivered in 1914 and in the ms notes Collingwood writes 
that they are "intended for a lecture to cover 2 hours a week for 8 weeks given in 1913 and enlarged in 
1914” .
7 Boucher mentions that Collingwood was critical o f psychology in his essay ‘The Devil’ (SPT, p. 293, 
n. 83), originally published in 1916 in B.F. Streeter et al. (eds.). Concerning Prayer: Its Nature, its 
Difficulties and its Value. London. Reprinted in 1968 in Rubinoff s collection, pp. 212-233. This essay 
was probably based on the paper ‘The Devil in Literature’: “an essay upon the Mythology o f the Evil 
One; Read before ‘Etanos’, 1908” (HS, p. 445).
8 HS, p. 365.
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methodologies and the erroneous efforts to apply one methodology universally; and he denied 
psychology's claim to the study of the human mind.
That psychology is in direct confrontation with the philosophical sciences there is no 
doubt. Both claim the same subject matter and therefore their differences can only be the 
methodology they assume to tackle their subject:
If we ask what constitutes psychology and distinguishes it from other sciences, we 
cannot answer merely that psychology is the study of the mind or soul. The philosophical 
sciences, -logic, ethics, and so forth,- attempt to study the mind; and they are not 
psychological. Nor can we say (as some psychologists say) that this is the reason of their 
unsatisfactory character; for these sciences exist on their own basis, and it is no criticism of 
one science to point out that it is not a different one. Again, we cannot define psychology as 
the study of conduct; because that title is already claimed by ethics. From these philosophical 
sciences psychology is distinguished not by its subject but by its method (RP, pp. 39-40).
The description of the methodological approaches and their differences are highly 
reminiscent of the distinction between criteriological and non-criteriological sciences that 
Collingwood was to make in his late writings:
The method peculiar to psychology may perhaps be described as follows. The 
psychology of knowing differs from logic or the philosophical theory of knowledge in that it 
treats a judgment -the act of knowing something- as an event in the mind, a historical fact. It 
does not go on to determine the relation of this mental event to the “something” known, the 
reality beyond the act which the mind, in that act, apprehends. Such a further investigation 
would be metaphysical in character and is therefore avoided by psychology. Now this formula 
can be universal ised, and thus gives us the definition of psychological method. Take the mental 
activity as a self-contained fact; refuse, so far as that is possible, to treat of its metaphysical 
aspect, its relations with real things other than itself; and you have psychology. Thus in 
scientific thought as studied by logic we have a judgment in which the mind knows reality: 
psychology, treating the judgment as a mere event, omits its reference to reality, that is to say, 
does not raise the question whether it is true. (...) In conduct generally we have certain actions, 
individual or social, designed to attain the ends of morality, utility, or the like; psychology will 
study these actions without asking whether they are right or wrong, but taking them merely as 
things done. In general, the characteristic of psychology is the refusal to raise ultimate 
questions. And since that is so, it is plainly not in a position to offer answers to them: or rather, 
in so far as it does offer answers these rest on an uncritical and quite accidental attitude 
towards the problems (RP, pp. 40-41).
From the description and contrasting of the methodologies of psychology and 
philosophical sciences, psychology appears to be in an odd situation. The function of 
recognising the mental activity is common both in psychology and the philosophical sciences. 
But logic, ethics, etc., go further than that asking and trying to answer whether the mental 
activity is right, wrong, valid, invalid and so forth: i.e. the philosophical sciences put emphasis
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on the normative character of their subject matter, but they have satisfied the descriptive 
function first.9 If psychology attempts to ask and answer such questions then its attitude 
becomes “internal” and it ceases to be psychology.10 If psychology regards the normative 
character as a wrong method of proceeding, it will find the task of description already occupied 
by logic, ethics and so on. Of course it might be argued that the way psychology describes its 
subject matter is a different one. But in either case the mere description of the mind, of a 
mental activity, is what Collingwood called “external” attitude and is very problematic:
When I describe the attitude of psychology as “external” my meaning is this. There is 
an air of great concreteness and reality about psychology which makes it very attractive. But 
this concreteness is really a delusion and on closer inspection vanishes. When a man makes a 
statement about the nature of God (or anything else) he is interested, not in the fact that he is 
making that statement, but in the belief, or hope, or fancy that it is true. If then the psychologist 
merely makes a note of the statement and declines to join in the question whether it is true, he 
is cutting himself off from any kind of real sympathy or participation in the very thing he is 
studying -this man's mental life and experiences. (...) The mind, regarded in this external way, 
really ceases to be a mind at all. To study a man's consciousness without studying the thing of 
which he is conscious is not knowledge of anything, but barren and trifling abstraction. It 
cannot answer ultimate questions, because it has renounced the attempt; it cannot enter into the 
life it studies, because it refuses to look with it eye to eye; and it is left with the cold unreality 
of thought which is the thought of nothing, action with no purpose, and fact with no meaning 
(RP, pp. 41-42).
In Collingwood's argument the conclusions are logically implied rather than forcefully 
stated. Thus psychology can either be a mistake or a superfluous discipline, which claims a 
position already taken by another field. The philosophical sciences are the only way of 
studying the mind, and psychology cannot sustain the same claim. The methodology of the 
natural sciences that empirical psychology embraced is erroneous for the study of the mind 
because ‘‘the functions of the mind itself are treated by methods which have been developed in 
connexion with the sciences of matter. Mind, according to these methods, is treated exactly as 
if it were matter;” (RP, p. 76).
One last question might be asked: is there a margin for a legitimate science of 
psychology to exist by having a different subject matter, that of feelings, emotions and 
appetite? The science, that is, which Collingwood recognised later. The answer must be no. 
Collingwood was not prepared to offer psychology the study of feelings. The discipline that
9 In RP Collingwood seems to suggest that thought and its object are two distinct things, but in SM it’s 
the same thing. Boucher points out that in RP Collingwood used “a realist argument, which he was later 
to abandon without abandoning the conclusion” (SPT, p. 238).
10 RP, p. 41.
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from the 16th century goes by the name of psychology and studies sensation, feeling and 
appetite does not receive a mention." This might be surprising at first. However a closer 
inspection shows that something of the kind was justified. The notion of the mind that 
Collingwood had was that of a unity." Thus a science which claims to study only one aspect of 
the mind appears to make an impossible statement. No discipline can study one aspect of the 
mind in isolation:
The life of the mind is whole, without seam, woven from the top throughout; the only 
sense in which we can separate one attribute from the others is that we may abstract it, that is, 
have a false theory that is separate; we can never actually employ one faculty alone (RP, p. 
154).
The situation is therefore clear and not very good for psychology. Collingwood denies 
that the methodological orientation of psychology is appropriate for the study of the mind; at 
the same time he cannot, as he is to do later on, assign to it a more restricted subject matter 
(emotions, feelings, appetites etc.) due to the unity of mind's faculties; the refutation of 
psychology cannot be but total.
§ 3. Psychology ’s total refutation in Speculum Mentis
Along the same lines is the position Collingwood expressed in SM, where he regarded 
psychology as “the study of thought as a mere phenomenon, without attempting to raise the 
question whether a given thought is true or false, valid or invalid” (SM, p. 274). Psychology 
treats thought as just an event, an occurrence by abstracting thought “from its own truth or 
falsity” (SM, p. 274) in the case of the psychology of knowledge. In a similar way, according 
to Collingwood, the psychology of conduct will examine thought by abstracting it from being 
good or bad. And the same applies to every psychology. Therefore, psychology's is not just a 
different way of examining the thinking mind but an artificial way to do so, by imposing an 
abstraction on something that is an organic unity: the thought and the way we judge it.
Collingwood, as he did in RP, points out the significance of standards or criteria as the 
necessary condition to study thought and the mind. And the way psychology proceeds in its
11 Collingwood in his early writings refers to modem psychology, the discipline that was current in his
time. Later, as we shall see, he was to contrast modem psychology to something that existed before by
the same name and aspired to study specific aspects o f the mind.
I ^“ For a more detailed account o f Collingwood’s theory o f mind see chapter II.
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inquiry, offers something abstract, generalisations propounding no answers:
Because psychology ignores the distinction between truth and falsehood, it gives us 
laws of thought which apply indifferently to both; all its distinctions, that is to say, cut across 
the distinction between truth and falsehood, and when psychology has classified a certain 
process as one of association or whatever it may be, no result ever follows as to whether this 
process yields a truth or an error. It is a fallacy, but an exceedingly common fallacy, to imagine 
that by giving a psychological analysis of any ‘mental event" we have done anything whatever 
towards either discrediting or commending it as an attempt at achieving truth, goodness, beauty 
or the like (SM, p. 274-5).
Not drawing a distinction between what is good and what is evil, what is true and what 
is false and so forth, and not trying to find out whether goodness, truth etc. has been achieved, 
is not something the study of thought can do without or can put aside for later consideration as 
“something alien to thought ... its accidental relation to an object other than itself’ (SM, p. 
276). For Collingwood “thought is nothing whatever but the drawing of this distinction” (SM, 
p. 276) and thus by ignoring this distinction the psychologist in effect ignores thought.
Psychology by not interfering with questions of value and judgment is not interfering 
with its subject matter. After the attempt to study the mind it leaves it completely untouched 
and no real advancement has been made towards the elucidation of its character. The problem 
of psychology in dealing effectively with the human mind is due to how it conceives the mind, 
in other words the methods it employs, methods that create a “mind de-mentalized, 
materialized” (SM, p. 276):
Its [psychology’s] basis is radically unsound, and this defect becomes progressively 
important as it deals with more and more fundamental problems; (...) It is all to the good that 
psychology attempts to conceive mind as a self-contained system, working by its own laws and 
not determined by relation to anything outside itself. Its error is to regard this system not as 
thought itself but as an object of thought, external to the psychologist as a thing to be observed, 
not living in him as a thing to be enjoyed. By this error it reasserts the very fallacy which is 
trying to avoid (SM, p. 277).
Psychology had tried and failed to grasp the mind. But what Collingwood believes 
about psychology’s attempt “to conceive mind as a self-contained system” is very important 
for his line of argument. Because although psychology has a serious shortcoming, it also seems 
to have a clear advantage:
But the work which it has done and is doing in detail is of the greatest value, and no 
one wishes to deny the fact. What we want is not a clean sweep of psychology but a 
psychology bent upon overcoming its own abstractness, a psychology of concrete mind; and, in
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a sense, that is the aim of this book (SM, p. 277).
Where does this leave psychology? Can it become a successful science of the mind? 
Can it become such a science at the cost of the traditional sciences of value and judgment? To 
answer yes to these questions would imply a misunderstanding. Psychology isn't more 
successful in SM than it has been in RP. It employs erroneous methods to deal with the mind 
and such inquiry produces nothing. We can be certain that, as it stands, psychology's claim to 
study the human mind cannot be accepted by Collingwood. But then what is the “psychology 
of concrete mind”? I believe it would be helpful for our inquiry also to consider the following 
idea that explains the relationship between psychology and the sciences of value and judgment.
It has been suggested that Collingwood's later conception of psychology has an 
element of defence for logic and metaphysics, in his wish to retract an earlier position of his.1 ? 
On one hand the word ‘defence' is deceptive and might encourage the notion of a special 
motive. Moreover Collingwood didn't need to retract anything. His position in SM is much 
simpler than that and quite clear. Logic (that is formal or mathematical logic) and metaphysics 
are conceived in the very special sense of scientific philosophy. For Collingwood scientific 
philosophy is synonymous with European philosophy “from Greece to the eighteenth century” 
(SM, p. 195), which was the endeavour to study and analyse the scientific consciousness. The 
logic, the metaphysics, the psychology of this philosophy were concerned with the scientific 
consciousness and Collingwood argues that “they are properly not philosophies but 
‘philosophical sciences', a contradiction in terms which signifies that they are fundamentally 
science, but science turned upon itself, scientia scientiarum, the scientific theory of science” 
(SM, p. 195).
In this sense logic and metaphysics are the justifications provided by the “scientific 
philosopher” to the scientist: logic is “an account of scientific thinking, an exposition of its 
principles, structure, and methodology”, and metaphysics “vindicates the objective validity of 
this type of thinking [i.e. scientific thinking] by showing that the real world is constructed in 
such a way that, in thinking of it scientifically, we are thinking of it as it really is” (SM, p. 
271).
Collingwood’s dissatisfaction with the scientific philosophy lies in the way it
13 Donagan, p. 157, n 1. The whole passage runs as follows: “In defending logic and metaphysics 
against psychology Collingwood partly recanted such remarks as the following. ‘The moral of this is not 
that we ought to abandon psychology and return to the old logic and metaphysics. Those sciences have 
been once for all criticized by and absorbed into psychology, which has made a real advance upon them’ 
(SM, 276)”.
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generalises. It is the ‘‘error of asserting an abstract generalization as lying behind and 
conditioning concrete fact” (SM, p. 280). This error appears in formal logic, in psychology, in 
“the attempt to draw up a table of ‘categories' or necessary forms of thought, whether regarded 
as a cycle of a priori concepts, a series of predetermined dialectical phases of experience, or a 
system of distinct and separate forms of the spirit” (p. 280). And the scientific philosophy was 
for Collingwood at the time he was writing an anachronism.
That he recognised a logic, which does not suffer from the shortcomings of formal 
logic, is undeniable. For he explicitly identified this kind of logic with dialectical logic “whose 
point of view is the point of view not of science but of philosophy, and whose object is not the 
abstract thought of science but the concrete thought of history and philosophy” (SM, p. 195).
Therefore it becomes apparent it was this kind of logic and metaphysics -as 
justifications of the scientific spirit- Collingwood considered absorbed by psychology. 
Moreover at the level of principles psychology is not in a better position than logic and 
metaphysics. All are manifestations of the scientific philosophy and “the revolt against formal 
logic and psychology and metaphysics, and the revolt against science, are the same thing” 
(SM, p. 195).
As a result “psychology of the concrete mind” cannot be a discipline that has any 
methodological similarities with the existing psychology. The existing psychology cannot 
abandon its methodological conceptions without abandoning at the same time its character: if it 
does it ceases to be psychology, if it doesn't it remains an error. That Collingwood called the 
new science of the concrete mind psychology is one of his idiosyncrasies. Psychology never 
achieved this different status. Collingwood was later to identify the discipline of the concrete 
mind with history.
The same, I believe, can be seen in some of Collingwood's reviews of psychology 
books.14 Although these reviews have been regarded15 as more considered and careful than the 
more temperamental EM, still, having being published in 1923, they belong to a time that 
Collingwood's philosophy of mind leaves no space for psychology. It is interesting, for 
instance, that the only occasion we find Collingwood “heartily agree” with Spearman is when 
the latter, looking at the history of psychology, “finds that general psychology has made 
practically no progress for many centuries, and that James’ famous description of it as ‘a string
14 Connelly, pp. 188-192.
15 Ibid., p. 188; CHP, p. 153. Especially the review of C. Spearman’s book The Nature o f  Intelligence ’ 
and the Principles o f  Cognition.
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of raw facts, a little gossip and wrangle about opinions, and a little classification and 
generalisation on the mere descriptive level' is entirely just. Experimental psychology, on the 
other hand, is as ‘blind' as general psychology is ‘empty'. Its accumulation of detail is guided 
by no principles and leads to no results” (Connelly, pp. 190-191). Collingwood is also critical 
of Carl Jung and of E. Rignano who “rhapsodises about the blessings of materialism in the 
good old positivist style” and offers “a very crude faculty-psychology applied with an 
uncritical assurance which is often astounding” (p. 192).
Concluding we could say that in his early writings Collingwood repudiates the claim 
of psychology to be the study of the human mind. The methodology of psychology, in tune 
with the natural sciences, has been examined and found inappropriate for such subject matter. 
And since Collingwood hadn't yet accepted a mind with independent activities, a psychology 
of feelings, sensations, appetites etc., couldn't exist. As a result the claim of psychology to be 
the study of the mind is completely erroneous:
We need not ask whether these claims [that psychology has solved or can solve 
problems that philosophical sciences have not or cannot] are justified; whether psychology is, 
as some believe, a new and brilliantly successful method of determining the true nature of 
mind, or whether as others maintain it is only an old fallacy in a new guise. It is enough for our 
present purpose to point out that it exists; that the distinction proposed by dualism as a working 
hypothesis is not actually accepted as helpful by the scientific men for whose benefit it is 
propounded (RP, p. 76).
The existence of psychology is the existence of a mistake and Collingwood’s 
formulation of the above passage is just a tactful way to dismiss psychology altogether. A 
discipline that treats the mind in such a manner cannot study the mind at all. The same applies 
to SM. The passage that was regarded as making allowances for the victory of psychology over 
logic and metaphysics we have seen to have an altogether different meaning.
§ 4. The Psychology of Feeling
We are now ready to examine the distinction that Collingwood made between traditional 
psychology and modem psychology16. The former was the discipline known from the 16th 
century, which had as its subject matter only a part of the human mind: feelings, emotions,
16 ‘Traditional’ and ‘modem’ are only terms o f convenience I use to differentiate the two psychologies.
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sensations, appetites and so forth17. Modem psychology was the discipline that claimed to 
enlarge the subject matter of the traditional psychology by encompassing the study of thought 
as well. It was the discipline that aspired to study the entire human mind. This discipline was 
current in Collingwood's time and it was this psychology that Collingwood attacked and 
considered pseudo-science of the mind. The historical justification that Collingwood gives for 
the rise of this discipline is interesting; thus I will devote § 5 to its description.
The new view on psychology was a result of the different perception of the mind that 
Collingwood had meanwhile developed. As we shall see in chapter II, Collingwood changed 
his view of the mind in his effort to define how historical understanding is possible. His answer 
to this question introduced the doctrine of re-enactment and the exclusion, from history's 
subject matter, of certain elements that he thought couldn't be re-enacted. Collingwood called 
these elements unconscious and then irrational. Thus, compared to his early writings and the 
unity of mind, his later philosophy supported a view of the mind where its faculties could be 
separated.18 Thus psychology could now have a valid claim to study some aspects of the mind. 
One more thing to mention is that the study of thought is now reserved for history. When 
Collingwood now discusses psychology, his main concern is to define its boundaries with 
regard to history and not any more with philosophy. And although he still contrasts psychology 
with the traditional sciences of logic, ethics etc., these now have a strong historical essence. It 
was this historical essence that Collingwood recognized when he talked about the inefficiency 
of logic and ethics and the need to reform them. It was to see philosophy through a historical 
and not a scientific epistemology. And along the same lines was his proposal to substitute (in 
effect redefine) the term normative with the term criteriological. It was, in a sense, the 
culmination of Collingwood’s dissatisfaction with the traditional spirit of these sciences, as it 
has already expressed, as we saw, in SM. I will treat this very point later in this chapter.
Before we proceed, it is worth clarifying a point. The distinction that Collingwood 
made between two psychologies has given rise to confusion as to the grounds on which he
17 Collingwood includes several elements in his definition o f psyche and his various references of 
psychology tend to present a different combination o f  them. Terms he uses include: sensation, feeling, 
sentiment, instinct, appetite, emotion, desire, sense, impulse and so forth. Most commonly he uses
feeling and sensation.
18 Collingwood’s separation o f mind’s faculties occurred in the mid 1930’s, although indications 
towards the same direction can be found, not without ambiguity, in his 1928 philosophy o f history 
lectures. However, as I have tried to show in chapter II, further elaboration o f his ideas restored mind’s 
unity, especially regarding the connection between thoughts and emotions. Still, the element o f psyche 
remains throughout his late writings within the purview o f psychology. A rather special case is that of 
NL where the distinction between feeling with a sensuous element and the psychological sense of body 
is a rather fine one.
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refuted psychology's claim to be the science of thought. It has been argued that apart from 
methodological reasons Collingwood also considered differences of subject matter.19 
Psychology, that is, cannot study thought because it is the science of feelings, sensations and 
appetites. I maintain that Collingwood only saw methodology as the problem of psychology in 
studying thought.20 To regard the subject matter in a similar manner amounts to the same thing: 
refutation, that is, for methodological reasons. It is not because psychology studies feelings and 
the like that it cannot be a science of thought; it is because by having such subject matter, it is 
committed to the use of naturalistic methods. These methods are fine in tackling this subject 
matter. If this science of feelings tries to study thought as well, this could only mean that the 
same methodology will be employed. And this is not possible or acceptable.
The distinction that Collingwood made put psychology back to a position of 
authenticity. Recognising a long-established, scientific discipline of feelings, emotions, 
appetites, and identifying it with psychology, Collingwood was happy to talk about its 
accomplishments. This position, contrasted with Collingwood's views in RP and SM, offers a 
softer approach to psychology.
Collingwood’s later view on psychology was already mentioned in his cosmology 
writings of 1933-34, where the mind as psyche is the subject matter of psychology.21 This view 
becomes clearer in IH. Collingwood in IH maintains22 his critical attitude towards psychology
Connelly, pp. 184-185. Also CHP, pp.157-159.
">o Saying, in the context o f psychology as a neighbour to philosophical sciences, that a certain discipline 
cannot study a certain subject matter because it studies a different one, I take it to mean the following. A 
discipline has defined its subject matter by certain conventional considerations. These considerations 
might consist o f time limitations, availability o f resources and, most importantly, o f a particular scope 
(arbitrary but with organic unity) by which the inquiry can be delineated. Potentially this discipline 
could encompass other elements, or even other disciplines, and thus expand its subject matter. That 
means, methodologically is capable o f doing so because the elements it wishes to encompass could be a 
part o f its initial organic unity. The examples o f anthropology and archaeology could be mentioned in 
this respect. The traditional character o f those disciplines has changed significantly. To talk about the 
"anthropology o f modem Japan” or the "post-medieval archaeology o f  England” we imply the 
expansion o f  the subject matter o f  anthropology as ‘the study o f the pre-literary societies’ and 
archaeology as ‘the study o f the material remains of pre-historic (before written records) cultures’. In 
these cases anthropology has interacted with the subject matter o f sociology or folklore or even politics 
where archaeology has interacted with the subject matter o f history. O f course, there are disciplines that, 
although methodologically allied, they have a subject matter that possesses no obvious interaction basis. 
In this respect I could mention the sciences o f zoology and astronomy.
Psyche being “desire or even appetite -  it is in substance a complex o f  emotions” (HS, p. 365).
After SM in 1924, Collingwood in 1927 ( ‘Aesthetic’, in The Mind: A Series of Lectures Delivered in 
the King’s College, London. R.J.S. McDowall (ed.), London: Longman’s. Reprinted, ‘Aesthetic and the 
Mind’, in CS, 1996, vol. Ill, pp. 194-215, with an introduction by James Connelly. My references follow 
the reprinted version. Hereafter abbreviated as Aesthetic) was also critical o f psychology’s inability to 
“distinguish between a healthy and a diseased imagination” (Aesthetic, p. 214) since it "possesses no 
criterion for distinguishing the healthy from the unhealthy imagination” (Aesthetic, p. 211). Imagination
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but recognises aspects of the mind that psychology can study. His criticisms occur, for 
instance, when he discusses Dilthey23 and his purported mistake of allowing psychology to 
enter his philosophy of history. Thus, when Dilthey applies his psychological method to the 
study of the history of philosophy this is done according to the principle that “there are certain 
fundamental types of mental structure, and that each type has a certain necessary attitude to, 
and conception of, the world” (IH, p. 173). Collingwood complains that this is erroneous 
because the criteriological character is ignored:
The only question that matters about a philosophy is whether it is right or wrong. If a 
given philosopher thinks as he does because, being that kind of man, he cannot help thinking 
like that, this question does not arise. Philosophy handled from this psychological point of 
view ceases to be philosophy at all (IH, p. 173).
The result of this approach is that “history disappears altogether and is replaced by 
psychology” (IH, p. 175). Similarly, elsewhere in IH, Collingwood sees the claim of 
psychology to be the science of the entire mind as unsound since “its apparatus of scientific 
method is merely the fruit of a false analogy, and it must pass over into history and, as such, 
disappear. And this is certainly what ought to happen so far as psychology claims to deal with 
the function of reason itself’ (IH, p. 230-231).24
Although Collingwood again proclaims that the methods of psychology are not 
suitable for the study of thought, psychology now has certain element of the mind as its subject 
matter: “sensation as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from conception, appetite as 
distinct from will” (IH, p. 231).25 These are the elements that traditionally have been called
is also a healthy activity studied by the science o f aesthetic. He none the less appreciated psychology’s 
contribution to the pathology o f the imagination. For more details o f psychology, psychoanalysis and 
imagination see Aesthetic, pp. 208-211. Collingwood's lecture on Aesthetic was one in a series of 
lectures delivered at King’s College London in the lent term o f  1927, the theme being the mind and how 
it is perceived by various academic viewpoints.
The whole discussion of Dilthey is in IH, pp. 171-175. It has also been suggested that Collingwood’s 
is “a contestable interpretation o f Dilthey” (CHP, p. 166, n. 11).
->4
Collingwood also criticises the attitude o f  historians who adopted a psychological attitude towards 
their historical subject matter: Thucydides as the father o f psychological history (IH, pp. 29-30), Tacitus 
(IH, p. 40), and Herder, whose psychological explanations Collingwood regarded in some respects as a 
precursor o f  racist theories (IH, p. 91-92). Cf. Collingwood’s objections to unhistorical entities put 
forward to explain historical phenomena (Collingwood’s case was the Celtic art as the product o f the 
‘Celtic temperament’): “With entities o f  that kind we have left behind us the daylight, end even the 
twilight, o f history, and have entered a darkness peopled by all the monsters o f Rassentheorie and 
Jungian psychology. In that darkness what we find is not history but the negation o f history; not the 
solution o f historical problems, but only a heady drink which gives us the illusion of having solved 
them” (A, pp. 139-140).
We see the same in his 1936 lectures on the philosophy o f history: “psychology [is] the study of
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psyche and constitute the conscious but irrational part of the mind.26 Likewise, in presenting 
the views of the French philosopher Lachelier, Collingwood is content to see Lachelier 
recognising that:
psychology, as a naturalistic science, cannot grasp mind as it actually is; it can only 
study the immediate data of consciousness, our sensations and feelings; but the essence of 
mind is that it knows, that is, has as its objects not mere states of itself but a real world. What 
enables it to know is the fact that it thinks; and the activity of thought is a free or self-creating 
process, which depends on nothing else except itself in order to exist (IH, p. 186).
Collingwood again in his “Notes on the History of Historiography and Philosophy of 
History” in 1936, recognises that the “idea of a naturalistic psychology is well-founded, but it 
runs into error if it is identified with a science of mind” (PH, p. 225). Instead this psychology is 
a science not of the entire mind but only of the irrational element of it, the “brute-mind in 
man”, which “includes senses, instincts, impulses and in general the subject-matter of 
psychology” (PH, p. 225). The other element of the mind, “that which has reason”, includes 
“intellect, will, and their synonyms” (PH, p. 225) and it is not within the scope of the 
psychological investigation.
In all his late writings Collingwood retained and elaborated this conception of 
psychology that occurs in the cosmology writings and becomes more prominent in 1936. Also 
he developed further the idea of the criteriological sciences, the self-criticising character of 
thought and the false claim of psychology to be the study of thought.
Collingwood after IH becomes more specific as to what psychology should be 
concerned with. He does this by clarifying what the difference between thinking and feeling is 
and why psychology cannot claim the study of the former. This occurs in a thorough manner in 
PA:27
immediate experience, sensation and feeling, which, though the activity o f a mind, is not the activity of  
thinking” (IH, p. 305). Also in his criticisms o f the “Modem French Historiography” (IH, pp. 189-190) 
o f having erred because o f the identification of the historical process with the “process o f immediate 
experience ... a merely psychological process, a process o f sensations, feelings, and sentiments” (IH, p. 
190). In the lectures ‘Goodness, Rightness, Utility' delivered in 1940 (now reprinted in the new edition 
o f NL, Appendix 1, pp. 391-479) Collingwood argues that “Nothing that a psychologist can say in his 
capacity as a psychologist about questions of moral philosophy has any interest at all for the student of  
moral philosophy” (NL, p 402). None the less in the same lectures he maintains that capricious choice 
“arises from psychical conditions” and is a legitimate field for psychology (NL, pp. 429-431).
26 IH, p. 231.
In PA Collingwood made a distinction not only between feeling and thinking but also between feeling 
and emotion. Feeling (that can have the dual meaning o f sensation and emotion) is found at the psychic
level o f  experience and combines a sensuous and an emotional element. These emotions have a 
psychical expression, i.e. “certain distortions o f the face express pain; a slackening of muscles and a cold 
pallor o f the skin express fear” (PA, p. 229). Psychology is the study o f this psychic level o f experience. 
More complex emotions only occur at the level o f imagination or consciousness when language comes
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feel are actually doing, in order to study the nature of thinking it is necessary to ascertain both 
what persons who think are actually doing and also whether what they are doing is a success or 
a failure. Thus a science of feeling must be ‘empirical’ (i.e. devoted to ascertaining and 
classifying ‘facts’ or things susceptible of observation), but a science of thought must be 
‘normative’, or (as I prefer to call it) ‘criteriological’, i.e. concerned not only with the ‘facts’ of 
thought but also with the ‘criteria’ or standards which thought imposes on itself. 
‘Criteriological’ sciences, e.g. logic, ethics, have long been accepted as giving the correct 
approach to the study of thought (PA, p. 171 note to p. 164).
Collingwood’s argument stands on the relationship between the activities of thinking 
and feeling and how they became distinct. Therefore the essential element is the concept of 
thought as self-criticising activity. In PH Collingwood also maintained that criteria are 
essential and indispensable, not incidental to human thought.29 With reference to theoretical 
and practical reason he argues that the former is “the pursuit of truth and the avoidance of 
error, nothing else” (PH, p. 88), while the latter is always the making of distinctions between 
“right and wrong, or virtue and vice” (PH, p. 88).
His most comprehensive account on this matter can be found in An Essay on 
Metaphysics. There he argues30 that ever since the ancient times and through the medieval and 
Renaissance periods, it was believed that the mind31, like everything else (the human body, 
other animals, the plants), had a teleological behaviour and on top of that it was “aware of this 
and having opinions, in some cases knowledge, as to what its own ends were” (EM, p. 107). 
And if this is the case and “a mind is something which has opinions as to what it is trying to 
do, its possession of these opinions will in certain ways complicate its behaviour” (EM, p, 
107). Collingwood maintains that the teleological self-awareness of the mind, this 
complication of its behaviour, is expressed through an appraisal of whether the ends that the 
mind is set to achieve have been met or not. This appraisal is an activity that is performed by 
the mind itself, a self-generated activity:
A mind aiming at the discovery of a truth or the planning of a course of conduct will
29 PH, p. 88.
30 Especially pp. 106-108.
31 Collingwood’s references to the mind should be taken to mean, throughout his analysis, thought, that 
is “the general name for a number o f different activities (questioning, supposing, and stating or 
propounding...) which together make up the complex activity o f knowing. These activities, considered 
sometimes as emanating from and sometimes as constituting an entity traditionally known as intellect, 
reason, or mind, had been regarded ever since the days o f  ancient Greek thought as having two different 
modes o f functioning, one theoretical and the other practical. Theoretical thinking meant trying to think 
out the truth about something. Practical thinking meant trying to think out what to do in a given 
situation” (EM, p. 106).
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not only score a success or failure, it will also think of itself as scoring a success or a failure; 
and since a thought may be either true or false its thought on this subject will not necessarily 
coincide with the facts. Any piece of thinking, theoretical or practical, includes as an integral 
part of itself the thought of a standard or criterion by reference to which it is judged a 
successful or unsuccessful piece of thinking. Unlike any kind of bodily or physiological 
functioning, thought is a self-criticizing activity (EM, pp. 107-108).
There exists, therefore, a certain connection between the self-awareness of the mind 
and its self-criticism. If the mind is capable of knowing that it is directed towards some ends, 
then at least it should be capable of knowing how it is supposed to go there and when it has 
attained its aim. This is meant by Collingwood when he says that the mind ”[n]ot content with 
the simple pursuit of its ends, it is also pursues the further end of discovering for itself whether 
it has pursued them successfully” (EM, p. 108). However this is not a mechanistic, 
unambiguous process since Collingwood recognises that the “mind judges itself, though not 
always justly” (EM, p. 108). The actual link, then, between a mind that knows it has some task 
to perform and a mind that knows it has performed it successfully, is a science that can 
describe not only each separate activity (self-awareness and self-criticism) but both in their 
mutual interdependence:
The science of mind, in addition to doing this32, must describe the self-judging 
function w hich is part and parcel of all thinking and try to discover the criteria upon which its 
judgements are based (EM, p. 108).
Therefore the establishment of criteria of judgement cannot be done arbitrarily, that is, 
be established from outside of the mind, according to some general rules. The criteria are 
related to the self-awareness of the mind, are related to what the mind aims to achieve. It is a 
motive that can be in a sense personal, esoteric. This is, I believe, why Collingwood describes 
the sciences of the mind as criteriological instead of normative or gives his own definition of 
normative. Collingwood provides a historical account of how the idea of normative science 
originated. He says that the self-critical aspect of thought was recognised by the Greeks who 
paid attention to the definition of criteria while constructing a theoretical and a practical 
science of thought logic and ethics respectively- that referred to those criteria to judge their 
success in performing the thinking activity properly.33 Because of the criteria involved in the
3* This is a reference to w hat Collingwood maintained to be the business o f the science of the body, to
’describe the physiological functions o f  which bodily activity is composed and try to discover upon what 
ends they are directed” (EM, p. 108).
33 Ibid.
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process of judgement those sciences are called normative from the Latin word norma.34 
Collingwood is alert to the fact that normative should not be taken to mean that the criteria 
belong to the practitioners of the sciences, the logician or the student of ethics, who employ 
these criteria to judge other people’s thinking.35 Instead Collingwood argues that normative 
suggests “the necessity that in every act of thought the thinker himself should judge the success 
of his own act” (EM, p. 109). In order therefore to stress the importance of this element 
Collingwood adopts the term criteriological instead of normative.
Normative can mean the imposition from without of rules of some abstract ideal, but 
Collingwood by emphasizing the self-critical aspect of the mind gives a dimension of a very 
concrete individual. Then again the possibility, that Collingwood recognises, of one person to 
be able to judge the thoughts of another is based on one basic assumption: he who wants to 
judge must know what the other person is aiming to achieve. Only then the possibility of a 
judgement is real, otherwise it amounts to “tyranny”. And for such tyranny the traditional logic 
and ethics were no less responsible. For although the practitioners of logic and ethics 
understood the need for applying standards to thinking, Collingwood argued that “it might very 
well be true that people who professed those sciences had misunderstood their normative 
character, and had claimed a right of censorship over the thought and actions of other people” 
(EM, p. 114). And because of that misunderstanding “a revolt against the old logic and ethics 
had been desirable and had proved beneficial” (EM, p. 114). Collingwood was of course 
conscious that whatever the shortcomings of logic and ethics and in spite of being “in need of 
reform” (EM, p. 104), their achievements had been substantial. Their strong point was that 
they were constructed around the fundamental principle of criteriology. And if at times they 
seemed to forget that the criteriological character of the mind was also self-imposed, this 
would be the point they would need to rectify.
The self-critical character was therefore the distinguishing feature between the mind 
and everything else that also had a teleological behaviour. But for the ancient thinkers, who 
didn’t regard feeling as non-cognitive, the self-criticism could have been equally valid for 
feeling too. It was only in the 16th century36, Collingwood argues, that the advent of
Ibid., pp. 108-109.
35 Ibid., p. 109.
3 6 Also PA, p. 171, note to p. 164: “In the sixteenth century the name ‘psychology’ was invented to 
designate an ‘empirical’ science of feeling”; PH, p. 82: “that science of instinct, sensation, and feeling 
which had gone ever since the sixteenth century by the name of psychology”; PH, p. 108: “psychology, 
which had existed under that name since the sixteenth century as the science of sensation and feeling”; 
A, p. 93-94: “Psychology ... both word and thing had been in existence ever since the sixteenth 
century”.
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psychology as a distinct science could be traced “when the word was used by Melanchthon, 
Goclenius, and others as a new name to designate what was in effect a new science” (EM, p. 
106). This new psychology did not come to replace logic and ethics but to supplement them, 
since in the 16th century (contrary to the Greek and medieval thinkers who had thought of 
feeling as a kind of thinking) it was recognised for the first time that the activity of feeling was 
different than the activity of thinking, in that feeling was not a cognitive activity, not self- 
critical37 and therefore a science that was criteriological could not study it.38 Therefore the 
activities of feeling (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting) were neither the activities of 
the thinking ‘mind’ nor the activities of the ‘body’ but of, what traditionally from the Greek 
word has been called, ‘psyche’, from where psychology got its name.39
Psychology, therefore, came to restore the discrepancy that was created as a result of 
the realisation that feeling was not a cognitive activity. The modification in the conception of 
the human mind resulted in a corresponding modification in the scale of the human sciences. 
Psychology was in effect invented as an answer to that specific problem:
Thus psychology was put on the map of the sciences, to march on the one hand with 
physiology and on the other with logic and ethics; a science of feeling, designed to fill a gap 
between the existing science of bodily function and the existing sciences of mind, in no way 
competing with any of them (EM, p. 110).40
With this Collingwood consolidates psychology, the traditional psychology, as a 
discipline that serves a necessary function and supplements the criteriological sciences and the 
sciences of the human body. The role, therefore, that Collingwood reserves for psychology is 
very vital: it is one indispensable contribution of the tripartite effort towards the total study of 
man. Moreover this psychology, according to Collingwood, has performed its business with 
significant success. For this discipline he had a sincere respect and he frequently declared his 
admiration for psychology’s achievements:
As the science of feeling, psychology is not only a science of respectable antiquity; it 
is a science with great triumphs to its credit, some of long standing, others lately achieved, 
others even yet incomplete, and (one may hope) others to come in the future. ... The study by
3 7 Which thinking is since it “includes the discovery and correction o f its own errors” (EM, p. 110).
38 Ibid., p. 109.
39 EM, p. 110.
4 0 Also A, p. 94: “[Psychology] had been deliberately created ... in order to study that which is neither 
mind in the proper traditional sense (consciousness, reason, will) nor yet body, but xjroxfi, or such 
functions as sensation and appetite. It marched on the one hand with physiology, and on the other with 
the sciences of mind proper, logic and ethics, the sciences of reason and will”.
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psychologists of sensation and emotion, whether in the laboratory or in the consulting-room or 
in what other conditions soever they think it capable of being pursued, is a most important kind 
of research and a thing which every friend of science will encourage by every means at his 
command (EM, pp. 141-142).
Also in his discussions of psychology Collingwood often includes the practises of 
psychoanalysis and argues that his opinion about the psychology of thought “implied no 
hostility towards psychology proper, the science of sensation, appetite, and the emotions 
connected with them, or towards the Freudian and other forms of treatment for certain 
ailments” (A, p. 95). Collingwood in fact respected Freud and thought of him to be “the 
greatest psychologist of our age” (PA, p. 64) and that his works had “reached a very high 
scientific level when dealing with problems in psychotherapy” (A, p. 95).41
§ 5. Psychology as the Study of Thought: A Historical Explanation
Collingwood produced a historical account of why psychology came to be regarded as the 
science that could study thought, why it “annexed a territory which was not its own, which its 
methods did not enable it to manage” (PH, p. 84). For him it was important to discover the 
rationale behind the attempt of psychology to substitute the philosophical sciences42, which in 
Collingwood’s understanding was equal to the commitment of an obvious and precarious 
mistake. He understood this attempt to be one aspect of a greater scheme, namely that the 
“intellectual task of the eighteenth century was the liquidation of Europe’s debt to Greece” 
(EM, p. 112). It was a revolt against the “typically Greek idea, the idea of purposive action” 
(EM, p. 113). Collingwood argued that on one side it was biology as the science of organism, 
“the last refuge of teleological natural science” (EM, p. 113), that this eighteenth century
4 1 Collingwood is expressing his high opinion about Freud elsewhere too: in PE, pp. 156-157, p. 169; 
EM, p. 118, n. 1; Aesthetic, p. 209. He was however very critical o f Freud, and the psychological school 
of interpretation of fairy tales and magic: PE, pp. 156-177; PA, pp. 62-65, p. 77, note on § 2. He also 
thought that Freud’s works “sank beneath contempt when they treated o f ethics, politics, religion, and 
social structure” (A, p. 95).
For his positive view of the psychology o f feeling see also SPT, p. 293, n. 81; NL, p. 431; and PH, p. 84: 
“I do not intend any disrespect to modem psychology in so far as it has continued and developed very 
successfully the work of the old psychology, the rightful owner o f the name, which was originally 
intended to identify its field as the ‘psychic’ part of man’s nature or activities, as distinct from his
‘bodily’ structure and activities on the one hand and his ‘rational’ activities on the other”.
4 2 Apart from logic and ethics Collingwood in PH includes the “eighteenth century additions to their 
number, aesthetic[s] and economics” (PH, p. 82) that also exhibited a criteriological character from the 
beginning. For Collingwood and aesthetics as a criteriological science see AHS, p. 313.
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proposal attacked. And on the other side were the theories about the thinking mind:
In the theory of knowledge the same revolt was at work. Here it took the form of 
maintaining that intellectual activities, or operations of thought, were nothing but aggregations 
and complexes of feelings and thus special cases of sensation and emotion. Theoretical reason 
or knowledge was only a pattern of sensations; practical reason or will, only a pattern of 
appetites. ... [The aim of] ‘materialistic epistemology’ was to wipe out the old sciences of 
thought, logic and ethics, with their criteriological methods and their guiding notions of truth 
and error, good and evil. ... [Materialistic epistemology hoped to study the processes of 
thought, theoretical and practical, by substituting for the old methods of logic and ethics the 
modem methods of psychology, the science of feeling (EM, pp. 113-114).
It was during the eighteenth century that the new proposal started and by the following 
century it had solidified its position.43 Psychology was now a science that had extended its 
interests and subsumed the thinking mind as well. It did so because of a “misguided attempt to 
show that natural science is the only kind of science that can exist” (PH, p. 84). And since 
psychology retained the study of feeling in its subject matter, Collingwood maintained that 
“there are now in existence two things called ‘psychology’: a valid and important ‘empirical’ 
science (both theoretical and applied) of feeling, and a pseudo-science of thought, falsely 
professing to deal ‘empirically’ with things which, as forms of thought, can be dealt with only 
‘criteriologically’” (PA, p. 171, note to p. 164).
The empirical standpoint of psychology was therefore manifested in that it tried to 
translate every mental activity into a physical one, that “reason and will were only concretions 
of sense and appetite ... For there was no such thing as ‘mind’; what had been so called was 
only ‘psyche’” (A, p. 94). Psychology was a natural science, based on materialistic principles 
and its meaning of the word ‘thought’ is related to those principles:
Hence when we are told that psychology is the science which tells us how we think, 
we must never forget that the word ‘think’ is being used in a rather special sense. It has lost all 
suggestion of self-criticism. It has lost all suggestion of an attempt to think truly and avoid 
thinking falsely. In fact, since this is at bottom what distinguishes thinking from feeling, the 
word ‘think’ here simply means feel (EM, p. 117).
4 3 See PA, p. 171, note to p. 164: “In the nineteenth century the idea got about that psychology could not 
merely supplement the old ‘criteriological’ sciences by providing a valid approach to the study of 
feeling, but could replace them by providing an up-to-date and ‘scientific’ approach to the study of 
thought”; A, p. 94: “early in the nineteenth century, the dogma got about ... that logic and ethics could 
disappear, and that their functions could be taken over by psychology”; PH, p. 82-83: “The new science 
of human nature was ... envisaged as a science of human thought or the rational part of human nature ... 
The proposal, then, was to replace logic and ethics, and their new kindred economics and aesthetics, by a 
science covering the same ground but using naturalistic methods”.
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For Collingwood the inability of psychology to deal with criteria is something endemic 
to the natural sciences.44 It is an idea found in the core of the natural sciences and their 
methodology, which emphasizes that observation and explanation is within the scope of 
science but that there is no need for judgement. Collingwood maintains that this idea of natural 
science was the outcome of the belief that nature as the work of God is infallible, as all the 
works of God, as opposed to the works of man that are not perfect and can often be something 
else from what they meant to be.45 Therefore human sciences have criteria to judge whether the 
human intention was successful or not but the natural sciences, with “assumptions consciously 
worked out and explicitly stated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and thereafter taken 
for granted” (PH, p. 83), do not distinguish between success and failure because God’s nature 
is not a world of failures.46 Collingwood argues that the idea of the infallible nature was still 
valid in the 18th century although people “had parted company with the theology on which 
these beliefs were based” (PH, p. 84). Therefore this belief in the infallible nature and the 
fallible human works was, for Collingwood, the reason for the methodological difference 
between natural sciences and human sciences: the former contain no element of judgement 
because they do not distinguish between success and failure while the latter are criteriological 
because they do recognise such distinction.47
Psychology then being faithful to its methodological orientation “approached the study 
of thought with a perfectly clear and conscious determination to ignore one whole department 
of the truth, namely to ignore the self-critical function of thought and the criteria which that 
function implied” (EM, pp. 115-116). However by doing so psychology has committed a 
serious blunder, omitting the distinctions of good and evil, truth and error etc., that everyone, 
including psychologists themselves, pursues, successfully or not, in every thinking activity. In 
the scientific sphere this amounts to a refutation of science itself:48
if a science of thought has nothing to say about truth and falsehood the omission
4 4 The distinctions, that criteria allow us to make, are “valid for reason and will [i.e. logic and ethics] but 
not for sensation and appetite” (A, p. 94). By that Collingwood refers to the idea that these distinctions 
do not apply to feelings because feelings cannot be right or wrong, they are what they are. However 
those distinctions do apply to the scientific method as such when, for instance, a theory or a hypothesis 
needs to be accepted or rejected. Therefore it might be said that criteria are not necessary in the actual 
subject matter of a naturalistic discipline but they are necessary in the conceptual frameworks within
which this discipline operates.
4 5
P H ,  p .  8 3
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 84
48 See also, A, pp. 94-95; PH, pp. 84-85, pp. 87-88; SM, pp. 275-276.
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becomes important. It can only mean that according to this science the distinction between 
truth and falsehood does not exist. ... Since the drawing of a distinction between truth and 
falsehood belongs to the very essence of thinking, a ‘science of thought’ which does not 
discuss the function by which thought distinguishes these things, and neglects to give a 
scientific account of the distinction itself, is doing something more than merely renouncing by 
its actions any claim which it may make in words to be considered a science of thought. It is 
actually teaching that there is no difference between the pursuit of truth, or science, and the 
pursuit of falsehood, or sophistry; no difference between scientific teaching or the inculcation 
of truth and pseudo-scientific teaching or the inculcation of falsehood (EM, pp. 119-120).
For Collingwood psychology belonged to a broader nexus of a condition that 
resembled “a kind of epidemic withering of belief in the importance of truth and in the 
obligation to think and act in a systematic and methodical way” (EM. p. 135).
§ 6. Philosophy, Psychology and the Study of Thought
According to Collingwood’s analysis traditional psychology was meant to be an empirical 
science. It was a science, that is, which would observe and analyse its subject matter but it was 
not within its interest to pass a judgement upon it. We have also seen that thought is the 
activity where the thinking mind’s self-awareness of its aims and the evaluation of the 
attainment of those aims are two interrelated processes and cannot be studied in isolation from 
one another. When Collingwood says that a student of a criteriological science has as his task 
to study what the thinking mind does and in addition to see whether this has been done 
successfully or not, one point should be made clear. In addition does not mean subsequently, 
afterwards. It means extra, more. It has not a temporal or sequential meaning but a quantitative 
meaning. In an ethical matter, for instance, it means that we have the prospect of doing 
something with the hope or intention that it will be the good thing to do. The idea of goodness 
exists in the criteria that one considers when attempting to do that good. The attempt to do the 
good is not an activity in vacuum; it does not proceed from total darkness to something that 
only vaguely hopes to be light. The criteria are used both when the attempt is made and 
afterwards in order to evaluate the success of that attempt.
It is erroneous, therefore, to say that two stages exist -the thinking of an aim and the 
evaluation of the attainment of that aim- and that an empirical science of psychology can study 
the first and leave the second to a criteriological science. Consequently any attempt to study 
thinking empirically, that is without any reference to the second of the two interrelated 
processes, must be absurd. Based on the mistaken possibility that the two processes in thinking
36
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY
can be distinguished, Collingwood was criticised in the form of a reply to his claims in EM.49 
Heamshaw deals with various points of Collingwood’s general position of psychology in EM 
but I would wish to focus on one which I think is the core of the argument.50 He says:
psychologists ... do not deny the self-critical function of thought ... psychology, like 
all sciences, is an abstract study and leaves out certain features of its subject-matter, but that 
this does not constitute a denial of the existence of these features ... psychology hands over the 
study of the formal and criteriological features of thought to the philosopher. But in dismissing 
them from his science the psychologist is not denying their existence, any more than the 
anatomist denies the existence of the bodily functions which he leaves to the physiologist, or 
the chemist denies the reality of the physical properties of matter which he leaves to the 
physicist (p. 166).51
At first this proposal seems, and has been considered, legitimate.52 Of course it 
presupposes the denial of the indivisible thinking activities, but then again it seems to be 
offering a formula by which both psychology and philosophy can study thought. It can be seen 
as an attempt to moderate the conflict between psychology and the criteriological sciences of 
thought that Collingwood recognised. It can be seen as an attempt to deny that psychology tries 
to substitute the philosophical sciences and instead to put forward the idea of supplementing 
them. However this suggestion is more problematic than it seems. There are two points of 
interest in the above proposal.
The first is that psychology recognises the two phases in thinking (a. what the mind 
does and b. whether it does it successfully or not), proceeds to acknowledge them as distinct 
and thus capable of being studied separately and then decides to devote its methods to the 
study of the first one and to leave out the second. The study of that second phase is reserved 
for philosophy. Let us, for a moment, accept that psychology’s new interpretation, of the 
thinking processes as two separate activities, is viable. If the first phase of thinking is what
4 9 L.S. Heamshaw. 1942. ‘A Reply to Professor Collingwood’s Attack on Psychology’, in Mind, n.s. 
vol. 51, pp. 160-9.
50 For more of Heamshaw’s reply see SPT, p. 272, n. 88; Connelly, pp. 186-188; CHP, pp. 151-153.
51 Heamshaw says that “when the self-critical aspects of thought have been relegated to philosophy, 
there are other aspects o f thought that fall within the province of psychology” (p. 166). This is a rather 
misleading phrasing. It might be taken to mean that thought is divided into two: the self-critical aspects 
that philosophy studies and the non self-critical aspects that psychology studies. This however cannot be 
accurate. Often there is overlap between what psychology studies and what philosophy studies. The 
cases, for instance, o f art and religion testifies to that. And what both disciplines study, in these cases, is 
the whole phenomenon of thought as manifested in art or religion. They do not study aspects of the 
phenomenon; they study the phenomenon as such but in two different ways.
It is also of interest to note that “there are certain kinds of thinking, sometimes termed by psychologists 
‘autistic’, which fall primarily within the province of psychology, for instance reverie, and the 
imaginative thinking of the child” (p. 167), and contrast it with Collingwood’s objections in Aesthetic.
52 CHP, p. 152; Connelly, p. 187.
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psychology wishes to study this certainly can be done. Assuming psychology’s position, it is 
not problematic to study the activity of thinking without any reference to the self-critical aspect 
of it. But if for psychology the criteriological aspect is not important, we cannot say the same 
about the first phase of thinking for philosophy. It would certainly be impossible to imagine 
how a discipline that studies the criteria, the success or failure of ‘something’, is capable of 
doing so without any reference to and knowledge of that ‘something’. This surely is an 
impossible task. Without the knowledge of what the thinking mind does, whether it has done 
well or ill cannot be verified. Philosophy or any criteriological science needs to study the first 
phase of thinking as well. And if the study of the first phase belongs to both sciences then one 
of them must be superfluous (and in this case it is upon psychology -as the modem contender- 
to defend its claim to be the science of thought). Certainly another possibility exists, namely 
that those two disciplines could indeed study the same subject matter given that they will adopt 
different methods and different concepts. In such a case there must exist some sort of conflict 
between the two disciplines and it was this sort of conflict that Collingwood acknowledged and 
Heamshaw in his reply tried to compromise by assigning different activities of the thinking 
mind to philosophy and psychology.
Along the same lines to argue that one science studies something and then, and only 
then, a different science can take the results and proceed to a different examination is unduly 
narrow. In this specific case it would be to suggest that psychology investigates what the 
thinking mind does and then hands over to the criteriological sciences the task of judgement. 
No scientific field functions like that. No scientific field is so inextricably linked to any other 
field as not to be able to proceed with its own enquiries until it has been provided with material 
partially investigated by some other discipline. A rudimentary autonomy is the prerequisite 
when a subject matter, and thus a scientific field, is defined. Even when a communication 
exists between neighbourly disciplines, it is a communication of mutual help and not of 
obdurate dependency. Therefore what Heamshaw and his idea of psychology put forward as 
communication is in fact a form of dependency.
The argument, that both psychology and philosophy can co-exist and study different 
aspects of the same subject matter, breaks down in close inspection. It is a confusion that arises 
from the erroneous concept that thinking can have two distinct activities that can be studied 
independently from one another. In fact Heamshaw has produced nothing but a circular 
argument. His effort was to tone down the tension between psychology and philosophy by 
giving a part of thought to each one. But his division created the problem of philosophy being 
isolated from the first part of thought and the contradiction of studying criteria for an entity
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that remains unknown. The effort to solve this unavoidably brings the argument to the situation 
of tension again. His initial argument is the reason for the creation of the tension he wishes to 
solve.
Let us move now to the second point of interest, because it can give us an idea why 
psychology excludes the self-critical aspect of thought from its subject matter and why it hands 
it over to philosophy. We are told that from the features that psychology -as an abstract 
science- leaves out, at least one is the self-critical character of thought. And this is done not 
because psychology is denying the existence of that character but because it chooses not to 
incorporate it. It is crucial to see why psychology chooses to exclude that element from its 
subject matter. In this respect the analogy with the sciences of anatomy and physiology is very 
interesting.53 As the anatomist concentrates on certain aspect of the human body and leaves 
other aspects such as the bodily functions to the physiologist, likewise, the argument goes, the 
psychologist studies certain aspects of thought and leaves the criteriological aspect to the 
philosopher.
Let us see what this analogy is about. The subject matter of anatomy and physiology is 
nothing more than the division of labour between those two sciences. The complication and the 
intricacies of the human body have given rise to different disciplines and to the subsequent 
creation of arbitrary but workable boundaries within which each of those disciplines can 
function with a reasonable degree of independence. But this doesn’t mean that the anatomist or 
the physiologist cannot use elements of the bodily functions or the bodily structures 
respectively, if for the purposes of their study such practice becomes helpful. This is not 
intrusion, is fruitful communication. And in many cases such communication is not just helpful 
but essential.
Given this analogy, psychology doesn’t choose to exclude the self-critical aspect of 
thought from its subject matter because is incapable of studying that aspect. We must not 
forget that between neighbourly disciplines -as psychology and philosophy are presented in 
this case due to the analogy- any elements that are excluded on the basis of ‘subject matter’ 
and not of ‘methodology’ are elements that are not incompatible with the methodology of the 
discipline; they are excluded for reasons of convenience and convention in order for that 
discipline to be able to have a manageable, but always coherent, study material. Therefore to 
exclude the self-critical character of thought for reasons of convenience and convention shows
5 3 The example of chemistry and physics follow the same principle; thus what I am saying about 
anatomy and physiology apply to chemistry and physics as well.
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psychology’s commitment to regard what the mind does and whether it does it successfully, as 
two distinct activities.
It seems therefore that psychology’s relation to philosophy is similar to the relation we 
find between anatomy and physiology. Hence psychology hands over to philosophy the self- 
critical character of thought not because -as an abstract, empirical science- it cannot study the 
criteria of thinking but because the subject matter of philosophy and psychology is the division 
of labour between them for the study of the thinking mind. But does such a relationship mean 
that philosophy and psychology have interchangeable and identical methodologies? Does it 
mean that psychology is potentially able to study the self-critical aspect of thought by 
approaching it with the empirical methodology? Alternatively does it mean psychology 
assumed that philosophy would tackle the self-critical aspect of thought using methods of the 
natural sciences? Or does it simply mean that the methodological distinction exists but still the 
division of labour is possible? Of course all these questions cannot receive a satisfactory 
answer that will help us to move forward.
The problem is obvious: the analogy with the sciences of anatomy and physiology is 
misleading. To consider psychology and philosophy, when they claim to study thought, under 
the same light as some natural sciences of the body is problematic. Between psychology and 
philosophy there is not a division of labour. They might complement each other (in the case 
where psychology studies feeling) but they do not communicate in the strict sense: they do not 
exchange results. The methodologies they have adopted commit them to different approaches 
to their subject matter (or the nature of their subject matter led them to adopt certain 
methodologies) and those approaches might be conflicting. Therefore psychology cannot hand 
over the study of aspects of thought to philosophy, with which there is no obvious 
communication. Notwithstanding the problem mentioned before (that philosophy cannot study 
the self-critical element of thought without studying what thought does nor can wait until the 
study of what thought does is passed on by psychology) the two aspects of the thinking mind 
are to remain unconnected since there is nothing to guarantee that the psychological and the 
philosophical investigations cannot produce contradictory or non-reconcilable results. But does 
it matter that the two won’t be connected? It does, because the division was not organic but 
conventional. It is a division of a unity (the thinking mind) in order to study the, alleged, 
constituents of it. At some point the communication ought to be established and the unity to be 
restored. This is the idea of one discipline supplementing the other. In the case of disciplines 
where the division of labour is genuine, the results of the individual sciences (e.g. physiology 
and anatomy) will be brought together, will be seen in their connection to the whole (i.e. the
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organism), suggest new lines of inquiry and so forth. If there are conflicting results then the 
assumption will be that an error has occurred. In the case of psychology and the philosophical 
sciences conflicting results cannot be ascribed to a similar concept of error: a psychology of art 
that testifies to the essence of art as the production of pleasurable effects on people is in 
fundamental disagreement with a philosophy of art that considers art as something altogether 
different, where the mere production of certain feelings has nothing to do with the aesthetic 
aspect of art.54
In a sense for psychology to acknowledge that it cannot study the self-critical character 
of thinking and that is why it hands it over to philosophy, wouldn’t have been worse than the 
claim of the division of labour. In both cases the issue of communication will arise. It is only 
less obvious in the second case and takes more time for the blunder to be detected.
We can thus sum up Heamshaw’s argument as follows. His argument is built around 
the effort to reduce the tension between psychology and the philosophical sciences and to find 
a common ground for them to co-exist. The idea behind this was: a. to absolve psychology 
from any accusation that it trespasses into the territory of the philosophical studies and seeks to 
substitute these studies; b. to show, at the same time, that psychology has indeed a legitimate 
claim to the study of thought. Without this understanding we cannot analyse his position and 
detect his mistakes. However the attempt wasn’t successful because it rests on the false 
dichotomy of the thinking mind: what the mind does and whether it does it successfully or not, 
are for psychology two different things. The argument proceeds with the conviction that this 
division is feasible and psychology can study the first activity (what the mind does) while the 
philosophical sciences can study the second (whether the mind does it successfully, the self- 
critical aspect of thinking).
There are two problematic implications by that suggestion. One is that philosophy 
cannot study the second without studying the first. And if it studies the first then there is an 
overlap with psychology’s assumed subject matter. In this case the accusation of substitution is
5 4 Collingwood among other things repudiated the idea o f art proper as a form of amusement, see PA, 
pp. 15-41, pp. 78-104. For art as psychological stimulus PA, pp. 29-36. The considerable amount of 
philosophical aesthetics that pointed to the shortcomings of art as amusement, pleasure etc., is virtually 
ignored in modem attempts of psychology to define art in those terms. In the 1997 book, for instance, 
How the Mind Works by the psychologist Steven Pinker, we are told that “What is it about the mind that 
lets people take pleasure in shapes and colors and sounds and jokes and stories and myths? That question 
might be answerable, whereas questions about art in general are not. Theories of art carry the seed of 
their own destruction” (p. 523). Thus the question for the psychology of art is not ‘what is art’ but what 
is the effect o f works of art on people and Pinker suggests that the arts are nothing more that another 
type of ‘pleasure technology’ (p. 525). His supporting argument are strikingly similar to the ones against 
which Collingwood was writing in the 1930’s.
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back. The second implication is that psychology excludes from its subject matter the self- 
critical element of thought on the basis of the division of labour with philosophy. This creates 
an odd alliance between the two disciplines, an alliance that cannot be sustainable since they 
are disciplines that follow different methodologies. Therefore how a communication can be 
established (the two aspects of the thinking mind to be brought together), psychology cannot 
answer. The truth is that such an answer cannot be given because the initial division is an 
erroneous one. In no case a communication between psychology and philosophy can be of such 
nature as to allow a meaningful exchange of aspects of their subject matter.
In fact Heamshaw’s position clearly includes the element of substitution. Thinking, 
which previously was within the purview of the philosophical sciences, is now reserved for 
psychology. This position indeed denies criteriology too, in the sense that it doesn’t perceive it 
as vital in the empirical study of thought that psychology carries out. The recognition of the 
self-critical aspect of thought as not so important to psychology makes it easy to be handed 
over to the philosophical sciences for study. This is the only way that an accusation for total 
substitution might be avoided: psychology claims that only one aspect of thought is its 
business.
The fact that psychology gives to philosophy the study of criteria under the idea of 
division of labour is a pretext. The pretext is easily, under closer inspection, revealed because 
psychology and philosophy cannot be conceived as disciplines that can develop the idea of the 
division of labour. Their methodologies have advanced in very diverse directions. Indeed the 
truth is that psychology needs to give something to the philosophical sciences in order to 
justify the non-substitution claim and to reinforce its position as a discipline that wants to 
supplement the philosophical sciences. But the trade is nonsensical.
Indeed it would have been better for Heamshaw’s argument to have denied the 
criteriological character altogether. This is exactly what a lot of modem psychological schools 
have done. The accusation of substitution is not any more of any particular value. Currently 
psychology studies the mind as matter.
§ 7. Conclusions
Collingwood in the development of his ideas on psychology traversed as follows. Two stages 
can be recognised. In his initial position, which is manifested in RP and SM, he saw 
psychology as one of the agents of natural science. The effort of psychology was to apply to
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the mind the same methodology that had been developed for the needs of the study of nature. 
In other terms, psychology attempted to study the mind only as an observable process and not 
as an activity that can be judged and evaluated as to the success or not of its performance. For 
Collingwood the mind acts and then it wants to know whether it has acted rightly or wrongly, 
truthfully or falsely and so forth. These are ultimate, metaphysical questions and psychology 
doesn’t raise them. But philosophical sciences do. Collingwood during that period had 
conceived the mind as a unity. The recognition of the different aspects of the mind (thought, 
emotion, will) wasn’t also recognition that those aspects could be separated and studied 
independently of each other. They were interrelated and every activity of the mind involved all 
three aspects. Therefore to see psychology as the study of the mind was equal to see it as the 
study of the entire mind. This was resulted in the total repudiation of psychology. Psychology 
as a naturalistic science of the mind cannot study the mind at all.
This position of total repudiation is helpful in understanding why Collingwood’s later 
views are indeed milder and more thoughtful towards psychology. His second position was 
found in all his subsequent works, e.g. IH, PA, A, PH, EM. This position rests on a different -  
because of the introduction of re-enactment- understanding of the mind, where feelings were 
excluded from the subject matter of a discipline that wishes to study the mind historically. In 
PA and EM Collingwood delineated the functions of feeling and thinking. The distinction is an 
important one since thinking is understood as a cognitive activity, a self-aware activity, but 
feeling is not. The distinction has a real value for psychology too: Collingwood recognises the 
study of feelings as the proper subject matter of psychology. In sharp contrast with how it was 
regarded in RP and SM, the later notion of Collingwood assigns a significant position to 
psychology. It is seen next to the philosophical sciences of thought and the sciences of the 
human body, all three together providing the total study of man.
However Collingwood recognised a problematic facet in existence, with the ideas of 
the 18th and 19th century to have created a claim for psychology as the study not only of 
feelings but also of thought. Collingwood repudiates such a claim. The ground on which he 
does it is the denial of psychology to attach importance to the self-critical aspect of thought 
and to study the criteria that this self-critical function sets. Therefore the reasons for his 
refutation of psychology as the study of thought -the study of feelings is still, rightly, under 
psychology’s purview- are identical to the ones used earlier in RP and SM. Psychology 
perceives only the process and doesn’t tackle the issue of whether this process has been 
performed successfully or not. Collingwood identified this extended psychology as a clear 
attempt to supersede the philosophical sciences that proceeded with their inquiries
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acknowledging the self-critical character of thinking.
Collingwood rightly understood that the psychology of thought, purporting to 
complement the philosophical sciences and not substituting or competing with them, was not a 
genuine claim. It was clear that psychology of thought came to study something that was 
already within the purview of philosophy. Also the idea of “division of labour” was erroneous 
and even misleading. We have seen that for different disciplines to share common elements 
and examine them from different angles is possible, sometimes even necessary. And we have 
also seen that the same idea is quite problematic when applied to the study of thought by 
psychology and philosophy. Collingwood was aware of that and detected that psychology 
didn’t have the intention to complement the philosophical sciences; its implicit aim was to 
offer a different and better approach to the study of the thinking mind, an approach that 
wouldn’t have the alleged shortcomings of the philosophical sciences. Psychology by aspiring 
to be a scientific field was placed within a tradition of methods different to the ones used by 
the philosophical disciplines.
A significant addition to his later view is the description of the philosophical sciences 
as criteriological, something only hinted in RP and SM. By using the term criteriological 
Collingwood tried to avoid misunderstandings often associated with the term normative. In so 
far as normative means the imposition of external criteria to the judgment of thought, 
Collingwood regarded such interpretation as erroneous: the thinking mind is self-critical, the 
criteria are imposed internally, from the mind itself upon the mind itself. In my interpretation 
of this character one point appears to be unavoidable. The thinking mind’s self-awareness and 
self-criticism cannot be functions that exist independently. The self-awareness, the knowledge 
that the mind does something, depends on the knowledge of the criteria by which the mind will 
judge its achievements. The criteria are presupposed in the initial effort of the mind to do 
something and in the later stage where the mind criticises the efficiency of its performance. 
Although mentioned as two activities, the one presupposes the other, they are two parts of the 
same activity and they are linked in such a way that it is absurd to suggest that they can be 
broken up effectively. Such efforts have been made and I have tried to show how, according to 
the above principle, they have implications that are indefensible.
There are important factors in Collingwood’s account on psychology. The first is that 
any accusation of being hostile to psychology doesn’t appear to be justified. His own 
confessions of the value of psychology aside, the implications of the development of his 
thought demonstrated that he had travelled from a total denial of psychology as a science of the
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mind, to proclaim psychology the uncontested science of feeling.55 By my exposition in this 
chapter I contended that this was a result of his careful and methodical consideration of the 
mind and the nature of its constituent parts. To the same careful and methodical consideration I 
attribute his denial to see psychology as the science of thought.
A second point is Collingwood’s almost prognostic account of the consequences of 
seeing psychological models as capable of explaining human actions due to thought. The 
situation today is a fully developed version of what Collingwood was writing more than half a 
century ago. The substitution of the philosophical sciences by psychology has been achieved in 
a remarkable degree. The behaviouristic, cognitive or evolutionary explanations of the mind all 
have in common that they present the processes of a thinking activity as the causes, the causal 
laws, of that activity.56 These explanations are currently widely held as providing a more 
satisfactory answer to the mind than any criteriological, historical reasons. Collingwood’s 
unease in EM was not unjustified. He saw psychology as a threat to civilisation, a way to 
promote irrationalism and fascism.57 Freud’s Totem and Taboo illuminated the problems of 
trying to understand a historical phenomenon using psychological abstractions; it “expresses 
the contempt and horror with which our civilization looks upon those different from itself’ 
(PE, p. 169). It was a very dangerous attempt to “reduce the differences between non-European 
and European civilizations to differences between mental disease and mental health” (PA, p. 
77, note on § 2).
The third point is that the criteriological character -which he largely developed in his 
effort to refute psychology as the science of thought- regarded as a self-imposed activity gives 
important insights in the way Collingwood conceived the understanding of human actions. 
When it is seen from an esoteric level (from the level of the person who performs a thinking 
activity) the criteriological character of thought first and foremost is the idea of a personal
55 This is also true for NL, although there psychology is concerned with manifestations of ‘body’ and 
not with feelings as such, although the word body in its psychological sense is a group of feelings. See 
NL, chapter III and for an analysis SPT, pp. 118-119.
56 See MHD, p. 248, about the problem of psychology to distinguish between reasons and causes. Also 
M. Oakeshott. 1975. On Human Conduct. Oxford University Press, pp. 20-23. Oakeshott argues, for 
instance, that the “theorems of a science concerned with the process of believing are represented as the
causes of beliefs” (pp. 21-22).
5 7 SPT, pp. 232-233. Also in the 1935 Reality as History: “Psychology is an attempt to understand man 
by the same methods by which modem man understood Nature. These methods, as applied to the study 
and consequent control of Nature, were built on the double assumption that man, the knower and 
controller, is intelligent; Nature, the known and controlled, unintelligent: mere mechanism, blind force. 
When these same methods are turned upon man, they preserve their character unchanged. They therefore 
assume that human nature, as the object upon which they are exercised, is unintelligent. The result is that 
intelligence itself is converted into unintelligence” (PH, p. 175).
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freedom within the effort and the responsibility to think correctly, logically and so forth. When 
it is seen from an exoteric level (from the level of the person who wants to understand the 
thought of other people) it is the attempt to realize that the above effort is due to reasons and 
the understanding of a thought is the understanding of the reasons behind it.
Collingwood’s conception of the criteriological character of thought recognises that 
the mind in its judgement is capable of making errors. The obligation of the mind is to think 
correctly but not every attempt of the mind to think correctly will necessarily score a success. 
A failure to achieve the aim that the mind sets is not an erroneous judgement, for the mind 
might recognise that it has scored a failure. An erroneous judgement is the judgement where 
the mind mistakenly believes that it has achieved its aim. But for the mistakes that the mind 
makes, Collingwood argues, the mind itself is capable of correcting them. And this is the main 
consideration of the criteriological character. The possibility of an external judgement (a man’s 
thought to be judged by another) is of course real but less important. It rests on an adequate 
understanding of what the mind aims to achieve. But it is less important because the core of 
criteriology is the self-criticism.
This characteristic of the mind -to score judgement errors- can be an adequate 
explanation for any ideas of relativism. Not every action is correct, true, logical, good etc. The 
mind has the capacity of correcting its errors but if it doesn’t then the error cannot be mistaken 
for the truth. Collingwood’s idea of criteriology is the denial of mechanistic models and 
processes in thought. Instead the thinking mind is the self-generating mind, free and 
responsible in its actions.
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Chapter It: The importance of mind’s unity
§ 1. Introduction
The previous chapter on psychology presented what Collingwood perceived as an erroneous 
attempt towards human understanding. This chapter will be, instead, a positive contribution 
by looking at Collingwood’s philosophy of mind1, since for him knowledge and 
understanding of man is the knowledge of his mind. This chapter is connected to the previous 
chapter on psychology in that it provides an analysis of the different stages of Collingwood’s 
ideas about the mind and their effect on the discipline of psychology. It was because 
Collingwood, in the late 1920’s and again in IH, in 1936, saw the mind differently than 
before, that he identified for the psychology of feeling a niche in the study of man. Before that 
the implication of his philosophy of mind rendered psychology completely erroneous.
The vicissitudes of Collingwood’s ideas about the mind are of special significance in 
tracing his ongoing efforts to establish a historical understanding of human actions. This 
chapter will be an exploration of this main notion with the qualification that I will only dwell 
on a certain aspect of Collingwood’s philosophy of mind, that is, the unity of mind. I take the 
unity of mind to be of particular significance because it is the skeleton around which other 
elements of a general philosophy of mind can be built. By unity of mind I am referring to 
Collingwood’s idea of the inter-connection of the various elements that the mind is thought to 
consist. Thus thinking, feeling or emotion and sensation are elements that do not exist 
independently from each other, cannot be distinguished in any given activity and thus cannot 
be identified with ‘what the activity is about’. Instead their mode of function within an 
activity is as elements that interact closely with each other and the activity is the outcome of 
that interaction. That we name different elements doesn’t mean that we identify their 
individual existence; for Collingwood such an existence is an abstraction, a false theory that 
any of these elements can operate without the others.
The unity of mind is significant as a way to overcome the criticisms that Collingwood 
restricted the subject matter of history and excluded elements of human activity that 
professional historians find indispensable to their business. Thus emotions too in
1 Very good treatments o f Collingwood’s philosophy o f mind can be found in HS, pp. 259-269; SPT, 
especially ch. 4, pp. 110-140; Donagan, mainly chapters II, pp. 27-46 & III, pp. 47-65; L.O. Mink.
1968. ‘Collingwood’s Dialectic o f History’, in History and Theory, vol. 7, pp 3-37 (esp. 7-17) 
(Hereafter abbreviated as Dialectic); MHD, ch. 4, pp. 79-118 and ch. 6, pp. 162-170; L.O. Mink. 1972. 
‘Collingwood’s Historicism: A Dialectic o f Process’, in Krausz, pp. 154-178 (Hereafter abbreviated as 
Historicism); Dray, especially ch. 4, pp. 108-149. Some aspects o f Collingwood’s philosophy o f mind 
are discussed in W. von Leyden. 1972. ‘Philosophy o f mind: An appraisal o f Collingwood’s theories o f  
consciousness, language and imagination’, in Krausz, pp. 20-41.
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Collingwood’s philosophy of mind and history have a very prominent role and can be seen as 
a reason and motive for human action. The unity of mind is also helpful in interpreting some 
of Collingwood’s positions when a certain amount of ambiguity exists. For instance, the 
function of emotions in PH can be better understood if we accept that the unity of mind is the 
case. On the whole the unity of mind is one of the vital ingredients of an extensive and wide 
ranging human understanding.
In Collingwood’s theory of historical understanding, the relation between the mind’s 
elements has played a decisive role. The unity of mind is related to the idea of the broader 
historical understanding that Collingwood attempted in his later writings. Not only history 
itself must include emotions as a vital element for the explanation of actions, but also, with 
the increasing importance of emotions in Collingwood’s writings, areas such as art and magic 
would become essential in historical knowledge and understanding. In fact the exact 
boundaries of these areas -  history, art, magic -  become less easy to discern and I maintain 
that there is a lot of scope to see art and history as identical in Collingwood’s late writings.2
At the same time the above position seems paradoxical in the light of what 
Collingwood asserted in IH, where not only the mind is clearly divided but certain of its 
elements fall outside the historical concerns. IH constitutes a moment of controversial claims 
by Collingwood and it was also the main impetus for the various criticisms against his 
historical theory. But as we shall see careful commentators of Collingwood’s theories of mind 
and history have identified the problematic aspects that IH present and have alerted us against 
an isolated reading of this book.
How, therefore, should the unity of mind be seen? Was it something constant in 
Collingwood’s philosophy or something that shows hesitation, wavering and instability? I 
maintain that the idea of mind’s unity is something that permeates all Collingwood’s 
philosophical writings. It has a very robust presence in his early writings and again it becomes 
very prominent in all his later writings. There is however a period between the early and the 
later writings when the unity of mind is not as straightforward an idea as it is presented 
elsewhere.
I recognise three phases in Collingwood’s unity of mind. The first is the one that 
Collingwood assumed as early as RP, and it was maintained in all his writings of the mid 
1920’s. In these writings thought and what comes under the various names of feeling, 
sensation, perception, intuition and so on, form a concrete whole. Thought and sensation are 
not separate elements but the two sides that compose any single activity. The activity is not 
due to thought only or due to sensation only; it is always the union of the two. When will 
(conation) is included the result is the same: thought, feeling-emotion and will are inseparable
2 For more see chapter IV.
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elements in any given activity. In other words for Collingwood this unity of mind admits that 
immediate experience and the mediating, reflective side of this experience cannot be 
separated.
The second phase I take to begin with the 1928 lectures on the philosophy of history. 
This is also the earliest reference on the principle of re-enactment. These lectures, in trying to 
establish how historical understanding is possible and what is the subject matter of history, 
present the mind in a different way from before: as a combination of conscious and 
unconscious activities. History is only concerned with thought, which is taken in a broad 
sense and includes all the conscious activities. This formulation of Collingwood is not free of 
ambiguity since he doesn’t clarify or specify which activities are conscious and which are not. 
The terms, however, in which he now talks about the mind evidently allow for the division of 
mind’s faculties since history can study the conscious without tackling the unconscious. 
Moreover the terms conscious and unconscious are a new way to describe mind’s elements. 
The same idea of mind’s division can be seen in some of his writings from the early 1930’s. 
Still, both the 1928 lectures and his early 1930’s writings are not clear as to the role of 
emotions and indeed there is plenty of scope to assume that emotions are closely connected to 
thought. From the mid 1930’s however we have the historical theory expounded in IH, where 
most of mind’s faculties are excluded from the subject matter of history. Given all the 
previous discussions of the mind, IH appears to possess a unique place in Collingwood’s 
thought. I will argue that, however important and influential might have been in introducing 
his theory of history, IH is a moment of aberration in the main corpus of Collingwood’s 
philosophy of mind and history. The rest of his writings from 1928 until IH, although they 
don’t support as strong a unity of mind as before, still they can be placed within a philosophy 
that perceives the mind essentially as a whole.
The third phase is the systematic (since his main philosophy of mind can be said to 
originate from this phase) endeavour we find in all Collingwood’s writings after IH, to re­
unite the mind. It was also a period in which Collingwood considered emotions extensively 
and urged their necessary and healthy function in all aspects of a civilised human conduct, a 
function often impeded by an over-rationalised modem life. He mainly developed this 
philosophy of mind in PA and NL. Of special importance are also his writings on 
anthropology and folk tales, where the position of emotions is very prominent. The folklore 
writings provide in many respects a foundation upon which PA was developed. The unity of 
mind is present in PH too, where with specific reference to his theory of history Collingwood 
considered thought and emotion as closely connected. Thus ‘history as the history of thought’ 
in PH is extended to include emotions that are essentially related to thought.
Collingwood’s later unity of mind is in one respect different from the initial unity of 
mind. His early writings show a total unity, that is a unity not only of thought and emotion but
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also of sensation. This is not present in the later unity of mind, as for instance we can see in 
PA where emotions and thought are connected but the psychical level (that includes feelings 
as sensations) belongs to a different level of experience. However the early unity of mind 
seems to be present in NL: mind is consciousness or thought and has feelings. These feelings 
(sensations with an emotional element, are the same as the psychical level of experience in 
PA) are intimately connected with consciousness. In this respect NL is quite close to SM.
Why the changes occur in Collingwood’s theory of the unity of mind is an enticing 
subject. Collingwood in the 1928 lectures includes only the conscious activities of the mind in 
the subject matter of history, but he is not very clear as to what these activities are. The same 
lectures introduce the doctrine of re-enactment as an important element towards 
Collingwood’s attempts to elaborate a theory of history and historical understanding. In IH re­
enactment is also present and what is excluded from history’s subject matter becomes clear. I 
maintain that the doctrine of re-enactment has been cardinal in effecting the novel 
appreciation of mind’s unity. The scholarship on Collingwood’s philosophy of mind has 
given appropriate consideration to the unity of mind. In addition to that my interpretation 
recognises the break of mind’s unity, due to re-enactment, as an aberration in Collingwood’s 
philosophy. I also maintain that the unity of mind underwent different stages where gradually 
the element of sensation became body and not mind.
§ 2. The First Phase: The Early Unity of Mind
Early on in his writing life, in RP, Collingwood spoke of the relationship between the various 
elements of which, traditionally, the mind is thought to consist; the elements or functions of 
thought, of feeling/emotion and of will. He found the relationship to be one of unity, where 
the three functions always interact and each one necessitates the other two. Thus in the case of 
the emotions, for instance, we are told that “emotion is not a totally separate function of the 
mind, independent of thinking and willing; it includes both these at once. If I feel pleasure, 
that is will in that it involves an appetition3 towards the pleasant thing; and it is also 
knowledge of the pleasant thing and of my own state. There is no emotion which does not 
entail the activity of the other so-called faculties of the mind” (PR, p. 10).
This is not to say that only emotions entail the other two aspects. The unity is 
extended to the other two faculties as well, so we can have a will which is at the same time a 
thinking and an emotional activity and a thought where the emotional and the conational
3 This is the word that Collingwood uses.
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element is present.4 And Collingwood concludes that “[t]he life of the mind is whole, without 
seam, woven from the top throughout; the only sense in which we can separate one attribute 
from the others is that we may abstract it, that is, have a false theory that is separate; we can 
never actually employ one faculty alone” (RP, p. 154). This is the earliest manifestation of 
what I perceive to be Collingwood’s first phase of his theory of mind. It is the phase where 
the unity of the mind is proclaimed unequivocally.
A similar argument was put forward in 19235 where Collingwood, arguing against 
various aspects of contemporary theories of knowledge, maintained that “the activities of 
sensation and thought always go hand in hand”6 and “are not two distinct cognitive activities 
each with a specific object of its own -whether separable or inseparable activities- but 
correlative aspects of a single activity with a single object: and that this object cannot either 
really or ideally de divided into a sensum and (if I may use the word) an intellectum”.7 And 
Collingwood after having demonstrated the impossibility of having purely sensuous or purely 
intellectual knowledge and the unsatisfactory attempts at “patching up... the quarrel between 
sensationalism and intellectualism”8, concluded “not only that all knowledge is both sensation 
and thought at once, but that even ideally these elements can never be distinguished”.9
In the vein of the above positions, Collingwood in 1924 explored activity -that is 
mental life- as displaying three elements. He presented his position in his 1925 book OPA 
and in one manuscript written in 1924 and published recently10 that represents a draft version 
of the book. Collingwood recognised that the three aspects of “all psychical life: cognition, 
conation, emotion (thought, will, feeling) ... are inseparable: any activity involves all three” 
(PE, p. 51). To recognise the three aspects within any activity is not the same as accepting 
these aspects as separate and he argued that there is an error “in the attempt to equate various 
activities with the three aspects of the mental life which are distinguished by analytic 
psychology: cognition, conation and emotion. This threefold distinction has a very real value, 
but it becomes a fantastic mythology if it is mistaken for a distinction between three activities 
which can exist separately, or of which one can predominate over the other, or of which one 
can undergo a modification without producing corresponding modification in the other” 
(OPA, p. 10). His analysis exemplifies what is the specific character of each aspect but also
4 There is an instance o f the special relationship between will and thought, RP, pp. 33-34.
5 R.G. Collingwood. 1923. ‘Sensation and Thought’, in Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society, 24 
(1923-24), pp. 55-76.
6 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
7 Ibid., p. 57.
8 Ibid., p. 56.
9 Ibid., p. 65.
10 The manuscript can now be found in PE, pp. 49-80.
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how each aspect is connected to the other two in such a way as to make it impossible to be 
distinguished from them:
In every field of activity there is a theoretical element, in virtue of which the mind is 
aware of something; there is a practical element in virtue of which the mind is bringing about 
a change in itself and in its world; and there is an element of feeling, in virtue of which the 
mind’s cognitions and actions are coloured with desire and aversion, pleasure and pain. In no 
case is any of these elements active without the others; they are correlative elements in every 
act and every experience, and make up a single indivisible whole. But the theoretical element 
is not always knowledge in the strict sense of the word; knowledge is the highest form of 
theoretical activity, not equivalent to that activity in general: and in the same way moral 
action, though the highest form of practical activity, is not found wherever practical activity is 
found. And each specific form of theory, practise or feeling involves corresponding forms of 
the other two elements, and cannot exist in the absence of these (OPA, p. 10).
Thus, through the inseparable character of the three aspects in any activity, 
Collingwood maintained that the mind must be seen as a unity.
Finally the same, I trust, is being asserted in SM11 when Collingwood maintains that 
“the immediacy of perception does not exclude mediation, it is not abstract immediacy 
(sensation) but implicitly contains an element of mediation (thought). When we say that we 
perceive something, we mean thereby to assert that we are not thinking; but this assertion is 
an error, and the analysis of perception reveals inevitably the presence of thought” (SM, p. 
204). Collingwood in SM refers to intuition as being sensation, the immediate element of 
experience. Thus intuition and thought “are not distinct activities but correlative aspects of 
experience itself ... are inseparable, being only the immediacy (actuality, positiveness) and 
mediation (reflection upon itself) of all experience” (SM, p. 95). Also that “[i]ntuition is the 
questioning, immediate side of experience: thought is the asserting, explanatory side” (SM, 
p. 188). Experience “as such is not partly intuitive and partly conceptual, it is all intuitive and 
all conceptual” (SM, p. 95) and “the division of experience into intuition and thought ... is a 
fiction” (SM, p. 188). And summarising Collingwood asserts that:
Intuition and thought are not two separate activities which are somehow united in the 
body of human experience. Experience is an indivisible whole in which two sides can always 
be distinguished: an immediate, intuitive or questioning side, which is hypostatized by 
abstract psychology into the faculty of sensation, and a mediating, reflective, logical or 
assertive side, which is called thought. Thought is the one, sensation the many. What 
characterizes the intuitive or sensuous side of experience is just its manyness or perpetual
11 See also, R.G. Collingwood. 1926. ‘The Place o f Art in Education’, in Hibbert Journal, 24, pp. 434- 
448 (Hereafter abbreviated as PAE), which can also be pertinent to the philosophy o f mind since it 
explores the role o f art in education, a role that Collingwood considers fundamental. Art here is 
imagination, “...a  fundamental mode o f  mind’s activity... which by bringing language into existence 
reveals thought to itself’ (p. 442). The connection between Collingwood’s conception o f art in this 
article and in the OPA and SM is very strong.
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difference from itself, flux, novelty or creation. What characterizes the logical or reflective 
side is its self-identity, permanence, unity (SM, p. 188).
In his discussion about art Collingwood says:
But if art is pure imagination, it is not therefore a purely immediate, instinctive and 
undifferentiated activity such as would be implied by placing its essence in feeling, emotion, 
or sensation. Art is a concrete activity; feeling and sensation are abstract elements which can 
be distinguished within any concrete activity by cannot form the whole or essence of any 
(SM, p. 63).
A concrete activity is the activity where different elements can be identified and 
distinguished but they are interrelated in such a way as to structure the unbroken whole of that 
activity. For the activity to be concrete we need not, and in fact we cannot, say that a certain 
element can alone be responsible for that activity. That is why the individual elements, in 
their individuality, are abstract elements: their function is their contribution to the whole; 
separately they serve, essentially, classification purposes.
The argument of mind’s unity in SM is even more comprehensible if seen against the 
general idea of the book: Collingwood’s dissatisfaction with the fragmentation of the mind 
and his effort to re-unite it. Collingwood considered that book to be his “Philosophy of the 
Spirit”12 and his attempt was to elaborate the principle that all the activities or “forms of the 
spirit”13 he identified (art, religion, science, history, philosophy) “must be identical”.14 He 
maintained that such principle “would serve to articulate without destroying the unity of the 
spirit”.15 The fragmentation of the mind, exemplified by the different and, taken in isolation 
(one distinct from the others), incomplete forms of experience, is like the attempt to recognise 
different elements within any mental activity: it becomes an abstraction.16 The only 
meaningful and satisfactory way is to see the mind as a unity, experience as a concrete whole.
12 Letters to de Ruggiero, Bodleian Library, Collingwood Papers, dep. 27. This letter is dated 24. viii. 
23, p. 1.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 The fact that Collingwood regarded this fragmentation an abstraction, an arbitrary division, is further 
supported by his examination o f five forms o f experience (provinces), a choice only used as a working 
hypothesis since “[h]ow many such provinces there are we do not yet know ... the number o f provinces 
may be augmented or decreased without affecting our fundamental questions” (SM, p. 39).
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§ 3. The Second Phase: The Division of Mind’s Unity
a. History as the History o f Thought: The 1928 Philosophy o f History lectures
During the middle of the 1920’s Collingwood started lecturing on the special subject of the 
Philosophy of History. It was a subject that he continued teaching for several years.17 Through 
meticulously writing his notes for those lectures, he developed more systematically his ideas 
on history. Some important principles first found expression in those notes.18
I would like to show now that the division of the mind was something that seems to 
have appeared during that period in Collingwood’s writings and thought and more 
specifically in the 1928 philosophy of history lectures. However, although this idea might be 
conceived as the precursor of his famous 1936 lecture and notes where without ambiguity he 
excluded emotions from history’s subject matter, the 1928 lectures present a more cryptic 
treatment of emotions and possibly there is space for their inclusion to what a historian can 
study. If this is correct then the significance that has been attached, in the form of criticism, to 
Collingwood’s exclusion of emotions can be found to be excessive; the idea of emotions as 
something outside the historical scope might have only been a brief interlude that occurred in 
1936. In the concluding section of the present chapter I will argue that the reason for this 
different appreciation was the introduction of the doctrine of re-enactment.
The subject of history as the history of thought appeared for the first time in the 
“Outlines of a Philosophy of History” a series of lectures presented to his students in Oxford 
in 1928, but never published during his lifetime. In those lectures thought is not only 
considered as a subject of history but as “the only thing of which there can be history” (IH, p. 
444). History’s subject matter, therefore, is limited to thought. But what kind of thought did 
Collingwood have in mind? Did he present, in this sense, a comprehensive theory of mind? 
Thought, Collingwood argued, is the only subject for history if thought is “understood in its 
widest sense” (IH, p. 444), if thought “includes all the conscious activities of the human 
spirit” (IH, p. 445). Only this kind of thought historians can tackle “with that intimacy 
without which history is not history” (IH, p. 444). If nature19 sometimes appears to have a
17 A list o f all the lectures given by Collingwood between 1914 and 1941 can be found in HS, pp. 433- 
434. On the philosophy o f history he lectured in 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929,1930, 1931, 1936, 1937. The 
list doesn’t mention the 1932 philosophy o f history lectures but they are mentioned in HS, pp. 163-164.
18 Information on the 1926-1928 lectures: introduction by van der Dussen in the revised edition o f IH, 
pp. xlii-xlviii.
9 Collingwood gives the following examples: the birth o f solar systems, the origins o f life on our 
planet and the early course o f geological history, IH, p. 445.
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history this is not quite accurate since in these examples “the historian can never really get 
inside20 them, actualise them in his mind” (IH, p. 445).
Here, thus, we have the human spirit, which we are told consists of conscious and -by 
the logical antithesis- unconscious activities. This is substantially different to the theory of 
mind presented in OPA, where the mind consisted of thought, emotion and will. “Conscious 
and unconscious activities” is not only a different name for those three aspects. It is now also 
a different way to see human spirit. Thought understood in the widest sense, encompassing, 
that is, all the conscious activities of human spirit, is history’s only subject matter. The 
unconscious activities, whatever they might be, are not history’s subject matter. Conscious 
and unconscious activities can exist and can be studied independently, if we assume that a 
discipline that studies the unconscious activities exists. Spirit is not inseparable. It is possible 
to separate it on the principle of whether the activities are conscious or unconscious.
By 1928, then, Collingwood’s unity of mind as we have seen it in his earlier writings 
is no longer current. The new theory sees spirit (mind) as being divided into conscious and 
unconscious elements. It remains to examine a final point: do we have enough to 
approximately ascertain what these elements are and whether they correspond to the previous 
scheme of the three inseparable aspects of the mind (cognition, conation and emotion)?
Collingwood does not offer a conclusive description as to what those conscious 
activities of the human spirit are. The only indication of their character is that they allow the 
historian to get inside them and develop an intimacy with his subject, something impossible to 
develop in the study of nature. What this character entails, however, is not at all clear. The 
same applies to the unconscious activities: not only do we not know what they are but 
Collingwood doesn’t even mention the term “unconscious”. We are only allowed to infer that 
unconscious elements exist as the logical antithesis to the conscious ones. However we can be 
certain that conscious activities are something more than thinking or cognition, because 
thought in the widest sense cannot be just thought. It must be something more.
Given the various criticisms Collingwood has received on account of the exclusion of 
emotions from history’s subject matter -a  thesis he was to make few years later, in 1936- it is 
an interesting point to see whether a similar position was implied in 1928. The scarcity of 
enough information to do so due to the laconic and cryptic wording of Collingwood is a fact. 
But Collingwood himself points towards a certain direction. Trying to imagine potential 
objections to the re-enactment theory he comes up with a consideration that poses a “more 
serious difficulty”. He says, for example, that the modem historian “is unable to share the 
emotional heat with which the characters of his narrative did the things narrated of them” (IH, 
pp. 446-447). Therefore, if we are to maintain that the historian re-enacts the past, we need to
20 The division between the inside and the outside o f  an event is a theme that Collingwood explored 
more fully in his later essays.
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ask why the re-enactment doesn’t involve the original emotional heat and to justify how, if 
“so important an element” (IH, p. 447) is absent, the re-enactment can be “the same thing 
over again and not a mere pale copy of it or something radically different” (IH, p. 447). 
Collingwood thus emphasises the importance of the emotional element and his answer to 
whether the re-enactment ignores or leaves out this element is that:
to re-enact the past in the present is to re-enact it in a context which gives it a new 
quality. This context is the negation of the past itself. Thus, the historian of poetry, reading 
Dante, re-enacts the medieval experience which that poem expresses: but while doing this he 
remains himself: he remains a modem man, not a medieval: and this means that the 
medievalism of Dante, while genuinely revived and re-experienced within his mind, is 
accompanied by a whole world of fundamentally non-medieval habits and ideas (IH, p. 447).
We have, therefore, the historian who by re-enacting the experience genuinely revives 
and re-experiences the whole experience adding something from his own world. I think there 
is plenty o f scope to assume a legitimate place for emotions in the theory of history and the 
contention that conscious activities are “presumably encompassing human emotions”21 is very 
reasonable.
Summarising then we can see that the 1928 lectures present some interesting insights 
into the development of Collingwood’s theory of mind and the beginning of his theory of 
history as the re-enactment of past thought. In contrast with the unity of mind that 
Collingwood advocated previously, in 1928 he felt he had to divide the mind, or at least to 
identify elements that they could and could not belong to history’s subject matter. Whether 
this was done at the expense of emotions is doubtful. Still a certain amount of puzzlement 
exists as to the exact character of the conscious and the unconscious activities, the areas that 
Collingwood divided the mind. Perhaps the fact that Collingwood only used those ideas as his 
teaching material is enough to tell that he felt it as something only partially complete: ideas in 
the making that he could further develop and elaborate by sharing them with his students. It is 
also tempting, and perhaps not a coincidence, to see the division of the mind and the theory of 
re-enactment somehow associated. Both occurred within the same context, for the first time in 
the 1928 lectures. It might be that Collingwood, trying to develop a theory of how the past 
can be known and establishing that re-enactment is the answer, felt that the former unity of 
mind cannot be sustained since the immediacy of certain elements of it would be difficult or 
impossible to be captured re-enactively. I will investigate this further in the last section of this 
chapter.
21 The editors’ introduction, PH, p. xxxvi. Also W.H. Dray. 1997. ‘Broadening the H istorian’s Subject- 
M atter in The Principles o f  History’, in CS, vol. IV, pp. 2-33 (Hereafter abbreviated as BH), p. 8.
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Before moving to IH it is worth mentioning the interesting case of the cosmology 
manuscript." Written in 1933/4 it deals extensively with the philosophy of mind. In the 
cosmology ms Collingwood divided the mind into spirit and psyche, the latter being what 
psychology studies, consisting “not of an activity of clear thought and pure activity but of 
conations and ‘ideas’ which are subjective and, regarded as thought, mainly illusory ... 
[Psyche is] desire or even appetite -  it is in substance a complex of emotions” (HS, p. 365). 
Thus it seems that Collingwood regarded thought and emotion as parts of different aspects of 
the mind. Interestingly enough, the same cosmology writings see emotions and thought 
closely related. Collingwood maintains that ”[a]n emotion which we find by reflection to 
persist as part of the furniture of our mind is a thought, or contains thought. Emotion as such 
is not destroyed by reason; it is clarified, it comes to know itself, it rids itself of many strange 
errors; but it survives all these changes” (PH, p. 129-130). These two positions appear to be 
contradictory: emotions as part of psyche, an activity that is not clear thought, and emotions 
that contain thought and are clarified by it. Moreover, in the Moral Philosophy lectures of 
193323, Collingwood argues that the “forms of rational action have their emotional colourings. 
In a sense, each is a peculiar emotion or complex of emotions”. I believe the reason for this 
ambiguity is that Collingwood had yet to distinguish between feelings and emotions the way 
he did in PA. Therefore emotion as part of the psyche can be something equivalent to the 
psychical experience as exemplified in PA: sensation with the emotional charge; while 
rational emotion or emotion that is or contain thought is the equivalent of what we find in PA 
at the level of imagination or consciousness. Thus the mind in the cosmology writings, as in 
the 1928 lectures, cannot be seen as having the unity of the earlier writings of Collingwood, 
where even sensation was connected to thought. Still, in 1933, emotions are considered in two 
different ways, one of which has a close connection with thought. Thus the division of mind 
in 1928 and 1933/4 is different from Collingwood’s description of 1936. Strictly speaking it 
can be seen as a division between mind and body and not within the mind as such.24
22 Bodleian Library, Collingwood Papers, dep. 18. The importance o f  the Cosmology ms has been 
mentioned (for instance HS, pp. 260, 262, 265).
21 Bodleian Library, Collingwood Papers, dep. 8, p. 125. In the same lectures Collingwood advises the 
students to respect both their mind and their body: “respect not only your reason but your passions; not 
only your conscious mind but your unconscious mind; not only your mind but your body”, “The Rules 
o f  Life” (extract from the moral philosophy lectures o f  1933, 127-130), in Essays in political 
philosophy/R.G. Collingwood: edited with an introduction by D avid  B oucher{ 1989, Oxford Clarendon 
Press), pp. 171-174, p. 173.
24 Collingwood in the cosm ology ms also says that he cannot admit “the separation o f  intellection from 
other mind-functions” (HS, p. 262).
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b. The Idea o f History: Mind as Psyche and Spirit
The next phase of Collingwood’s theory of mind appeared in the well-known passages of 
IH.*5 We have seen that chronologically this theory appeared in 1936, in one of 
Collingwood’s published essays as well as in his Philosophy of History lectures of the same 
year. The different treatment of the mind becomes immediately apparent. Man in his striving 
to attain self-knowledge does not need to know his body and not even the parts of his mind 
(which aren’t his knowing faculties), i.e. feeling, sensation, emotion.26 Therefore when, 
according to Collingwood, the mind becomes the object of historical knowledge, only the 
activities o f the mind expressive of thought are of interest to historians. Historians do not 
consider within their subject matter the non-historical impulses and appetites of man that 
constitute his animal nature.27 In IH Collingwood had subscribed to the old division of spirit 
and psyche or soul. Both are constituents of the mind. But the spirit is responsible for the 
rational elements, while psyche contains “the irrational elements” (IH, p. 231). These belong 
not to history but they are the subject matter of psychology.28
The wording of Collingwood in 1936 is in accord with what he was saying in the 
1928 philosophy of history lectures, only when it comes to see the mind as something that can 
be divided into elements that pertain or not to history’s subject matter. However where in 
1928 the division was between conscious and unconscious elements now, in 1936, the 
division occurs between rational and irrational elements. These are not synonymous or 
interchangeable terms. In fact he refers to the irrational elements as “the blind forces and 
activities in us which are part of human life as it consciously experiences itself, but are not 
parts o f the historical process: sensations as distinct from thought, feelings as distinct from 
conceptions, appetite as distinct from will" (IH, p. 231). Also those blind forces constitute 
“the proximate environment in which our reason lives... the basis of our rational life, though 
no part o f it” (IH, p. 231). Thus we cannot see the division of the mind into rational and 
irrational elements as a development or a different formulation of the division between 
conscious and unconscious elements and we cannot associate the rational to the conscious and 
the irrational to the unconscious. In 1936 both rational and irrational elements are part of the 
conscious experience of human life.
Again in the 1936 philosophy of history lectures Collingwood refers to thought as the 
proper purview of re-enactment, when thought is taken “in the widest sense of that word” (IH,
25 Epilegomena §1: Human Nature and Human History, pp. 205-231, Epilegomena §2: The Subject- 
matter o f  History, pp. 302-315.
26 IH, p. 205.
27 Ibid., p. 216.
28 Ibid., p. 231.
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p. 282). However the widest sense excludes a “merely immediate experience, a mere flow of 
consciousness consisting of sensations, feelings and the like” (IH, p. 302).
Thus if we assume that Collingwood held the same idea of consciousness in 1928 (i.e. 
that conscious elements involve emotions) this only strengthens the position that his theory of 
history only briefly excluded emotions from the realm of re-enactment.29 In effect 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind and the theory of history can be seen to be very 
compatible with the ideas of Mink, where a very broad definition of the term thought could be 
discerned in Collingwood’s writings from early on.30 It is also compatible with van der 
Dussen’s position that, minor details and changes of emphasis aside, Collingwood’s thoughts 
on the philosophy of mind are consistent.31 The main line of their argument is that 
Collingwood from the early 1920’s developed a philosophy of mind, where one important 
aspect is that he didn’t make any sharp distinctions between different aspects of the mind.32 
This is obvious by a careful reading of his various writings on the philosophy of mind but his 
writings are scattered and it’s not always easy to see the continuous nature of this idea. The 
consequence of the mind being united is that the term “thought” can be seen as having a broad 
meaning or definition and “does not exclude but includes emotions, desires, motives, 
attitudes, and acts of will -all those non-rational aspects of human life” (Historicism, p. 
157).33 Moreover Collingwood’s philosophy of mind informs other areas of his thought, such 
as his philosophy of history, but often in an indirect way. A clear example of this indirect way 
is found, according to Mink and van der Dussen, in IH and it is argued that “it is virtually 
impossible to arrive at an adequate interpretation of Collingwood’s idea of history from The 
Idea o f  History itself’(Dialectic, p.3).34 For Mink Collingwood’s conception of thought in IH 
should be understood as a “recessive doctrine”35, which should be seen and interpreted within
:g It seem s that the exclusion o f  emotions was abandoned more or less in the same year by the 
introduction o f  emotions as a historical element in the folklore manuscripts, where a much more 
sustained analysis o f  the role o f  emotions in human actions and life was presented. 1936 was also the 
year o f  the “Man Goes Mad” manuscript (now published in PE, pp. 305-335), a clear indication o f  the 
importance that Collingwood attached to emotions, for he considers them one o f  the three necessary 
dimensions o f  a real civilised condition (emotion gives vitality, intelligence gives complexity and 
memory gives continuity: PE, p. 329). This essay has been rightly seen (for instance HS, p. 268) in 
connection with Collingwood’s philosophy o f  mind.
30 Mink interpreted Collingwood’s philosophy o f  history by paying close attention to the connection 
between the philosophy o f  mind and the philosophy o f  history and how the former is necessary in 
understanding and clearing misunderstandings about C ollingwood’s historical theory. For the relevant 
sections see ft. 1 o f  this chapter.
31 HS, p. 260.
32 Ibid., p. 262.
33 Also Historicism, p. 165, Dialectic, pp. 12-13, HS, pp. 265, 266.
34 Also HS, p. 259, Historicism, p. 157. Boucher in that respect stresses that “ The New Leviathan is 
central and not marginal to our understanding o f  Collingwood’s philosophy in general, and to his 
philosophy o f  history in particular” (NL, p. xviii), while Mink maintains that “the main questions o f  
The Idea o f  History belong to the philosophy o f  mind rather than to what is arbitrarily called the 
‘philosophy o f  history’” (Historicism, p. 155).
3 Historicism, p. 155.
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the broader philosophy of mind that Collingwood held, i.e. as thought that does include 
emotions.36
The analysis by Mink and van der Dussen is very useful since it provides a clear 
account o f the continuity and consistency of Collingwood’s philosophy of mind. It is however 
very difficult to reconcile a total unity of mind throughout Collingwood’s writings with the 
1936 position, where he is so ambiguous about the role of emotions. The position of Mink 
and van der Dussen reads back into IH certain elements of the philosophy of mind that 
Collingwood only developed in a more clear way later on in PA and in NL. This interpretative 
view, as Boucher has pointed out, “is quite contrary to the view Collingwood wishes to 
present in The Idea o f History" (NL, p. xxxiii)37 and, I contend, it does not recognise IH as 
signifying a break, albeit short, with the previous concept of the mind that Collingwood held. 
It is not a matter of linguistic confusion, as Mink maintained, that Collingwood assimilated 
emotions to feelings and sensations. It seems that in IH he intentionally excluded emotions in 
his attempt to formulate his historical theory.
It is fair to say that exclusion of emotion doesn’t deserve the attention received so far; 
it has been based mainly on an isolated reading of IH. Thus the result is not only a restricted 
general picture but also a distorted one since IH signifies an odd departure from 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind. As part of Collingwood’s theory of history the exclusion 
of emotion is of secondary importance, of use only to inform us about the vicissitudes of 
Collingwood’s efforts in the formulation of his ideas.38 A reading of Collingwood’s views on 
the philosophy of mind throughout his published and unpublished material confidently shows 
that any strict division between thought and emotion, as Boucher has suggested, “is implicitly 
rejected in The New Leviathan, and everywhere else in Collingwood’s writings for that 
matter" (NL, p. xxxiii).
It is true however that, as in 1928, the division of mind’s faculties is a fact in 1936 
too. Furthermore Collingwood is more assertive in indicating what is and what is not, part of
36 Mink says about Collingwood’s wording that “in The Idea o f  History Collingwood had not yet given 
full expression to parts o f  his own theory o f  mind, and therefore in discussing the connection o f  
thought and emotion he tended to slip into the confusions embedded in ordinary language and hence 
seems to assimilate emotion to sensation and feeling (as we often do) rather than recognising, as in his 
more developed theory o f  mental functions, the extent to which emotion dialectically links the levels o f  
consciousness and appears, as sensation and feeling do not, in all the higher levels although it is rooted 
in the low est” (Dialectic, p. 12). Mink also maintains that “Collingwood’s view o f  the ‘subject-matter 
o f  history’ can be emended without important repercussions where his other views are concerned” 
(M HD, p. 165-166).
37 A lso that “the subject matter o f  history is conceived differently in The Idea o f  History and in The 
Ne\v Leviathan. This is because in the former Collingwood wishes to emphasize that thought and 
feeling are distinct and, for the purposes o f  historical enquiry, quite separate, whereas in the latter he 
emphasizes at every stage the overlapping character o f  thought and feeling” (SPT, p. 110). Also NL, p. 
xxxiii.
38 In the next sections o f  this chapter this will become more categorical, with the attention that 
Collingwood gave to emotions in nearly all o f  his later writings.
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history’s subject matter. The mind has rational and irrational elements and the latter cannot be 
the historian’s concern. To the irrational part of the human mind belong feelings, emotions, 
sensations and the like. These elements are excluded from history’s subject matter.39
In this respect the division of mind’s faculties has been unequivocally proclaimed. 
But where does this leave the quest for a satisfactory answer to the subject matter of history 
and the general theory of understanding? We should now proceed to the next phase of 
Collingwood’s theory where a slightly different picture began to emerge, approximately the 
same time as the ideas presented in IH.
§ 4. The Third Phase: The Later Unity of Mind
a. The Folklore writings40
The folklore or fairy tales writings contain very valuable ideas on several of the areas that 
Collingwood embarked upon. It is my purpose to deal with them extensively in chapter IV, 
where I will refer to details concerning the various topics they cover, their treatment by 
modem scholarship and their importance to Collingwood’s general theory of history. For now 
I will restrict myself to the examination of their content with regard to Collingwood’s theory 
of mind.
Collingwood wrote his ideas on fairy tales before PA and almost at the same time as 
the theory of the division of the mind presented in IH, where emotions were treated as 
something not belonging to the subject matter of history.41 However the folklore writings 
demonstrate a different idea.
The essential effort of Collingwood in the folklore writings was to use fairy tales as 
historical evidence, because a “theme contained in such a story is a fragment of ancient 
custom or belief’ (PE, p. 128). We know that something becomes historically known when 
the historian re-enacts the thought it expresses in his mind. Collingwood holds to a very 
similar principle here too when he contends that “All historical knowledge involves the 
recreation in the historian’s mind of the past experience which he is trying to study” (PE, pp. 
128-129). Collingwood wanted, therefore, to show how fairy tales, properly studied, could
39 Boucher argues that “The theory propounded in The Idea o f  History does not entirely exclude what 
might be called rational emotions, it simply ignores them”, Boucher, D. 1997. ‘The Significance o f  
R.G. C ollingwood’s Principles o f  H istory’, in Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas, vol. 58, No 2, pp. 309- 
330 (Hereafter abbreviated as SPH), p. 323.
40 All the relevant sections are included in PE, pp. 115-287. The importance o f  the folklore mss for the 
subject o f  emotions has been pointed out frequently, for instance: HS, pp. 187-191; SPT, p. 133; AHS, 
pp. 324-325; SPH, pp. 323-325.
41 Collingwood however regarded emotions important as the environment and the basis o f  rationality.
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yield knowledge. Now, in order to study and understand fairy tales the historian needs to 
understand magic because this is what, according to Collingwood, the themes of fairy tales, in 
their diversity, have in common: they operate in a world that is ruled by magic. In his analysis 
Collingwood shows that magic’s “basis is emotional” and he believes that this “is true not of 
one type of magic only, but of all magic” (PE, p. 201). Magic for Collingwood is the 
emotional activity where we contemplate, express an emotion “in its relation to practical life, 
as a motive for acting in a particular manner” (PE, p. 228).
By describing the themes of fairy tales as an area deserving the attention of history 
and by recognising the emotional activity of magic as the common element of fairy tales, 
Collingwood clearly connects the issue of emotions and history’s subject matter. This, after 
the theory of mind’s unity in mid 1920’s (and the suspected role emotions might have had 
within the “conscious activities” of the human mind in the 1928 lectures), is the first time we 
find emotions possessing a significant role in Collingwood’s theory. It is a significant 
divergence from the ideas of IH about the irrationality of emotions and feelings. Now 
emotions are not seen as a peripheral element in history's subject matter, but as the driving 
force, the motive and the reason behind an important human activity, magic, which can be 
treated historically. Thus Collingwood has added a new dimension to the theory of mind and 
history’s subject matter, a new dimension that is remarkably similar to his earlier views, 
where the mind was seen as a whole, as a unity. But is the strong unity of mind also the case 
in the folklore writings? Is it not true that Collingwood stresses the emotional character of 
magic at the expense of its intellectual, cognitive character? Are we, therefore, to say that 
magic, as a purely emotional activity, pertains to only one of mind’s elements, which can be 
isolated and understood and regarded as the sole reason for this activity?42
In various places in PE Collingwood seems to be making a sharp distinction between 
intellect and emotions or feelings. For instance when he declares that the idea of magic can be 
found “not in the savage's intellect, but in his emotions” (PE, p. 196); or that magic is “an 
idea which arises spontaneously, without any theoretical or intellectual basis, from our 
emotional nature” (PE, p. 199); or that all of us have “a feeling -not an intellectual idea, but 
an emotional one- of an intimate connexion between ourselves and the things which we have 
made” (PE, p. 196). However these statements are much less categorical if seen next to other 
ideas of Collingwood’s found in PE, where magic is also presented as an activity of thought. 
We are told, for example, that the historian studies fairy tales -and by implication magic- “by 
reconstructing in his mind the life and thought of the people who have left him this sample of 
their work” (PE, p. 128, my emphasis); or that the historian would find it impossible “to 
understand magic, superstition, and so on if he himself has no inner experience of these
42 See also the conclusions o f  chapter IV, where I have tried to show that this is not the case.
62
THE UNITY OF MIND
thought-forms. (...) Either these things are only phenomena outside him, in which case they 
must be to him for ever unintelligible; or they are a part of his own experience, and therefore 
not the peculiar thought-form of other people called savages but thought-forms of his own” 
(PE, pp. 193, my emphasis).
A too literal interpretation of Collingwood’s understanding of magic as only an 
emotional activity will give us a misleading idea on how Collingwood saw the unity of mind 
in his folklore writings. Unquestionably he emphasised the emotional element of magic. But 
this he did in his effort to define magic adequately, correcting what he argued were the 
mistakes of the previous over-intellectualised interpretations of the scientific anthropologist 
and psychologist. But magic cannot exclude thought. If fairy tales are to be used as historical 
evidence in order to yield historical knowledge then magic, as the common element of fairy 
tales, is an activity that necessarily includes thought too. Thus I maintain that the unity of 
mind was not compromised in the folklore writings.
b. The Relationship between Thought and Emotions: The Case o f The Principles o f Art
It might be said that what Collingwood hinted in the 1933 moral philosophy lectures (see 
footnote 27) and how he dealt with emotions in the folklore mss, were the precursors of a 
more detailed theory of mind articulated in PA and in NL.
The effort of Collingwood in PA to define art is almost synonymous with his effort to 
clarify the place of emotions in human experience. This is the second step in his effort to 
unite the mind or, for that reason, to widen the understanding of human actions. The first was 
when he attributed a significant role to emotions as reasons for action in the folklore 
manuscripts. There it was within the scope of his theory of history, since magic as an 
emotional activity is the main element of fairy tales and fairy tales can be used to provide us 
with historical knowledge. In PA the new perspective was to link emotion and art. Thus it is 
only logical that his theories of art and history must be seen as having a strong connection.
PA offers a very valuable exposition of the relationships between the thinking and the 
feeling activities of the mind. Collingwood described at some length, and under a novel 
perspective, the relation between feelings and emotions and offers a theory of mind that sees a 
close connection between thoughts and emotions.
Collingwood first contrasts the thinking and the feeling elements of the mind. These 
elements display specific characteristics and they are distinguished from one another.43 
However the definition of feeling is not the same as before. He points out the double meaning
43 PA, pp. 157-160.
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of that word: feeling as sensation, the equivalent of the Latin sentio, and feeling as emotion.44 
Moreover sensation and emotion share an “intimate” relation, in the sense that they are 
combined and performed together as one experience 45 This union is not random but occurs 
“according to a definite structural pattern” (PA, p. 161). Sensation is what occurs first and 
emotion follows, but Collingwood doesn’t see this as temporal or cause and effect 
relationship.46 The outcome is to regard “a given emotion as the ‘emotional charge’ on the 
corresponding sensation” (PA, p. 162). This sensation Collingwood calls sensum and “every 
sensum has its own emotional charge” (PA, p. 162). This is a fine relation and in the ordinary 
life the exact correspondence between sensa and emotional charges is difficult to establish, 
not the least because modem people are more sensitive to their sensations than to their 
emotions.47
These feelings, the sensa with their emotional charge, have in PA the same character 
as the irrational elements in IH. They are independent of the thinking nature of man -although 
they are discovered by thought- and as an experience they are placed to a level lower than 
thinking 48 Lower for Collingwood has not the sense of importance but of stmcture, it is the 
“foundation upon which the rational part of our nature is built (...) before the superstructure 
of thought was built upon it, and enabling that superstructure to function well by being itself 
in a healthy condition” (PA, pp. 163-164).49 And as we have seen50 these feelings, the 
psychical level as he calls it, are what Collingwood regards as the legitimate subject matter of 
psychology.
Finally Collingwood elaborated further and made another distinction, this time 
between feelings as sensuous-emotional experience and emotions as such:
This level [i.e. the psychical level] contains indeed a vast variety of emotions; but 
only those which are the emotional charges upon sensa. When thought comes into 
existence... it brings with it new orders of emotions: emotions that can arise only in a thinker, 
and only because he thinks in certain ways. These emotions we sometimes call feelings; but 
in this book I shall avoid so calling them, in order not to confuse them with the peculiar 
experiences we enjoy at the psychical level (PA, p. 164).
This refinement seems clearly to dissociate emotions from the previous irrational 
context. Collingwood proceeds in a careful way, which builds solidly upon the ideas
44 PA, p. 160.
45 Ibid., p. 160.
46 Ibid., p. 161.
47 Ibid., p. 162. He argues that women, artists and children are more sensitive to their emotions.
48 Ibid., p. 163.
49 In IH Collingwood said in the same vain that the irrational elements “are the basis o f our rational 
life, though no part o f  i t ... Our reason ... [b]y learning to know them, it finds out how it can help them 
to live in health, so that they can feed and support it” (IH, p. 231).
50 See chapter I about psychology.
64
THE UNITY OF MIND
presented in the folklore mss. The position in PA is drastically different to the one advanced 
in IH. Now emotions don’t belong to the basic appetites of man but are linked to thought. But 
what are exactly the “emotions that can arise only in a thinker” and what is their connection to 
thinking?
This is where Collingwood’s theory of language appears, where language is 
conceived as the activity that expresses emotion and, with certain modifications, thought.51 
Collingwood’s purpose is to show that “the expression of any given thought is effected 
through the expression of the emotion accompanying it” (PA, p. 225). It is not within my 
current scope to present all the intricacies of his theory of language and the various levels of 
experience.52 For now53 it will suffice to say that in PA Collingwood identified different 
levels of experience. These levels are structurally related and the new level (the level above) 
retains elements of the previous level (the level below), which modifies in order to form the 
individual character of that new level and effect the transition from the lower to the higher 
level (the terms lower, higher, above, below, have always structural connotation and they do 
not indicate degrees of significance). The lower level (the psychical level) contains the 
elements that Collingwood identified earlier as sensa with the emotional charges. The other 
levels, all of which are conscious, contain emotions of a progressively more advanced 
character. Thus, for example, at an initial level of consciousness we have the “emotions of 
consciousness”, which “unlike the purely psychical emotions, admit expression in language: 
in a phrase, a controlled gesture or the like” (PA, p. 232) and these emotions are “the 
emotional charge not on a sensum but on a certain mode of consciousness” (PA, p. 232). 
Because of the structural character of the various levels -i.e. the fact that elements of the 
previous level remain at the next (with the necessary modification in order to be consolidated 
at that level)- the emotions of consciousness can have not only linguistic expression but 
psychical too, the latter being the element from the previous level of experience. Language, 
thus, appears at the young levels of the conscious experience where “it receives its original 
characteristics, which it never altogether loses, however much it is modified (...) in adapting 
itself to the requirements of the intellect” (PA, p. 225).
The progression from one level to the next and the corresponding modification of the 
emotions and their linguistic expression continues until the level of the intellect, the ultimate 
level. Summarizing this process Collingwood says:
51 Collingwood says that language is “an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion. 
Intellectual language is the same thing intellectualized, or modified so as to express thought” (PA, 
p.225).
2 PA, see mainly chapters X and XI. For a detailed analysis o f  these matters see the commentaries on 
Collingwood’s philosophy o f mind mentioned in footnotes 29 and 30.
53 My following synopsis o f  Collingwood’s theory comes mainly from chapter XI.
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An emotion is always the emotional charge upon some activity. For every different 
kind of activity there is a different kind of emotion. For every different kind of emotion there 
is a different kind of expression. Taking first the broad distinction between sensation and 
thought, the emotional charges upon sense-experience, felt as they are at a purely psychical 
level, are psychically expressed by automatic reactions. The emotional charges upon thought- 
experiences are expressed by the controlled activity of language. Taking then the distinction 
within thought of consciousness and intellect, the emotions of consciousness are expressed by 
language in its primitive and original form; but intellect has emotions too, and these must 
have an appropriate expression, which must be language in its intellectualized form (PA, pp. 
266-267).
The interconnection of the levels reminds us of the unity of mind in the early writings 
of Collingwood. Moreover the specific link between thought and emotion at the level of 
intellect now appears to be strong and Collingwood describes the connection in clear and 
unambiguous terms:
If it is once granted that intellectualized language does express emotion, and that this 
emotion is not a vague or generalized emotion, but the perfectly definite emotion proper to a 
perfectly definite act of thought, the consequence follows that in expressing the emotion the 
act of thought is expressed too. There is no need for two separate expressions, one of the 
thought and the other of the emotion accompanying it. There is only one expression. We may 
say if we like that a thought is expressed in words and that these same words also express the 
peculiar emotions proper to it; but these two things are not expressed in the same sense of that 
word. The expression of a thought in words is never a direct or immediate expression. It is 
mediated through the peculiar emotion which is the emotional charge on the thought (PA, p. 
267).
c. The Relationship between Thought and Emotions: The case o f The Principles o f History
The Principles o f  History, written in the first months of 1939 during Collingwood’s voyage to 
the Dutch East Indies, is an important text. Collingwood thought highly of it or at least of the 
intended outcome. He considered it as the pinnacle of his efforts in the philosophy of history.
The value that Collingwood attributed to it and the turbulent history of the manuscript 
itself (the idiosyncratic editorial decisions of T.M. Knox combined with the disappearance 
and the subsequent rediscovery of part of the ms) are sufficient reasons to exercise a definite 
attention to it.54
Moreover, the actual content itself put forward various ideas that Collingwood either 
explored and developed further or introduced for the first time. In many respects to the latter 
category belongs the treatment of emotions as an element related to thoughts and thus a part
54 The following treatments o f  the PH present valuable insights and the necessary historical background 
o f  the writings o f  the book:
D. Boucher. 1995. ‘The Principles o f  History and the Cosmology Conclusions to the Idea o f  Nature', 
in CS, vol. II, pp. 140-174 (Hereafter abbreviated as Cosmology); W.J. van der Dussen. 1997. 
‘Collingwood’s “Lost” Manuscript o f The Principles o f  History', in History and Theory, vol. 36, pp. 
32-62 (Hereafter abbreviated as LMS); SPH; BH; PH (Editors’ Introduction), pp. xiii-lxxxvii.
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of history’s subject matter.55 PH sharply contrasts with IH in the treatment of emotions. 
Boucher sums up the basic ideas and reasons behind Collingwood’s modified theory of 
history by pointing out that although “in The Idea o f History Collingwood distinguished 
between thoughts and feelings in an uncompromising way, suggesting that the latter were the 
context in which the former occur, he seems in The Principles o f History ... consciously to be 
bringing his theory of history into line with the theory of mind and language articulated in 
The Principles o f  Art” (Cosmology, p. 158).56 Moreover certain significant ideas in PA were 
based on the folklore ms and thus Boucher rightly observes that Collingwood in PH made 
clear “the implications of the importance he attached to emotions in his study of 
anthropology, which in many respects provides the foundation for the theory of mind 
formulated in The Principles o f  Art” (SPH, p. 323).
Collingwood presents his position in the, now, well-known example of the 
fortification officer. A historian, who studies a fort that has been built during a certain 
campaign, needs to know why the fortification officer built that particular fort. In order to do 
so the historian needs to understand “the nature of fortification in general, and of fortification 
at the time of that campaign in particular” (PH, p. 68). Collingwood then goes on to explain 
that:
Fortification in general is a protection against certain dangers; any particular type of 
fortification a protection against some particular variety of these dangers. And certainly the 
consciousness that one is providing protection against danger will be accompanied by certain 
emotions. If one is conscious that the protection is of a new and ingenious kind, these 
emotions will be complicated by others. These are emotions essentially related to the thought 
of the officer responsible for the fortification. And if we know what his thoughts were, we 
know what emotions of this essential kind he experienced (PH, p. 68).
To distinguish between essential and inessential emotion he adds:
But in the life of the officer, while the fortification was being planned and carried out, 
there were plenty of other emotions for which we have no evidence. ... (B)ut so long as these 
emotions are neither directly due to his building the fort, nor the cause of his building it in 
what a military engineer would consider a bad or inappropriate way, they have nothing to do 
with the fort and relatively to his action in building it are inessential emotions (PH, p. 68).
55 We have already seen that the relationship between thought and emotion was an idea that 
preoccupied Collingwood and he explored it before mainly in the folklore writings in PE and in PA. In 
PH, however, this relationship can be more clearly seen within the scope o f history. In PE o f  course 
emotions can also be a part o f  history’s subject matter but they seem to be independent o f the 
intellectual processes.
56 Boucher also maintains that PH shows “how integral The Principles o f  Art and An Essay on 
M etaphysics are to understanding Collingwood’s later philosophy o f  history” (SPH, p. 310). Dray 
points out that PH should also be read along with A since “the two are practically simultaneous works 
on the same subject” (BH, p. 33, n. 80).
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The same, for Collingwood, applies to other thoughts that might have been present in 
the officer’s mind but they “affect his building of it [i.e. the fort] not at all, and therefore have 
no connexion with the history of that event” (PH, p. 68). The conclusion that follows from 
Collingwood’s analysis is that history as the history of thought now “includes the history of 
emotions so far as these emotions are essentially related to the thoughts in question” (PH, p. 
77). However other emotions and thoughts that “may happen to accompany” (PH, p. 77) the 
thoughts in question are excluded.
This is a clear exposition, with a particular reference to his theory of history, that 
Collingwood sees thought and emotions related, both constituting a legitimate subject matter 
for the historian. However his thesis is not without problems or at least ambiguity. I see two 
main questions. One has to do with the exact relationship between thoughts and emotions or, 
in Collingwood’s terms, how emotions are essentially related to thoughts (and not just 
accompany them); the other has to do with whether emotions can be historically known the 
same way as thoughts. I will begin with the first question.
It has been argued by Boucher that essential emotions are the ones “necessarily bound 
up with the thoughts of the person who performs the action” (SPH, p. 325).57 Thus in the case 
of the fortification officer the emotion that accompanied necessarily the thought or choice of 
building the fort was fear of a danger against which protection was needed.58 On the other 
hand Dray sees fear as an emotion that Collingwood explicitly considers inessential59 and 
wonders whether there are indeed any emotions that “can be considered essential in the 
specified sense, namely, that of being strictly inferable from actions which ... they
57 Boucher gives an example o f  essential and inessential emotions in the form o f  an historian whose 
historical interest in a poem will lead him to be “unconcerned with the inessential emotion o f  anger as 
the nib o f  the pen snaps half way through the second verse, but he is concerned with the essential 
emotions o f  love and desire expressed in the poet’s characterization o f  the woman he adores” (SPH, p. 
325). Similarly he provides an example from Collingwood’s own account o f  his life that shows what 
emotions can be considered essential: “The details o f  his life which he gives relate directly to the 
thoughts he had at a particular time. In so far as emotion plays any part, it is those emotions directly 
related to his philosophical thought that are presented, and not those related to his personal life. We 
glimpse his emotional side, for example, when he talks o f  his frustration at not being able to understand 
Kant at an early age, his revulsion when gazing at the Albert Memorial, or his anger at contemporary 
political developments” (Cosmology, p. 160).
58 SPH, p. 325.
59 Collingwood in fact wrote that “We cannot say ... when we see how strong and elaborate the 
fortifications were, that he [i.e. the officer] must have been very frightened o f  the enemy; ... He may 
certainly have been frightened ... but as long as these emotions are neither directly due to his building 
the fort, nor the cause o f  his building it in what a military engineer would consider a bad or 
inappropriate way, they have nothing to do with the fort and relatively to his action in building it are 
inessential emotions” (PH, p. 68). Thus it can be said that Collingwood doesn’t rule out fear altogether 
but only when it is not relevant to the building o f the fort.
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‘accompany’” (BH, p. 9).60 He also seems to equate the terms essential and necessary for 
emotions that accompany an action or a thought.61
To assume that there are emotions necessarily connected with thoughts or actions is, I 
believe, problematic. To assume, that is, that a necessary emotion is the emotion that ought to 
be produced when a specific thought is formulated or when a specific action is taken. The 
same I think happens with thoughts: there are no thoughts that ought or should be expected to 
be present in a specific situation. At least not with the certainty that would make them 
causally probable or explainable. However there are thoughts and emotions that are pertinent 
in a given situation. I take pertinent to mean the following. Collingwood refers to the fact that 
the fortification officer’s consciousness of what he does, of his situation, is accompanied by 
certain emotions. These emotions pertain to consciousness; other emotions might exist but 
they are not pertinent if the officer himself was not aware of their existence at that specific 
time. The same applies to other thoughts: the officer might have had other thoughts but they 
are not pertinent since they were not fully conscious ones or, in other terms, they were not 
pertinent to what he was doing at the moment of the building of the fort. Thus those thoughts 
were at an undifferentiated state and didn’t leave any evidence of what they were about.
Now, as Collingwood claimed in PA, there is no need to assume that the act of 
attention to consciousness has two distinct objects, one being the thought and the other being 
the emotion. This is, I believe, what he implies by “essential”: essential refers not to the 
correspondence between a specific thought and a specific emotion62 but to the way emotions 
and thoughts are connected, the kind of connection or unity they have. It is a reminder of the 
earlier formulations of Collingwood’s unity of mind where he used to call emotions and 
thoughts “correlative activities”, connected in such a way that cannot be distinguished. It is 
the idea of the mind as a unity that Collingwood wishes to emphasize and not to prescribe 
guidelines for a necessary connection between certain thoughts and certain emotions.
Therefore his phrase “if we know what his thoughts were, we know what emotions of 
this essential kind he experienced” appears to be much less cryptic. Collingwood was 
describing the process of the mind as a complex one, where different elements have a 
simultaneous presence but a conscious attention to certain of those elements is our awareness 
of a specific situation. Moreover in our awareness of that situation there is no real distinction 
between thoughts and emotions and no real basis to believe that we are be able to discern one
60 Also PH, p. xxxvii: “it may well be doubted that there are any emotions which, in any strict sense, 
are essentially connected with acting in certain ways”.
61 BH, p. 28, ft. 26; PH, p. xxxviii.
62 And similarly the terms “accompany” and “related” do not entail particular combinations or absolute 
connections between certain thoughts and certain emotions. This seems to be impossible to ascertain 
and just gives the idea o f a peculiar uniformity.
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but not the other. The idea of knowing the thoughts but not the emotions seems, thus, an 
absurd one.
The point that Collingwood was trying to make was to insist on the very individual, 
the historical, character of an action and not to provide abstract generalisations. For him this 
individual character should involve the close connection between thoughts and emotions, not 
a connection between specific thoughts and specific emotions but between the generic 
concepts of the two. What emotion accompanies what thought cannot be decided in the 
abstract and in fact for Collingwood, I believe, such a question wouldn’t arise. Thus it was not 
his inability or inattention to provide “a general analysis of the concepts”63 that would suggest 
such a connection between thoughts and emotions. This cannot be done by this kind of 
analysis, since it presupposes what Collingwood’s historical approach wishes to avoid: 
generalisations, uniformity, logical connections and so forth. The concrete, individual, 
historical action can, thus, be only understood through a meticulous, historical analysis of the 
situation.
This certainly doesn’t solve the general problem of understanding something 
historically. However, in the hypothetical situation of the fortification officer, Collingwood 
does provide a framework within which historical understanding can be approached 
meaningfully. One of the parameters is to consider every utterance, action, event and so on as 
the product of a unified mind, where thoughts and emotions cannot be distinguished as 
individual elements. Another one is to consider an action as individually as possible. Towards 
this direction, I think, point Collingwood’s various remarks. When, for instance, he says that 
the historian needs to understand not only the general nature of fortification but the 
fortification of the specific campaign;64 that particular types of fortification provide protection 
against particular varieties of dangers;65 that the consciousness of fortification as protection 
against dangers will have emotions that will be complicated by other emotions should the 
fortification is of a “new and ingenious kind” 66 Thus by degrees the general situations are 
broken down into smaller actions that need to be understood in that sense first, before they 
can take their place in the more general scheme: the building of the specific fort as a part of 
the specific campaign, which will be seen as a part of the specific war and so forth.
In that respect, therefore, with reference to the fortification officer example it is a real 
possibility to consider fear as one of the emotions that the officer had during the war 
campaign. However fear seems to be a more general emotion. It exists before the construction
63 Dray argues that Collingwood didn’t show “by a general analysis o f  the concepts involved, that 
particular emotions are, say, logically or conceptually connected to corresponding types o f  action”
(BH, p. 9). See also PH, p. xxxvii, where such analysis might be able to demonstrate “that certain 
emotions are necessarily connected with certain types o f  action”.
64 PH, p. 68.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
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of the fort and might well continue to exist after the fort has been completed. Fear of the 
enemy is one of the general emotions, a general condition in a war.67 But the activity as such 
of the building of the fort as protection against dangers, although it might fall within the 
general emotion of fear, still is a specific activity of a certain kind -a  work of engineering- 
that has more specific emotions as well. What these emotions are I think we cannot infer 
without a real knowledge of the historical situation. The same with thoughts.
I have tried to show what I believe ‘essential’ means in the context of Collingwood’s 
example. This leads to our second question: can emotions be historically known the same way 
as thoughts? It seems now that if by essential Collingwood wanted to refer to the kind of 
connection between thoughts and emotions, it follows that emotions can be historically 
known the same way as thoughts. If it is impossible to distinguish between a thought and an 
emotion, what the historian faces in his studies is a whole that necessarily entails both 
elements. Now, according to Collingwood something is historically known if it can be re­
enacted in the mind of the historian who studies it. Therefore the historian, who works along 
the principles of Collingwood’s theory, should be able to re-enact emotions as well as 
thoughts.68 However any discussion about re-enactment is absent from PH, even though the 
doctrine was meant to be part of the book.69 This is surprising and has raised various 
questions, even as to whether Collingwood himself in his late thought regarded re-enactment 
important for his theory of history.70 Of course the reason why in PH he didn’t write about re­
enactment is possibly a very simple one, like deciding “not to write about the subject without 
consulting his lectures on philosophy of history of 1936, which have a section on re­
enactment” (LMS, p. 40).71
It has also been suggested that although there is no reference to re-enactment as such, 
the idea still survives in different expressions, such as reconstruction, or implied in the way
67 This general condition however might or might not be present in individuals. For example it needs to 
be absent for the notion o f  fearlessness during a war or a battle to be meaningful. Otherwise it would be 
an incomprehensible notion altogether. Moreover what makes this condition ‘general’ is rather an 
abstract psychological (or even statistical) element, not a historical one.
68 The idea that emotions are re-enactable was suggested by Mink much earlier that the discovery o f  the 
PH manuscript and it was based on his dialectical interpretation o f  Collingwood’s philosophy. See 
Dialectic, p. 12-15; Historicism, p. 167; MHD, p. 164-167.
69 See Collingwood’s Scheme fo r  a Book: ‘The Principles o f  History’ (PH, p. 245-246). Re-enactment 
was to be discussed in the 3rd Chapter o f Book I: “Conception o f  Re-enactment, and contrast the Dead  
Past and Completeness”.
70 For example van der Dussen argues that it is interesting to ask whether Collingwood himself thought 
o f  re-enactment “as paramount or perhaps as problematic, at least at this final stage o f  his thought, as it 
has appeared to most o f his commentators” (LMS, p. 40).
71 van der Dussen also argues that in general the reasons that PH was not finished are to be found 
“largely in certain fortuitous circumstances” (LMS, p. 36) and “certain accidental conditions” (LMS, p.
38) and not in Collingwood’s dissatisfaction with the content or the subject-matter o f the book. For van 
der Dussen’s justification o f  this argument see mainly LMS, pp. 36-39.
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Collingwood presents several of his examples in PH.72 In short it seems not very likely for 
Collingwood to have abandoned re-enactment.73 Therefore, with the assumption that re­
enactment continued to play a role in Collingwood’s theory of history and understanding, the 
re-enactive understanding of emotions becomes a very interesting topic. We have seen that if 
‘essential’ refers to the intimate connection between thought and emotion, then when a 
thought is re-enacted the emotion is as well. However the re-enactment of emotion has been 
seen as more complicated than that. One problem, as van der Dussen puts it, is whether 
emotions can “be understood in the way Collingwood elsewhere says thoughts are to be 
understood. For the “mediacy” of thoughts, which for Collingwood is a condition of their 
being historically understood ... seems to be lacking in the case of emotions” (LMS, p. 51, n.
39).74 However as it has been pointed out neither emotions nor thoughts can be re­
experienced or re-enacted in their immediacy but in their mediacy.75 Still more perplexing 
seems to be the intentional character of emotions. As Dray suggests in the case of emotions, 
as opposed to thoughts, the element of intention is missing since emotions are out of our 
control and cannot be felt on purpose.76 On the other hand Boucher argues that Collingwood 
in the folk tales writings and in PA tried to show how the expression of emotions can be a 
controlled, deliberate and purposive activity and thus a criteriological human science and re- 
enactable.77 The main difficulty with seeing emotions as non purposive and non intentional is, 
I believe, the following. If by intention and purpose we mean something like a process that 
begins because of our own will and continues to be under our absolute control, then even 
thought looks difficult to possess such qualities. The actual birth of any intellectual process is 
somehow contingent and random. It actually appears to be impossible even to locate the very 
point of birth of any given intellectual process, any given thought, emotion and the like. I 
think this idea is not unlike Montaigne’s distrust of thoughts since they just occur to us. None 
the less after the appearance of any thought or emotion, however contingent their birth might 
be, there is little doubt that we are presented with something upon which we can exercise a 
certain control. We may not start to think or feel on purpose, but there is scope to accept that 
under certain conditions we harness our thoughts and emotions and deliberately direct them. 
Therefore I see no fundamental difference between thoughts and emotions as to their 
intentionality; and contrary to the suggestion that Collingwood didn’t see emotions as reasons
72 SPH, p. 326; PH, pp. lxvi-lxvii; LMS, p. 50; BH, p. 24.
73 PH, p. lxiv; SPH, p. 327; BH, p. 23-24.
74 However van der Dussen at the same footnote stresses the fact that Collingwood in PA distinguished 
between feelings and emotions and related thoughts to emotions.
75 Boucher maintains that the “aspect o f  Collingwood’s theory that enables emotion to be experienced 
in its mediacy, that is, its ability to be revived in a different context, is the theory o f  imagination found 
in the Principles o f  Art" (SPH, p. 330). Mink used the term ‘surrogate way’ to describe how emotions 
that survive in consciousness can be re-enacted (Historicism, p. 14; MHD, p. 167).
76 PH, p. lxvii; BH, p. 11-12, 13; Dray, pp. 130-131.
77 SPH, pp. 324-325, 329-330.
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or motives for action and didn’t assign an explanatory role to them78, it seems that this is 
exactly how he saw them.
d. Feelings and Consciousness: The New Leviathan
The theory of mind expounded in NL is very similar to the one Collingwood described in PA. 
The connection between these two books in that respect has been pointed out and a parallel 
reading has been suggested79 as a meaningful way to understand and put in a single context 
the intricacies of Collingwood’s theory of mind.
The mind in NL is again seen as having levels that are structurally interrelated. Only 
that now, in contrast with PA, feelings do not form a level below the conscious ones but they 
belong to consciousness.
Consciousness or thought is what the mind is made of. Thus we are told that the 
“essential constituent of mind is consciousness or thought (practical and theoretical80) in its 
most rudimentary form. In addition, many minds have other constituents in the shape of 
various specialized forms of consciousness. Forms of consciousness are the only constituents, 
so far as I know, possessed by any mind” (NL, 4.18). For Collingwood man in his capacity as 
mind “is consciousness, practical and theoretical, both in its simplest form and also in 
specialized forms” (NL, 4.2).
In contrast feeling is not a constituent but “an apanage of mind” (NL, 4.19). 
Therefore a feeling being an apanage of mind is an apanage of consciousness. Man is not 
feeling but “has feeling, both in its simplest or purely sensuous-emotional form and also in 
specialized forms” (NL, 4.2).
The simple feeling is exactly the same as what Collingwood in PA described as sensa 
with their emotional charges. The same connection (structurally and not temporally or 
causally) appears to exist as well, where the sensation (sensum) takes precedence over the 
emotional charge. Thus in NL a feeling “consists of two things closely connected: first, a 
sensuous element such as a colour seen, a sound heard, an odour smelt; secondly, what I call 
the emotional charge on this sensation: the cheerfulness with which you hear the noise, the 
disgust with which you smell the odour” (NL, 4.1).
78 BH, p. 9-10; PH, p. xxxiii.
79 For an exposition o f  a theory o f  mind by a parallel reading o f  PA an NL see mainly Mink’s writings 
and Boucher’s SPT.
80 About this dual aspect o f  thought Collingwood says that: “Theoretical thought is, for example, 
thinking about the cold, or thinking about the difference between cold and hot, or thinking that 
yesterday was even colder than to-day” (NL, 1.64). “Practical thought is, for example, thinking whether 
to light a fire or thinking that you will go back to bed, or thinking: ‘Why should I have the window 
open?’ ” (NL, 1.65). Also he asserts that “thought is primarily practical; and only in the second place 
theoretical” (NL, 1.66).
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About the specialized forms of feeling Collingwood says that they “arise through the 
practical work of consciousness, which is always bringing into existence new types of feeling 
and then, reflecting on the situation its practical work has created, making it a new object to 
itself in its theoretical form” (NL, 4. 21).
The relation between thought (or consciousness) and feeling is thus very intimate. 
They are connected both at the simple forms of consciousness and at the more specialized or 
complex ones. In its simple form feeling is an apanage of “simple consciousness, namely its 
proper object, what there is consciousness o f ’ (NL, 4.19). Simple consciousness, when 
operating theoretically, “finds feeling in its simplest form” (NL, 4.22) and its only job is “to 
apprehend simple feeling” (NL, 4.24), that is, to have that simple feeling as object. In the 
same way any specialized form of consciousness, when operating theoretically, “finds feeling 
in a correspondingly specialized form” (NL, 4.22). Again any specialized form of 
consciousness has as object, apprehends, the corresponding specialized form of feeling.81 
Always the work of any form of consciousness is to apprehend the corresponding form of 
feeling and any form of feeling can only be apprehended by the corresponding form of 
consciousness.82
From this intimate relationship between feelings and thought (consciousness) it 
follows that all forms of consciousness have a close connection with emotions too. Since all 
forms of feelings are immediate objects to the corresponding forms of consciousness and 
“[ejvery immediate object (...) carries one [an emotional charge]” (NL, 4.77), thus “any form 
of consciousness, however highly developed, it always has an immediate object, and the 
immediate object always carries an emotional charge” (NL, 4. 78).
The case of NL, the mind as a unity of feeling and consciousness (thought), 
consolidates the ideas that Collingwood in various degrees expounded in PE, PA and PH. 
However the argument of NL is unique in one respect. As it has been pointed out83 in NL the 
psychical level of experience is within the province of the sciences of the mind since feelings, 
as an apanage, belong to the mind. In PA Collingwood did distinguish between feelings and 
emotions. Feelings belong to the psychical level of experience, while emotions belong to 
higher levels of experience. Thus the distinction made was between psyche and spirit, 
predominantly a way to divide the mind as such. In NL Collingwood makes a distinction 
between body and mind, which is not the same as the distinction between spirit and psyche, 
not a division within the mind as such. In fact Collingwood appears to consider the psyche 
and the mind the same thing when he says in his discussion of the Greek word \\n)yr\ that 
“‘Soul’ is our conventional translation for but the word ‘soul’ is obsolescent or obsolete
81 NL, 4.24.
82 Ibid.
83 SPT, pp. 118-119.
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in modem English, except in a few special contexts, and ‘mind’ has taken its place” (NL, p. 
17, n. 1).
Now his distinction between body and mind is a distinction between something that is 
made of matter (i.e. body) and something that is not made of matter (i.e. mind).84 For the 
purposes of his investigation of the mind “all inquiry into ‘body’ where ‘’body’ means 
matter” (NL, 3.71) must be excluded. However Collingwood argues that there is an occasion 
“in which a discussion of man’s ‘body’ can be of value for an inquiry into his mind” (NL, 
3.12). This is when the word ‘body’ has “a sense neither physical nor chemical nor 
physiological but psychologicar (NL, 3.13), when “‘body’ means not matter but feeling” 
(NL, 3.72). And when body has this meaning it “is closely connected with our present 
inquiry, and we must not ignore it” (NL, 3.14).
This psychological sense Collingwood attaches to the phrases “‘bodily appetite’, 
‘bodily pleasure, and ‘bodily exertion’” (NL, 3.2). Appetite, pleasure and exertion are general 
terms and can include cases where ‘bodily’ can and cannot apply. Thus the general term 
appetite can include hunger and curiosity but Collingwood contends that ‘bodily’ applies to 
hunger but not to curiosity85 and this because “there is a characteristic group of feelings 
(sensations and emotions connected with them) whereby a man knows that he is hungry, and 
none by which he knows that he is curious” (NL, 3.34).86 The same with pleasure, where 
“lying in a hot bath is called a bodily pleasure; the pleasure of reading Newton’s Principia is 
not” (NL, 3.4), the difference being “that in the case of the bath the pleasure is the pleasure of 
feeling in certain ways: the pleasure of warmth on the skin and so forth; in the case of the 
Principia the pleasure is the pleasure of thinking in certain ways” (NL, 3.42). And in the case 
of exertion Collingwood maintains that digging, as opposed to following a mathematical 
argument, is a bodily exertion.87 Therefore in all three cases of appetite, pleasure and exertion 
the term bodily applies to them when they are connected with feelings.
One thing should be noted. When Collingwood says a) that the bodily appetites, 
pleasures and exertions are connected with feelings; b) that the appetite of curiosity, the 
pleasure of reading the Principia and the exertion of following a mathematical argument are 
not bodily; we should not assume that the non bodily appetites, pleasures and exertions are 
not connected with feelings. As we have seen consciousness and feelings in NL are always 
connected, both in their simple forms and in the more specialised forms.88 Therefore even the
84 NL, 2.14.
85 Ibid., 3.3.
86 Collingwood gives the examples o f  “a ‘gnawing’ sensation at the stomach, a general organic 
sensation o f  weakness or lassitude, with an inability to see clearly and a tendency for things to go 
black, and an emotional feeling o f  gloom or depression” (NL, 3.32), as the group o f  feelings that are 
present in hunger but absent in curiosity.
87 NL, 3.5-3.54.
88 NL, 4.2-4.22.
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non-bodily appetites, pleasures and exertions will be connected with feelings. I think, 
however, that Collingwood is in some way unclear at this point, since on one hand he 
differentiates between the physiological and the psychological sense of body (which is 
connected with feelings) and on the other hand he also seems to maintain a distinction 
between the psychological sense of body and the mind, where the mind is a combination of 
thoughts and feelings.
This ambiguity aside NL is closer to Collingwood’s early philosophy of mind than 
any of his other later writings. Feelings in NL are connected to consciousness and are part of 
the mind. Since they are a combination of sensation and emotion, they remind us of 
Collingwood’s writings of the 1920’s where sensation was a necessary part of the mind and 
not distinguished from thought. Moreover the concept of the ‘psychological sense of body’ 
brings the elements of sensation closer to the human mind and at the same time creates an 
intimate connection between the sciences of the mind and psychology.
§ 5. Conclusions
In the previous sections I have attempted to show that the philosophy of mind Collingwood 
formulated in his various writings, had as one of its main tenets that the mind should be seen 
as a whole, which is not and cannot be divided and whose different activities can only be 
separated in the form of an abstraction. To abstract is, for Collingwood, the attempt to 
separate any activity from the concrete form of experience, the experience that is, whose 
activities interact and create an indivisible whole. Abstraction then becomes not a legitimate 
attempt to describe individual activities, but rather a meaningless game. In Collingwood’s 
words it is a “false theory”.89 It is not, however, to be believed that the concrete experience is 
composed of an undefined single activity; different activities can be identified. But to identify 
different activities is not to deny that the mind is united, only to realise that these activities 
have a proper life only when they interact with each other; in their individuality they hardly 
possess more than a name.
This position of Collingwood’s was particularly strong in his earlier philosophical 
production: RP, SM, and various essays from the 1920’s. In those writings the unity of mind 
includes not only thoughts and emotions but also what comes under the name of feelings or 
sensations or, in the case of SM, intuition. For Collingwood perception is not, what he calls, 
an abstract immediacy (sensation) but implicitly includes mediation (thought). The mind 
being thus united can only be studied as a whole and for Collingwood this could be done by
89 RP, p. 154.
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the philosophical sciences, such as ethics, logic and so on. The claim of psychology to study 
the mind was found by Collingwood erroneous. It was found erroneous not because 
Collingwood considered -as in his late writings- psychology incapable of studying the entire 
mind but only what can be termed feelings. In those early writings psychology was found ill- 
quipped to study the mind because it assumed the methods of natural sciences and treated the 
mind as something that is not, i.e. matter. The united mind is also found in all Collingwood’s 
later books and essays of the mid 1930’s and the early 1940’s. In particular, as we have seen, 
PA and NL, if read together, construct a coherent philosophy of mind and the most extensive 
treatment of that subject; both works explain the mind in terms of a unity. One difference can 
be discerned though. In PA the psychical level of experience, which corresponds with the 
element of pure sensation, cannot be seen as part of the mind as such, but it forms the subject 
matter of psychology, the discipline that employs the methodology of the natural sciences. In 
NL, however, the psychical level is an integral part of the mind and should be studied not in a 
naturalistic but in a historical way.
However the unity of mind cannot be sustained during a brief interlude, the main 
manifestations of which are to be found in the famous passages of IH. Collingwood in IH 
divided the mind in spirit and psyche, the former being the subject-matter of history, the latter 
of psychology. This different view of the mind had a real value for psychology. It was 
because of this view -the distinction of different elements within the mind- that the 
psychology of feeling was recognised by Collingwood as a legitimate discipline. It was a 
recognition that would have been impossible with the previous strong unity of mind that 
Collingwood advocated in his earlier philosophy. This division of the mind in IH has also 
affinities with the 1928 philosophy of history lectures, where Collingwood introduced the 
distinction between conscious and unconscious activities of the mind, the conscious being the 
subject-matter of history. The similarity is that both in IH and the 1928 lectures the mind is 
seen as something that has no unity since different activities can be discerned and studied in 
different ways by different disciplines. However in IH psyche is not an unconscious activity 
but part of the conscious human life and the basis for the rational life although not a part of 
rationality.90 Moreover it is unclear, in 1928, what the boundaries of the conscious and the 
unconscious activities are, and perhaps emotions are part of consciousness. It is very likely 
that this was a scheme that Collingwood hadn’t fully worked out but only served him as a 
hypothesis to rethink the structure of the mind and to link it to his historical concerns. In the 
above writings we are, therefore, faced with a novel appreciation of the mind: in the 1928
90 IH, p. 231.
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lectures more mildly and ambiguously, in IH more categorically.91 Compared with the unity 
of mind strongly present elsewhere in Collingwood’s work, IH and the 1928 lectures must, I 
think, be seen as an aberration which, albeit short-lived, has been vital in all the subsequent 
exegeses of Collingwood’s philosophy. IH, in particular, has provided the material for 
criticising Collingwood’s concept of history as unduly restricted and over rationalistic. What 
was then the reason for this aberration?
In contrast with any discussion in some other of his works, Collingwood’s treatment 
of the mind in 1928 and in IH was directly related to the problem of history. It was within 
Collingwood’s efforts to provide an answer to how historical knowledge is possible and how 
historical understanding can be attained. According to Collingwood himself, although he had 
been working on historical problems for some years, it was only in 1928 in the manuscript he 
wrote during his vacation at Le Martouret, near Die, that his ideas advanced considerably.92 It 
was in 1928 that the concept that all history is the history of thought was formulated and the 
doctrine of re-enactment was introduced.93 It appears, therefore, that the new conception of 
the mind coincides with the introduction of this historical perspective: what created this 
historical perspective also rendered the unity of mind obsolete.
Trying to define the possibility of historical knowledge through re-enactment, 
Collingwood paid close attention to the immediacy of the experience. This is what connects 
the unconscious elements of the 1928 lecture and the psyche in IH: both thought to be the 
elements of that are carried away by the flow of the immediate experience. Of course 
everything -thoughts, feelings, sensations- is carried away by the immediate experience. 
Thus in order for something to be re-enactable it needs to be able to revive itself in a different 
context, on a different time by a different -often- thinker. And to be able to do so by 
remaining the same, not just something similar. This led Collingwood in IH to make sharp 
distinctions between thought and sensation/feeling/emotions.94 The latter is immediate 
experience and disappears forever with the flow of this experience. If we try to revive it 
through memory “at most there reappears something like it” (IH, p. 293). Thought is “both 
immediacy and mediation” (IH, p. 300) and thus it can be revived in a different context and it 
will be the same thought not one like it. I believe that the sharp distinction between thought 
and the rest of the elements of the experience is not satisfactory. It does not fully explain why
91 Boucher argues that Collingwood’s position, as to the treatment o f emotions and feelings, is the same 
in A as in IH (SPH, p. 322-323). This is even more surprising given that Collingwood was in the 
process o f  revising A at the same time he was composing PH.
52 A, p. 107.
93 It is not my intention to discuss re-enactment in detail. For some thorough and competent accounts o f  
the doctrine see: Dray; M.H. Nielsen. 1981. ‘Re-enactment and reconstruction in Collingwood’s 
philosophy o f  history’, in History and Theory, vol. 20, pp. 1-31; HS, mainly pp. 96-109, 312-324; H. 
Saari. 1984. Re-enactment: a study in R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy o f  history.
94 His argument can be found mainly in pp. 282-302 (§4. History as Re-enactment o f  Past Experience) 
and in some parts o f the next section pp. 302-315 (§5. The Subject-matter o f History).
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emotion and sensation cannot be revived in the same way as thought, since it is through 
thought that these elements of the immediate experience become known.95
Collingwood was soon to free his historical considerations from the restrictions found 
in EH. Instead of paying attention to -perhaps supposed- differences between thought and 
sensation/emotion, his later historical theory restores the unity of mind in the effort to attain 
historical knowledge. It is in a sense the appreciation that the problems that pertain to the 
understanding of thoughts are not less or less complicated than the ones that pertain to the 
understanding of emotions and feelings. The unity of mind is not the answer to the 
fundamental question of how historical knowledge is possible; it is the necessary form that 
such answers should have.
95 For instance: “In the immediate experience o f sight, we see a colour; only by thinking can we know 
ourselves to be seeing it” (IH, pp. 294-295).
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Chapter III: From Imagination to Knowledge -  The problem of art and the problem of 
history 
§ 1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to look at Collingwood’s philosophy of art.1 My purpose for doing 
so is to see how his philosophy of art falls within the broader human understanding, a vital 
element in Collingwood’s philosophy. His philosophy of art is not only an integral aspect of 
his philosophy of mind but it stands in close connection with history in the epistemology that 
Collingwood was formulating after SM. After history art is the most prominent element in 
Collingwood’s philosophical system.
We have seen in chapter II how this broader understanding is facilitated by 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind, where thoughts and emotions are closely connected. In 
that respect Collingwood’s aesthetics is a central element in his philosophy of mind since in 
PA the connection between thoughts and emotions was propounded in detail. Moreover the 
place of art in human experience and understanding is almost equal to that of history, since 
Collingwood considered art a form of knowledge, the knowledge of the individual. This is the 
significance of Collingwood’s aesthetics: art is not a peripheral experience of man but a 
central element in the understanding of him and vital to civilisation. Collingwood’s 
contribution to the field of aesthetics is his conviction that art is a form of knowledge and his 
effort to establish this character in his writings. My aim is to show that the epistemological 
status of art in Collingwood’s philosophy was established by a process the origins of which 
can be found in his very early writings.
I maintain that Collingwood’s early aesthetic references support the idea of art as the 
expression of emotion or feelings, hence art as knowledge. However the traditional view, that 
he begins with art as imagination and gradually moves to a mature and more developed theory 
of art as the expression of emotions, eclipses the early epistemological importance of art. 
Even in SM, where art as imagination has a prominent place, Collingwood’s main 
preoccupation was to answer the question if art can provide genuine knowledge. In the mid 
1920’s Collingwood, undeniably, gave emphasis to art as imagination. But this, I believe, 
should be seen as an interval between his main attempts to see art as the expression of 
emotions and knowledge. In order to clarify these issues I propose to examine chronologically
1 Some criticisms o f  Collingwood’s aesthetics revolve around the question whether art is a general 
term. It falls out my scope to investigate such avenues but a good starting point to explore this and 
other criticisms is T.J. Diffey. 1995. ‘Aesthetics and Philosophical Method’, in PHC, pp. 62-78.
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his early philosophy of art -see how he regarded art in his various writings and the changes of 
emphasis- and then consider the reason for the changes.
Roughly this early period can be placed between the late 1910’s and early 1930’s, 
with most of his extended treatises on art coming from the mid 1920’s. A problem with 
Collingwood’s aesthetic writings -  especially those in essay form -  is that they are scattered 
in various journals or were left in inaccessible manuscript form. Even after his mss became 
available, a lot of his small essays on aesthetics among them remained unpublished.2 Perhaps 
because of this accessibility factor or because of the tendency to regard the early 
philosophical attempts as provisional and modified by the later ideas of a thinker on the same 
subject, Collingwood’s early aesthetic views have not, as a whole, received a lot of attention.3 
It might be true that the late work of some thinkers renders obsolete the earlier. This is not the 
case with Collingwood. The manner he approached any philosophical question was careful 
and slow. Long periods of gestation usually produced a final idea, the stages of which were 
not unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem, but vital elements to the formation of the final 
idea.4 Thus Collingwood can be seen as frequently modifying and trying to better his theories, 
without completely abandoning earlier tenets for later ones. With reference to his philosophy 
of art, the importance of The Principles o f Art, as his last word on the subject, cannot be fully 
understood outside a general appreciation of his aesthetics. In that respect his early writings 
are as important as the later.
I will begin by giving an account of Collingwood’s early books on art and those of 
his essays where, even briefly, he touched upon ideas relevant to art. Some of those pieces are 
small, delivered as lectures or -although competent essays- remained unpublished in his
2 A collection of some o f  his published essays on art does exist and is a good place to start with 
Collingwood’s early aesthetic writings: A. Donagan (ed.). 1964. Essays in the Philosophy o f  Art by 
R. G. Collingwood. Indiana UP.
The situation with regard to the unpublished mss has been largely amended with the publication o f  PE. 
This book contains many previously unpublished manuscript o f  Collingwood on issues o f art, criticism, 
culture, anthropology and folktales and facilitates the understanding o f the significance o f  such areas in 
the general philosophical-historical concern o f  his. With regard to art it contains a number o f useful 
essays from his early period that will help to realise his aesthetics as an ongoing process.
3 A critical approach o f Collingwood’s early philosophy o f  art or even a comparative approach between 
early and late stages o f  his aesthetics is very rare. There is for instance the essay by P. Jones. 1972. ‘A 
Critical Outline o f Collingwood’s Philosophy o f  Art’, in Krausz, pp. 42-67. However the early 
philosophy o f  art o f Collingwood is solely represented by his two books, the Speculum Mentis and the 
Outlines o f  a Philosophy o f  Art. Although many o f  his ms essays were unavailable at the time, still 
published essays from the mid 1920’s could have been used to provide a more thorough and perhaps 
unconventional idea o f Collingwood’s aesthetics. The same can be seen in the overview o f  
Collingwood’s theory o f  art by Mink in MHD, chapter 7, pp. 195-238.
4 I believe this is in accord with Rubinoffs main tenet that in Collingwood’s philosophy “there is no 
radical conversion; that on the contrary there is a strong continuity between the early and later 
writings” (Rubinoff, p. v). Rubinoff o f course was trying to argue against the accusation o f  a strong 
scepticism in the later philosophy o f  Collingwood, that Knox initiated. Albeit the context might be 
somehow different the principal idea is the same: that Collingwood’s philosophy should be seen as 
consistent without dramatic changes o f  his stance. In that respect a similarity can de discerned with 
Oakeshott’s philosophy.
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lifetime. I intend to discuss all these early essays, in as much as they do not usually receive 
extended coverage5, because they communicate nuances that otherwise would have been 
unobserved. Seen within his general output on the philosophy of art, they comprise an 
interesting phase or phases, small and occasionally isolated instances of ideas that they do not 
correspond to the traditional interpretation of Collingwood’s philosophy of art. Thus, 
examining some of these essays, we realise that the idea of art as the expression of feelings or 
emotions can be found very early in Collingwood’s thought, in fact preceding the doctrine of 
art as imagination. In addition, some other of his mid 1920’s essays present a hybrid character 
between art as imagination and art as expression. All the essays taken together show that art 
as just imagination was a rather short lived idea, although imagination never ceased to play a 
vital role in Collingwood’s philosophy of art. Alongside the essays I will also examine the 
more extended of Collingwood’s early references to art, as found in SM and OPA. Both were 
formulated at about the same time, in the mid 1920’s. OPA was published a year after SM and 
in effect it is the same theory that is presented in both books. Indeed the design of OPA was 
also made in the year of the publication of SM, in 1924. The remnants of that design can now 
be found in a manuscript that Collingwood used for his lectures. The theory of art as 
imagination is propounded in both books but in SM art is only one of various forms of 
experience and its treatment is somehow different from OPA. In SM Collingwood seeks more 
to answer the question whether art is knowledge than firmly establishing art as imagination. 
Lastly I will examine Collingwood’s writings and reviews from the early 1930’s that show 
the characteristics developed in the late 1920’s, the status of art as expression and knowledge 
was consolidated.
After presenting Collingwood’s early ideas on the philosophy of art it will be 
apparent that a linear development from imagination to the expression of emotions is not to be 
found. The early Collingwood tended to see art as the expression of emotions or feelings. 
Moreover in some of his writings imagination and thought (or expression) are treated 
together. In some writings art is considered solely as imagination or expression. The various 
phases and vicissitudes in addressing the problem of art was an ongoing concern. He did not 
proceed with bold steps and attempts for final solutions but rather with a careful attitude of 
small modifications, additions and corrections and not infrequently steps back to previous 
formulations to look at them afresh and to re-evaluate them.
The second part of this chapter will look for the reason for those vicissitudes, which 
resulted in the definition of art as the expression of emotions in PA. The epistemological
5 For a discussion o f the essays see PE: Editors’ Foreword and Note, pp. xiii-xxi and Editors’ 
Introduction, pp. xxiii-cxix. Taylor 1985 and Taylor 1988 also discuss a number o f these essays and 
provide annotation. Taylor’s bibliography was not entirely complete: James Connelly has provided 
additions and corrections to Taylor’s listings (CS, vol. VIII, 2001, pp. 152-154; CS, vol. XII (no 1), 
2006, p. 116; CS, vol. XIII (no 2), 2007, pp. 118-126).
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character of art was an area that had received attention in the history of aesthetics and 
Collingwood attempted his own solution. That involved reconciliation between imagination 
and knowledge. The principal problem was that art as pure imagination falls short of 
providing adequate foundation for knowledge. Imagination was, for Collingwood, an activity 
that, albeit fundamental, comes before thought. It is a precursor of thought and in some cases 
it assists thought. It is a very important function and Collingwood never ceased to address that 
fact. None the less imagination as such cannot provide knowledge. And if art is to become a 
vital part of human expression and understanding, it needs to be something more than just 
imagination.
Collingwood’s two main attempts to tackle this idea were SM and the PA. However 
there is also another element that it is worth considering: the essays where Collingwood 
contrasted art with history, the two areas to which he devoted the major part of his intellectual 
efforts. The essays are particularly important in that art is contrasted with what Collingwood 
regarded as the main way to acquire knowledge of the human mind. The significance of this 
point has been hinted by Louis Mink. In his construction or reconstruction of Collingwood’s 
philosophy on the basis of a dialectic, he maintains that “while the interior stages of the 
dialectic of mind are subject to compression or expansion, the terminal stages represent 
stronger and more definite philosophical claims” (MHD, p. 195). Mink refers to his idea that 
the four levels of consciousness he identified in Collingwood’s philosophy could conceivably 
be more but only if we add levels in between; we cannot go further than a certain point, the 
terminal, and this point for Mink are the stages of Art and History. Thus “the philosophy of 
art and the philosophy of history are accordingly both more important and more developed in 
Collingwood’s thought than his views on religion and on science” (MHD, p. 195). Therefore 
the intention of Collingwood to contrast these two areas cannot but have a special gravity.6 
These essays, chronologically, fall within Collingwood’s two main attempts, in SM and in 
PA, to solve the problem of art as both imagination and knowledge. Therefore I propose first 
to look at SM before the relationship between history and art will be explored. Then I will 
examine how he finally tackled the problem in PA.
The scholarly work that has been done on Collingwood’s philosophy of art attends 
closely to the elements of imagination, language and expression; to the connection it has with 
his philosophy of mind; and to the difference between his discussion of art in SM and PA.7 
My contribution to the interpretation of Collingwood’s aesthetics is the emphasis on the very
6 The philosophy o f  art and the philosophy o f  history that Collingwood expounded are connected in 
another way too, since the late versions o f both theories recognise the significant role o f emotions in 
the human condition. For a closer examination o f  this idea see chapter II.
7 This is mainly the point that Mink makes in MHD. He sees the difference in terms o f  the “change in 
Collingwood’s vocabulary from “spirit” to “consciousness” [which] was not merely a semantic 
substitution but a complex conceptual development” (MHD, p. 197).
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early character of art as expression of emotions and feelings. Also an alternative explanation 
as to the differences between SM and PA, described in terms of an epistemological shift.
§ 2. Collingwood’s writings on the Philosophy of Art from the 1910’s
a. Words and Tune%
In this short essay Collingwood attempted to formulate the connection between a poem or a 
piece of prose and the music these literary works are being set to. One of his main tenets is 
that for this transformation to be achieved “the composer must have a thorough and profound 
apprehension of the meaning of the words he is setting, and that he must somehow express 
this meaning in his music” (PE, p. 3). And Collingwood further on explains that “[w]e use the 
word ‘meaning’ in the widest possible sense, to include both grammatical and logical 
structure on the one hand and (what properly considered is perhaps hardly to be distinguished 
from these) emotional colouring or atmosphere” (PE, pp. 13-14). The details of how, in 
Collingwood’s theory, the composer achieves this, need not concern us here. For now it will 
suffice to say that the aim of the composer is to express in musical language a meaning that 
has been initially manifested in a language composed of words and in doing so to express also 
the emotional element that this meaning carries within it. Of course the composer does not 
express something that is outside him, a meaning with which he is in a form of mystical 
communication. He expresses the meaning as filtered through his own experience and 
understanding; he expresses, that is, his own emotional element.
Art as expression of emotions is a position traditionally thought to be of a much later 
date and in many respects a development of his earlier theory, where he regarded art 
essentially as imagination. This, in my knowledge, is the very first example that Collingwood 
treats art as the expression of emotions.
b. Ruskin’s Philosophy9
Collingwood did not use this lecture to present his theories about art. Published in 1922 but 
initially delivered in 1919, is a very early example of his thought and perhaps a stage when he 
didn’t have developed ideas about art himself. He is more concerned with presenting a mode
8 R.G. Collingwood. 1918. ‘Words and Tune’. (This was a short piece not published during 
Collingwood’s life. Now it is collected in PE, pp. 3-17).
9 R.G. Collingwood. 1922. Ruskin’s Philosophy. An Address delivered at the Ruskin Centenary 
Conference, Coniston, August 8th, 1919. Kendal.
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of thinking which he calls historicism and it was that mode of thinking that, according to 
Collingwood, Ruskin’s mind was congenial to. However the Ruskin lecture is important in 
that it is not in accord with the “art as imagination” position that is associated with the early 
aesthetic views of Collingwood. Here art is the expression of one’s feelings10, the familiar 
theory of art that Collingwood was to present fully only in his 1938 book The Principles o f  
Art. Although we do not get an extensive reference to what art is, the passage in question 
portrays clearly the idea of art as the expression of feelings:
Art is expression, and it cannot arise until men have something to express. When you 
feel so strongly about something -the joys or sorrows of your domestic or national life: the 
things you see round you: your religious beliefs, and so on- that you must at all costs express 
your feelings, then art is bom (p. 34).
Like “Words and Tune”, the Ruskin lecture shows that the very early ideas of 
Collingwood about art do not correspond with the familiar “art as imagination” tenet of few 
years later. It might, of course, be said that those early stages are no more than a sketch of 
what art might be; but they are the very early ones, different from the theory articulated in 
Collingwood’s books of the mid 1920’s and show affinities with his much later ideas about 
art; as such they have a very interesting value.
§ 3. Collingwood’s writings on the Philosophy of Art from the 1920’s
a. Jane Austen11
Collingwood had a fascination with Jane Austen. He delivered lectures on her literary output 
on several occasions and he thought highly of her competence as a writer. When compared 
with the most able of the classical prose writers such as Boccaccio, Cervantes, Fielding, 
Balzac, Dickens, Henry James, Dostoyevsky, Thomas Hardy and so forth, Austen is found to 
be “the greatest of them all” (PE, p. 21). Collingwood’s lectures on Austen provide an 
analysis o f her works, her character and her literary gifts but in so doing they do not deal with 
the issue of the nature of art as such. In the 1921 lecture we only get passing remarks that
10 At this stage Collingwood hadn’t made a distinction between feelings and emotions. Therefore the 
expression o f  feelings can be taken to mean or to include expression o f  emotions too.
11 There are two manuscripts containing Collingwood’s lectures on the novelist Jane Austen. I will deal 
first with the early one o f  which we have a certain date o f  1921. It can now be found in PE, pp. 21-33. 
For Collingwood and Jane Austen see P. Smallwood. 1997. ‘From Illusion to Reality: R.G. 
Collingwood and the Fictional Art o f  Jane Austen’, in CS, vol. IV, pp. 71-100. For Collingwood and 
literary criticism in general see P. Smallwood. 2001. “ The True Creative Mind’: R.G. Collingwood’s 
Critical Humanism’, in British Journal o f  Aesthetics, vol. 41, no 3, pp. 293-311.
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could give us some idea about Collingwood’s understanding of art but not something so 
concrete or developed as to call it philosophy of art. We are thus told that Austen’s 
“imagination illuminates her characters” (PE, p. 25) and that she was a “writer in whom the 
working of the imagination was so direct and spontaneous” (PE, p. 28). And contrasted to the 
work of imagination we have “an unimaginative person” (PE, p. 25) that in the attempt to 
present a realistic view “records the misunderstood facts which he half-sees” (PE, pp. 25-26). 
This is inferior to Jane Austen, who wasn’t content just to write down what she saw as the 
external behaviour of her friends and her family but was able “to see in their behaviour a 
whole world of subtle meanings and to make that world her home” (PE, p. 26).
The above comments do not constitute a philosophy of art but they do point in a 
direction that Collingwood was soon to follow in a methodical and extensive manner. They 
anticipate the more robust and lengthy exposition -substantially different from the views on 
art he held in the “Words and Tune” and in the Ruskin lecture- of art as imagination as found 
in his two books that I will discuss next.
b. Speculum Mentis
In this book Collingwood discusses art at length, as one of the provinces of the mind, a form 
of concrete experience with claims to true knowledge. The other provinces he investigates are 
religion, science, history and philosophy, all of them with similar claims to yielding true 
knowledge of the world. This is only a starting point, an assumption, that Collingwood uses to 
proceed with his analysis, to show, that is, that these provinces are only abstractions: it is the 
symptom of the ills of the modem, post-medieval, life; the false idea that the mind is divided 
into different areas that independently can produce tme knowledge. His main effort is to 
reunite the mind, to show how all these provinces are not autonomous and mutually exclusive 
but instead they constitute a whole and the efforts to artificially divide this whole produce 
grave consequences.
In SM Collingwood maintains that art is imagination, the activity where its object is 
not real or unreal:
The aesthetic experience cares nothing for the reality or unreality of its object. It is 
neither tme nor false of set purpose: it simply ignores the distinction. (...) Its apparent 
assertions are not real assertions but the very suspension of assertion. (...) This non-assertive, 
non-logical attitude is imagination in the proper sense of the word. The word is sometimes 
used with the implication that the imagined object is necessarily unreal, but this implication is 
illegitimate; the correct implication is that in imagining an object we are indifferent to its 
reality or unreality (p. 60-61).
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Imagination therefore is an activity quite different from other cognitive or thinking 
activities:
The artist does not judge or assert, he does not think or conceive, he simply imagines. 
(...) The artist never transcribes facts ‘as they are’. He only, at most, transcribes them ‘as he 
sees them' and whenever the artist says see he means imagine (p.61).
For Collingwood an artist’s “apparent statements are not statements, for they state 
nothing; they are not expressions, for they express no thought. They do not express his 
imaginations, for they are his imaginations” (p. 63).
This is the first substantial comment of Collingwood on art. It is not a treatise on art 
as such, since art is considered here only as one of the spirit’s provinces, in its claim to yield 
true knowledge and in its relation to the unity of the spirit. None-the-less it is a lengthy 
exposition and an important one of the idea of art as imagination and where all references to 
art as expression are absent. The few comments of the Jane Austen lecture aside, this is the 
first time that Collingwood places the essence of art in imagination.
c. Outlines o f a Philosophy o f Art
This is Collingwood’s first book exclusively devoted to art philosophically considered and 
examined. Still as in SM “art is only one of a number of activities; and to answer the question 
what art is can only mean placing it in its relation to our other activities” (OPA, p. 8). 
Collingwood mentions the other activities: religion, science, history, philosophy, the same as 
in SM, and he considers the spirit as a unity, where all the activities give only partial 
knowledge and their claim to be knowledge of the ultimate reality is erroneous. However the 
scope o f the book is not to consider all activities equally and the comparative examination of 
all the activities takes a very small part of the book, the bulk of which deals specifically with 
art.
Art once more is imagination:
In art there are always a subject and an object, a contemplator and something 
contemplated. But the subject’s activity, the object’s nature, and the character of the relation 
between them have certain peculiarities which distinguish the case of art from other cases. 
What the subject does is to imagine: the object is an imaginary object, and the relation 
between them is that the individual or empirical act of imagining creates the object (OPA, p.
1 1 ).
And Collingwood further clarifies what is the character of an imaginary object:
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An imaginary object ... is not an unreal object but an object about which we do not 
trouble to ask whether it is real or unreal. The imaginary is not the opposite of real, but the 
indifferent identity of the real and its opposite (OPA, p. 13).
And again:
art is not based upon a previous perception of real objects. We do not first ascertain 
what the object really is and then modify it to by allowing our imagination to play upon it. We 
first imagine; the attempt to ascertain what the object really is involves the attempt to criticise 
our own imagination, and hence assumes that we have already imagined (OPA, p. 16).
The attitude towards the object is what distinguishes thinking from imagining:
To imagine is to refrain from making a distinction which we make whenever we 
think: the distinction between reality and unreality, truth and falsehood. Therefore imagining 
is not a kind of thinking, nor is thinking a kind of imagining, for each negates the specific 
nature of the other (OPA, p. 13).
This book, although published in 1925, sprung from ideas that Collingwood explored 
in 1924. A version of these ideas was in lecture-notes12 format and they substantially present 
the same argument of OPA. Regarding the object and the essence of art we are, thus, told that:
The object of art is an object which is not judged to exist. It is indifferent to art 
whether its object exists or not ... (and) the not being judged to exist is not an accident but the 
essence of the object of art. This object is essentially imaginary, and art, qua cognition, is 
imagination (p. 51-52).
And the same idea is present as to the difference between imagining and thinking:
Imagination does not mean fancying that which does not exist, for to do this is to be 
guided by the distinction between existence and non-existence, and that means that imagining 
would be only one kind of thinking. It means taking up a certain attitude to objects 
irrespectively of whether they exist or not. The imagined object may be real: but to imagine it 
is to pay no attention to the question whether it is real. Our thoughts are sometimes true and 
sometimes false: if then we take all the thoughts that come into our mind and consider them 
irrespectively of the distinction between true and false, we are imagining. Everything we 
imagine either is so or is not so: but to imagine it means refraining from asking which it is (p. 
52).
SM, OPA and the lecture notes show Collingwood’s position on art as imagination in 
its most developed form. They constitute the basis of regarding art as imagination to be 
Collingwood’s initial aesthetic doctrine. I have tried to show that this is not an uncontested
12 These notes are now collected in PE, pp. 49-80. They were delivered in 1924 and formed the 
abbrev iated version o f  notes that eventually lead to the writing o f  the OPA. See PE, p. 49, explanatory 
note.
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thesis if we take into account his very early aesthetic ideas where art is closer linked to 
expression and imagination does not receive any mention. However art as imagination was a 
tenet that received more sustained and detailed attention and was the main idea in 
Collingwood's first book length treatment of the philosophy of art.
d. Plato's Philosophy of Arti}
In this papier Collingwood argued that Plato had indeed a very serious philosophy of art and 
that his contribution to aesthetics had been significant. Arguing in that way Collingwood tried 
to challenge the orthodoxy in the platonic scholarship, the view, that is, that Plato launched an 
attack on art, at least in the passages found in the Republic, because he had misunderstood or 
misconceived the nature of art. Collingwood analysis intends to show that art for Plato has not 
as its aim the reduplication of perceptible objects as many of Plato’s commentators thought it 
w as the case; instead he maintains that Plato had a theory of art as imagination. We are told 
that for art, or for the aesthetic experience, the “right name is imagination, and that of its 
objects is phantasms or images ... sheer appearances apprehended and indeed created - i f  that 
can be said to be apprehended and created which does not exist at all, but only appears -  by 
an activity resembling, if not identical with, dreaming” (p. 161). And again that art “is 
imagination, whose object is an image or phantasm, and whose emotional character derives 
from the fact that this phantasm is not the real but a symbol of the real” (p. 169).
By ascribing this theory of art as imagination to Plato, Collingwood is not only 
describing or elucidating an issue in the history of philosophy; he also agrees with that theory, 
which, as we have seen, was occupying an important position in his own writings at the time.
e. The Place o f Art in Education
The role of art in education was a subject dear to Collingwood.14 He advocated an early 
involvement of children with artistic education. This artistic education would primarily have 
the form of encouraging children to practise any type of art for themselves; not just to become 
acquainted with the history of art or with the works of the past, great masters. The reason why 
Collingwood thought necessary that such an artistic education ought to take place is that he 
considered art “an activity, one of those fundamental forms of mental activity...a mode of 
acting; a necessary mode, in so far as every mind that is a mind at all acts in this way” (PAE, 
p. 439). Now the “ordinary name for this mode of acting is ‘imagination’” (PAE, p. 439-440)
n R.G. Collingwood. 1925. ‘Plato’s Philosophy o f  Art’, in M ind , vol. XXXIV, no 134, pp. 154-172.
14 Collingwood commented on the advantages o f  an artistic education in other o f  his writings too. See 
for instance the next two pieces: the essay Art and the M achine and the lecture Aesthetic.
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and we are told that “[t]o be an artist is to create for oneself a world of imaginary objects 
whose function is to express to oneself one’s own mind” (PAE, p. 440).
In the mid 1920’s the view that art is imagination was a familiar position of 
Collingwood’s. But in this essay we see that the function of imagination is different; it is 
connected to the expression of the mind, a theme that he was only later to explore and the 
formulation is highly reminiscent of that of Collingwood’s later philosophy of art:
The art o f literature... is the art of speaking one’s mind; and speaking one’s mind, 
whether to oneself or to another, is the same act as making up one’s mind. The thought that 
before utterance lies obscure and unrealised in the dark places of the soul, in ‘the chaos of 
preordination and the night of its forebeing,’ comes into living existence in the act of 
expressing it: a person who has not, somehow and in some kind of language, said what he 
means, does not yet know what he means, and strictly cannot be said to have a meaning. Thus 
the act of imagining, which is the act of uttering language, is not an embroidering of a pre­
existent thought; it is the birth of thought itself (PAE, p. 440).
Imagination therefore is not the activity that does not make, or does not care to make, 
a distinction between the reality or unreality of its object but the “creative activity which by 
bringing language into existence reveals thought to itself’ (p. 442). It is a stepping stone and 
not so much an activity that has its own manifestation as an end. Although it appears to have a 
life on its own, its function is eventually to help thought come into existence and this is 
obvious by what Collingwood says about the division of art:
all art falls into two great divisions: poetry and prose. (...) Poetry is pure imagination; 
prose is imagination as controlled by and consciously expressive of thought. (...) We begin by 
imagining, and in imagining we discover our thought -a  thought that did not actually exist till 
discovered (PAE, p. 442).
Thus for instance the aim of the literary education would be to “enable the pupil to 
express his own thoughts clearly and intelligibly, and to understand the expressed thoughts of 
others” (PAE, p. 444) and the same for drawing, painting and modelling where the end is the 
production of a drawing “whose purpose is to express thought” (PAE, p. 444). This is not to 
deny the freedom of art and to assume that it has a utilitarian purpose, its function being only 
as a means to an end. Instead it is to see imagination as something that is linked to other 
processes of the mind, associated with the birth of language and the facilitation of thought. In 
that sense art begins as imagination and ends to be almost anything.
90
HISTORY AND ART
/.' Art and the Machine15
In this essay Collingwood explores the place of art in a machine-orientated and dominated 
age, the consequences of art being mechanically reproduced, the debasement of taste and the 
value of art in life and in education. It is when he talks about education that we get a glimpse 
of what art is about, a description very close to his understanding of art as expressed in his 
essay on education in 1926.
Collingwood maintains that a child that has received training in the arts “will be able 
to do something better with its emotions than to stimulate them artificially. It will be able to 
express them, and so to understand the expressions of other people” (PE, 304).
Where in the 1926 education essay Collingwood, with almost the same wording, 
spoke about art as expression and understanding of thoughts, in this essay he talks about art as 
expression and understanding of emotions. This position has close affinities with his remarks 
in his very early essay “Words and Tune” and his lecture on Ruskin, where in both art was 
seen as expression of emotions or feelings. It is also identical with his 1930’s position where 
art is the expression of emotions.
g. Aesthetic
This lecture was part of a series of lectures that had as their focus the mind as seen in different 
ways from different academic disciplines. It was an able essay and a lucid exposition, with a 
great scope on many aesthetic issues. One review regarded it as the best contribution.16 
Collingwood presented the mind in connection with aesthetic. The mind in that respect is an 
imaginative activity. Collingwood defended imagination as a healthy activity, “an activity 
which instead of impeding the formation of knowledge actually advances it up and, in fact, 
constitutes its initial stage” (Aesthetic, p. 210-211). This was against the psychoanalytic
15 R.G. Collingwood. ‘Art and the Machine’. (Unpublished during his lifetime, now it can be found in 
PE, pp. 291-304). Taylor’s bibliography places it among the dated manuscripts and gives 
approximately 1926 as the year o f  composition (Taylor 1988, p. 55). Connelly gives a possible date o f  
1926, following perhaps the suggestion o f Taylor (CS III, p. 194). The bibliography o f  van der Dussen 
mentions it as undated too (HS, p. 452). For arguments about a later date and more information about 
the dating o f  that essay see PE, p. 291, explanatory note. I believe a late date can be reasonably 
supported by internal elements o f  the essay, not the least because o f  the tenet o f  art as expression o f  
emotions. I have, however, placed it after the 1926 education lecture and before the 1927 lecture at 
King’s College only for purposes o f  convenience since Taylor’s bibliography provides a date. In 
relation to art this essay is interesting regardless o f  an earlier or later date. The affinities between this 
essay, PAE and the KCL lecture o f  1927 have been pointed out, for instance by Connelly in CS II, p. 
183.
16 In the reprinted version in CS 1996, p. 195, the quotation from the Oxford Magazine, 24/10/1929, a 
review by H.H. Price: “Mr R.G. Collingwood’s paper (Aesthetics) is undoubtedly the ablest piece o f  
work in the book. We have never seen so clear and straightforward an exposition o f  what may roughly 
be called the Crocean view. He ends with the entertaining suggestion that Nature, like art, is created by 
the human imagination. And to our immense relief he never once uses the word ‘expression’”.
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doctrines that tended to mistrust imagination and to regard it solely as pathology. Therefore 
art, the aesthetic experience, is imagination:
We all know that the work of the artist consists in using his imagination, and that the 
whole business of an artist is to be imaginative (Aesthetic, p. 205).
And as we have seen before imagination sees its object neither as real nor unreal:
[the] distinction between reality and unreality is a distinction which the aesthetic 
consciousness does not make... [and] to refrain from making that distinction is to imagine; 
and imagination may be defined as a kind of attitude towards objects in which we do not use 
the concepts of reality or unreality (Aesthetic, p. 206).
This position is identical to the one presented in SM and OPA. The date, however, 
that this lecture was delivered makes it rather interesting. It came only one year after PAE but 
in certain respects the central idea about art in both essays is substantially different. 
Imagination in PAE is neither an activity that is indifferent to the reality or unreality of its 
object, nor it is an activity that has no connection, as we were told in SM, with the expression 
of thought. Instead imagination facilitates, gives birth to thought through language and its 
function is to create a world that will help the person himself to express his own mind. The 
idea of imagination as a necessary conduit to expression of thought is only made explicit in 
PAE for the first time. In SM the idea is rejected altogether. However there is something to be 
said about the relation between imagination and thought in OPA. There Collingwood 
maintained that:
Thinking is making a distinction between truth and falsehood; but this presupposes a 
phase of consciousness in which this distinction is not made. That which we deny or think 
false must be first imagined, or there is nothing to deny: that which we assert or think true 
must first be imagined, or else we could not ask whether it was true without assuming that it 
was true. Hence the relation between imagination and thought is that thought presupposes 
imagination, but imagination does not presuppose thought (OPA, p. 14).
Imagination in that sense is linked to thought but in a different way. Here thought is 
provided by imagination with an object for reflection but there is no temporal aspect in that 
operation. That is, there wasn't an act of imagination first and then thinking comes and makes 
the distinction between truth and falsehood. If that had been the case then there wouldn’t be 
any free activity o f imagination but just a precursor of thought. Imagination would have been 
an error that would wait the advent of thinking to correct it. Instead both activities exist 
independent of each other at the same time and one (imagination) supplements the other 
(thinking) but not the other way around.
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In PAE, on the other hand, imagination is still a free activity but in this case it is prior 
to thought. Imagination doesn’t supplement thought, doesn’t provide thought with any 
assistance. Imagination and thought do not exist independently, but imagination generates, 
creates thought, which comes into existence because imagination brings language into 
existence and the linguistic utterance is the expression of thought.
Given the above, the position in the 1927 lecture seems to be closer to the tenet found 
in SM, where thinking and imagining were two distinct and unconnected activities. It is a 
surprising position in that it restates a version of Collingwood’s art as imagination theory at a 
period where he had begun to be preoccupied with art as a form of expression of the mind and 
not only imagination.
h. Form and Content in Art11
After the King’s College lecture this is his next essay on art. Collingwood’s aim was to reflect 
on artistic endeavours and their relation to their subject. Thus initially he distinguishes 
between the attitude of classical artists who care about the form of their work and the attitude 
of romantic artists who pay attention to the content. This distinction is later to be found 
problematic and all art is subsumed under a combination of both tendencies, classical and 
romantic.
In this essay art as imagination is nowhere to be found. Instead all the references are 
about art as expression:
The subject of a work of art... is something distinct from the work, something which 
the artist is generally said to describe or represent in the work; and in the case of romantic art, 
it is because the artist has been impressed by this other thing that he proceeds to express 
himself in the work of art (p. 337).
And further on when the two artistic tendencies are found to be complementary:
Good romantic art does succeed in expressing itself (...) A merely romantic artist 
would be a person whose inspiration was only expressed - i f  this can be called being 
expressed- in rantings and mouthings and meaningless gestures. It is the classical element in 
his art that keeps him out of that morass and makes him able to create something that really 
expresses him. Art may therefore be at once romantic and classical. In deriving inspiration 
from its subject, it may be romantic; in converting that inspiration into expressive form, it 
must be classical (p.340).
17 R.G. Collingwood. 1929. ‘Form and Content in Art’, in Journal o f  Philosophical Studies, vol. IV, pp. 
332-345. The theme o f  the classical and the romantic art, form and content, has been explored 
elsewhere as well, e.g. Collingwood’s contribution, ‘The Showman’s speech’, in The Fothergill 
Omnibus, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode (1931), pp. xi-xvii. Reprinted in CS, 1995, vol. II, pp. 192- 
196.
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In elaborating that point Collingwood maintains that if art had a perfect form without 
content it would be a “perfectly expressive language with nothing to express” (p. 342). For 
Collingwood the attention to form and structure is not enough because art is not some kind of 
skill or an activity that we engage with and given the proper training and perseverance we 
become able to master it and perhaps excel in it. Art is predominantly our “attempt to express 
something, to give outward and visible form to the way in which we are impressed by the 
things we come across in the course of our experience” (p. 342). That the artistic expression 
has an outward and visible form, a manifestation beyond a personal and esoteric expression, 
was still an element in the way Collingwood understood and described art. Collingwood also 
presented a case of art as an autonomous and self-contained experience where the artistic 
expression is “in need of no explanation beyond itself’ (p. 343).
Art is, therefore, expression. But what kind of expression? Collingwood refers, for 
instance, to Beethoven who managed “to express his thoughts in his music” (p. 337). But this 
is mainly what Beethoven himself thought about his music. Instead, what art expresses is 
once again feelings. Moreover at this stage Collingwood hadn't distinguished between 
feelings and emotions, thus the expression of feelings is also synonymous with the expression 
of emotions. Thus we are told, for example, that “Wordsworth writes a poem to express the 
excitement he feels” (p 336), that when a scenery “looks forlorn and sombre, and you paint it 
to express that feeling” (p. 342) or that “A strong emotion may be the first step towards a 
poem”and the work of the artist is to “devise ways of expressing it” (p. 344).
In this essay Collingwood describes the process of expression is similar terms to PA. 
Feelings or emotions are not a very specific and defined subject that the artist puts in one 
form or another. They are not, that is, properly understood before their expression. Their 
expression is at the same time the formulation or the de-codification of those feelings. Before 
their expression feelings and emotions are “only obscure emotional perturbations, and do not 
take the shape of a “message,” a conviction to be imparted to others or brought clearly before 
himself [the artist]” (p. 345). Therefore it is only through the expression that feelings and 
emotions come into life, since the artist “until he has learnt to speak, he has nothing to say” 
(p. 345).
Art as expression of emotions or feelings receives in this essay a definite status. Apart 
from Collingwood’s very early formulations, it is the first time that expression is mentioned 
without any reference to imagination. Furthermore certain elements that preoccupied 
Collingwood's philosophy of art are to be found in this essay, some to remain in later 
discussions, some to be modified. The object of art as something tangible will become 
something that exists only in the artist's mind, the distinction between emotions and feelings 
non-existent here will be of paramount importance later on, while expression as the process of 
clarifying feelings and emotions that before were almost unknown will remain constant.
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§ 4. Collingwood’s writings on the Philosophy of Art from the 1930’s
a. Aesthetic Theory and Artistic Practise18
This essay was on aesthetic theory and its relation to what artists do. Again this essay is not 
about the character of art as such. Early on Collingwood makes it clear that here he is 
concerned with finding out whether any theory about art can help artists to do their job better 
and improve other people’s appreciation and understanding of art or whether the theory is of 
no consequence to the actual artistic endeavour. However Collingwood is not satisfied with 
exploring whether aesthetic theory is descriptive or normative and he shows why it is 
problematic to regard it either way. Instead he proposes a third alternative to how aesthetic 
theory and artistic practise are related. In doing so he ventures to use an historical example, 
the art of the middle part of the nineteenth century: naturalism. In describing the main 
features of naturalism he is, at the same time, expressing his dissatisfaction with the attitude 
of reverence towards nature that this form of art exhibits. Thus we get his own ideas about the 
nature of art. Whereas naturalism sees the copying of nature as the main task of all art, 
Collingwood maintains that, for instance, drawing is not the reproduction of shapes found in 
natural objects but “the construction of expressive and significant shapes” (PE, p. 92). 
Drawing means “setting down lines that are worth setting down because they are significant, 
or expressive, or beautiful” (PE, p. 106). And the same for literature, whose function is not to 
describe “an actual scene or event” but instead to describe “scenes or events in such a way as 
to give them a value in relation to a coherent whole with a formal and expressive character of 
its own” (PE, p. 92).
Art as expression is therefore the concept that Collingwood continues to use. 
Moreover the connection of expression with imagination hasn’t been lost. Imagination, as in 
some of his previous essays, is the womb, the place where expression comes from. The 
importance of imagination to expression only becomes stronger as Collingwood’s philosophy 
of art develops. In this essay the case of Thomas Hardy, who in his novels “conceived life as 
a drama whose actors are spiritual forces within the mind of man” (PE, p. 107) is 
characteristic and indicative of this connection:
The art of Hardy, like that of Cezanne, is an art that can no longer be described in 
terms of nature and the copying of nature. In order to describe it, we must appeal to the 
conception of the artist as constructing in his imagination an object whose purpose is to be 
significant or expressive, and which achieves that purpose just so far as it is genuinely 
constructed in the imagination -an intuition and therefore an expression (PE, p. 107).
18 R.G. Collingwood. 1931. ‘Aesthetic Theory and Artistic Practise’. (It can now be found in PE, pp. 
81-112).
95
HISTORY AND ART
b. Jane Austen19
This the second lecture on Jane Austen. We have already seen that Collingwood delivered in 
1921 a lecture on the same topic. Examined together these two lectures provide a useful 
illustration of the aesthetic shift of Collingwood. They share substantial similarities but they 
diverge when it comes to the character of art. Collingwood’s idea of art as imagination was 
present in the first lecture, while in the second lecture he talks about expression. He 
maintains, for instance, that under Jane Austen the novel “reaches maturity and discovers a 
structure adequate to express the novelist’s entire experience of life” (PE, p. 36). He also 
makes the same point when he talks about Austen’s precocity and the balance between 
content and form:
Many able writers begin writing late; but that is because they are driven into an art 
whose form does not come natural to them by something they want to express: the content 
takes precedence over the form and balance is never achieved (PE, p. 38).
One cannot but feel that the following process described by Collingwood anticipates 
his later and more detailed formulation of art as the expression of emotions and of the 
corruption of consciousness:
The problem in all her books is the problem of knowing one’s own mind. Every one 
of her heroines is placed in a situation where a resolute and fearless facing of her own motives 
is demanded of her. The catastrophes are one and all caused by failure to distinguish one’s 
real thoughts and desires from those which one idly supposes oneself to have; and the happy 
endings take place invariably by a moral crisis in which these illusions are swept away and 
the heroine is left face to face with her real self (PE, p. 47).
It is only through the genuine and conscious expression of one’s own mind -which if 
it had been left unnoticed, the illusion (the corruption of consciousness) would have 
prevailed- that the “conversion of the soul, as Plato would call it, from illusion to reality” 
(PE, p. 47) takes place.
19 The second lecture that Collingwood delivered on Jane Austen can now to be found in PE, pp. 34-48. 
It is undated and for an idea about its estimated composition date see PE, p. 47, n. 23 and P. 
Smallwood. 1997. ‘From Illusion to Reality: R.G. Collingwood and the Fictional Art o f Jane Austen’, 
in CS, vol. IV, p. 95, note 2.
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§ 5. Some of Collingwood’s reviews on aesthetics
Collingwood also expressed his ideas about the philosophy of art through his reviews20 of 
works of aesthetics. I will here present four of his reviews. Two are from 1926, one from 
1931 and one from 1932.
The review21 was of a book about the romantic theory of poetry and the contrast of 
that theory with the aesthetic views of Croce22 (the full title of the book is: The Romantic 
Theory of Poetry: an examination in the light of Croce’s Aesthetic). As opposed to the 
romantics, Croce, Collingwood argues, had correctly identified the vital question in 
aesthetics, “What is art?”, and proceeded to answer that “art is intuition which is at the same 
time expression” (p. 190). A satisfactory answer for Collingwood since it “takes up into itself 
everything in the romantic view that is worth preserving, and suffices to destroy the rest” (p.
190). That means that “intuition, or expression, is both matter and form: matter, in so far as 
there is something to express, form in so far as it gets itself expressed in an expressive way” 
(p. 191). The mistake of romanticism, according to Collingwood’s analysis, was its 
preoccupation with only one aspect of art, “it sees the necessity of the matter but either does 
not see or actually denies the necessity of the form” (p. 191). Collingwood explored the theme 
of matter and form, of classical and romantic art elsewhere too.23
From the same year comes this review24, where Collingwood considering some 
aesthetic views of Samuel Alexander -a  philosopher of whom he had a very high opinion- 
emphasises Alexander’s notions of imagination and expression. Alexander’s contention was 
that “there is no artistic experience without a ‘physical embodiment’ of itself in words, 
pigments and so forth” (p. 196); at the same time “this physical embodiment may only be 
imagined, and consistently assumes that an imagined sound (e.g.) is just as physical as one 
played on an actual trumpet” (p. 196). With this in mind Collingwood argues that Alexander
20 Some o f  Collingwood’s reviews on the subject have been reprinted in ‘A Selection o f Collingwood’s 
Writings in Aesthetics’ (compiled and introduced by James Connelly), in CS, 1995, vol. II, pp. 182- 
212. This selection excludes other o f his reviews on aesthetics on the ground that “did not possess 
sufficient merit or interest to warrant their reissue” (Connelly, CS 1995, p. 182). Having read those 
reviews I feel that the decision is justified.
21 Review o f  E.R. Dodds, ‘The Romantic Theory o f Poetry’, in The Oxford Magazine, May 27th 1926, 
pp. 494-495. Reprinted in CS, vol. II, 1995, pp. 189-192 (My references come from this reprint).
2 The affinities between Croce’s and Collingwood’s philosophies o f art have been discussed. See for 
instance J. Hospers. 1956. ‘The Croce-Collingwood Theory o f Art’, in Philosophy, vol. XXXI, no 119, 
pp. 291-308; and the reply, A. Donagan. 1958. ‘The Croce-Collingwood Theory of Art’, in Philosophy, 
vol. XXXIII, pp. 162-167.
23 See footnote 19.
24 Review o f  Samuel Alexander, ‘Art and the Material’, in The Oxford Magazine, May 27th 1926, pp. 
496-497. Reprinted in CS, vol. II, 1995, pp. 196-198 (My references come from this reprint).
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is mistaken in maintaining that his thesis is different from Croce’s, who takes the artistic 
experience to be mental and the physical embodiment to be only the communication aspect 
between the artist and the public. Mental in this sense means imaginative and according to 
Croce (and also Collingwood who defended the same thesis in his own writings) “artistic 
experience is the intuition of an object which may be imaginary, because intuition does not 
worry about the distinction between real and unreal” (p. 197). Therefore the thesis of 
Alexander and Croce (and Collingwood as well) is the same.
Regarding the artistic expression Alexander thought “it expresses a passionate 
excitement about the subject-matter” (p. 197). Collingwood says that Alexander’s position “is 
certainly true as against the view he is criticising, which is that the artist first has an ‘image’ 
in his mind, and then writes to express it: he is right in maintaining that the work of art does 
not in this way pre-exist to its own expression” (p. 197).
Both the above reviews support a view of art as being imagination and expression 
simultaneously. They were written in 1926, the year that Collingwood also wrote the essay on 
art and education. In all those writings art is viewed as a relationship between imagination 
and expression.
From the early part of the 1930’s comes a review25 of a book of Ducasse who argued 
that the “function of art, relative to the artist, is to express feeling” (p. 204). In this context 
expression “means objectification or objective self-expression: that is, the creation of an 
object -whether a ‘real’ object or an ‘imaginary’ object, does not matter- capable o f ‘yielding 
back the feeling of which it was the attempted expression” (p. 204). His theory had common 
elements with Croce’s view of art as intuition and expression and Collingwood thinks that up 
to a point the theory that Ducasse has propounded is correct, that in “some sense it is true that 
art is objective self-expression” (p.205). However when it comes to the question what is the 
feeling that art expresses, Collingwood found Ducasse’s theory to be emotionalistic, thus “the 
term feeling is harmless, even beneficial, when it is merely an algebraical symbol for ‘that 
which is expressed’; but when it takes on a positive meaning of its own, the result is a theory 
of art whose emphasis lies wholly on emotion” (p. 205). The problem for Collingwood is that 
art and the appreciation of it, seen though the spectrum of emotions, becomes just a matter of 
the senses and thus “judgment is reduced to taste ... [and] criticism, except as a mere 
expression or personal and momentary predilection, vanishes; and the feeling of any given 
individual, at any given moment, about any given work of art, is an ultimate court from which 
there is no appeal” (p. 205).
25 Review o f  C.J. Ducasse, ‘The Philosophy o f Art’, in Philosophy, vi, 1931 (July), pp. 383-386. 
Reprinted in CS, vol. II, 1995, pp. 204-207 (My references come from this reprint).
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Likewise, the actual meaning of ‘expression’ is another point that Collingwood found 
Ducasse’s theory incorrect. For Ducasse expression is something different from the theory of 
Croce, who holds the view that “to express our feelings is to intuit them, to arrive at 
illumination concerning them” (p. 206). Collingwood’s objection with Ducasse’s formulation 
is that only the expression of feelings seems not to be enough to reveal us what are the 
feelings we have expressed because “it is not speech that illuminates our minds to themselves, 
it is subsequent reflexion on the things said” (p. 206). This for Collingwood is incorrect and 
“based on insufficient analysis of the relation between ‘having something to say’ and 
‘knowing what it was that I had to say’” (p.206). Collingwood maintains that Ducasse is not 
clear and uncertain about two things. The first is whether “we begin by not knowing what it is 
we have to say” or whether “we begin by knowing it, but knowing it less clearly” (p. 206). 
The second is whether or not “we have feelings before we express them” (p. 206).
Through Collingwood’s criticism of Ducasse’s aesthetic theory we can see the 
importance of expression. For Collingwood expression is the ultimate aim: before expression 
there is nothing to be expressed, or as Croce would put it, “we do not know what we have to 
say before we say it” (p. 206), and after expression there is nothing to be further clarified by 
an extra function. Ducasse presented a theory of art where the essential elements are present 
but in matters of detail or clarification he was confused: he saw expression as only a temporal 
point in the process of the objectification of feeling and he allowed for other stages to exist 
before and after expression.
Lastly in his 1932 review26 Collingwood is content to see the main tenets of Reid’s 
theory as being “in line with the classical tradition of aesthetic” (p. 209). The basic points of 
that theory are that “beauty is just expressiveness', that the aesthetic attitude is a contemplative 
attitude, and that what distinguishes it from other kinds of contemplation is its imaginative 
character” (p. 209).
However Collingwood recognises a problem with the idea of expressiveness. Thus 
when it is said that the “aesthetic object ‘expresses’ such things as joy, sorrow, excitement, 
power” (p. 209), the meaning is that these things “exist not in it, but in us” (p. 209). However 
“for the aesthetic experience, they appear to exist in the object” (p. 209) and the aesthetic 
theory is trying to explain this paradox by answering the question “how can the aesthetic 
object, which is out there, express feelings that are in me?” (p. 210) or in other words “how 
my feelings can get into the object” (p. 210). Collingwood thought that this way to treat the 
problem of art was endemic to aesthetic theories of his times that followed theories of 
knowledge which placed their emphasis on perception. Trying to answer the question in this
26 Review o f  L.A. Reid, ‘A Study in Aesthetics’, in Philosophy, vii, 1932 (July), pp. 335-337.
Reprinted in CS, vol. II, 1995, pp. 208-212 (My references come from this reprint).
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way is a mistake but there is “one condition on which the aesthetic experience ... is possible, 
namely, that the aesthetic object can be identified with language, i.e. with objects created by 
us for the purpose of expressing our feelings” (p. 210). That involves starting from different 
premises and asking a different question and this, Collingwood argues, is what Croce’s theory 
does which has “the merit of starting from the question, ‘How is aesthetic experience 
possible?’ and of answering that it is possible if every aesthetic object is somehow a kind of 
language, and the aesthetic experience in general more like talking than perceiving” (p. 210).
§ 6. Art as imagination and knowledge in Speculum Mentis
Mink points out that what Collingwood tried in SM, in relation to art, was to solve the 
problem or the paradox of art being imagination and knowledge (or expressive, in the sense of 
revealing the truth) at the same time.27 This aim was also present in PA which should be seen 
as “his final answer to the same question which in Speculum Mentis was posed but not 
satisfactorily answered: how is it possible for art to be both imaginative and expressive?” 
(MHD,p. 198).
Art claims to be knowledge; it claims to be truth, “a truth identified indeed with 
beauty but not thereby ceasing to be truth” (SM, p. 39). And in that artists are unanimous, art 
is “the one and only key to the riddle of the universe, the sole true revelation of the mystery 
whose concealment is the perennial torture of the human intellect” (SM, pp. 39-40). Art, 
moreover, is not just a type of knowledge but knowledge in its entirety. As with the other 
forms of experience art is “claiming not only to give truth, but to give the absolute or ultimate 
truth concerning the nature of the universe, to reveal the secret of existence, and to tell us 
what the world really and fundamentally is” (SM, p. 41).
This is then what artists claim to be able to do or aim at achieving: the starting point 
of their quest is the certainty that art is knowledge, the only way to know things and they go 
about trying to achieve it. However as we have already seen28 Collingwood in SM considered 
art as imagination and he observes that:
Art makes for itself two claims. First, that it is the activity of pure imagination; 
secondly, that it somehow reveals the truth concerning the ultimate nature of the real world. 
Now for pure imagination there is no real world; there is only the imaginary world (SM, p. 
87).
27 MHD, p. 196.
28 See §3, b o f this chapter.
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Imagination as such is not concerned with the reality or unreality of its object. How 
then it is possible to accept the claim of art to provide knowledge of the real world when it is 
indifferent to it? Collingwood also maintains that it is of no use either to restate the second 
claim and say that art as imagination reveals the truth about the “ultimate nature of the 
imaginary world” (SM, p. 87), because this is superfluous and just reiterates the fact that art is 
imagination. It is in that respect that Collingwood mentions the idea of Croce who identified 
expression and intuition. He contends that Croce trying to solve the paradox of art as being at 
the same time “intuitive (pure imagination) and expressive (revelatory of truth)” (SM, p. 87) 
only managed to evade the problem by identifying the two:
Intuition and expression have not been reconciled. Expression has merely been 
reduced to intuition; in other words, expression in the true sense has been ignored (SM, p. 
87).29
The problem therefore remains and art “destroys itself by its own inner contradiction, 
by defining itself as at once pure intuition and also expression, imagination and thought, 
significance without definable signification, the intuitive concept” (SM, p. 90).
How then is this paradox to be solved, if at all? In SM Collingwood considered the 
claim of each form of experience to exist independently and to provide knowledge and he 
proceeded to examine the validity of such a claim. From the outset30 his opinion was clear: it 
was during the Renaissance that the idea of independent forms of experience took shape; it 
was an idea moreover that created problems. Before there was the medieval mind, the mind of 
unity, that provided security by recognising a very certain function for all forms of 
experience, which were living in a harmonious synthesis. But at the same time it kept them 
under a “comparatively low level of development” (SM, p. 29), not the least because of their 
interdependence. The Renaissance came with the message of maturity and freedom, meaning 
that these forms of experience, art, religion, philosophy and so forth, should become 
independent and autonomous. Indeed they liberated themselves by severing the ties between 
them, therefore becoming voices incomprehensible and even hostile to each other.
Collingwood observes the confusion among his contemporaries who follow or 
practise one or the other of these activities. They often fail to justify their existence and to 
support their function, let alone their claim that by what they do they provide the sole way to 
knowledge. Collingwood’s is categorical: independently, in isolation those provinces of
29 As we will see in the next section Collingwood’s view on Croce was to take a somehow different 
turn.
30 Collingwood provides a historical peregrination o f the unity and the fragmentation o f the human 
spirit and refers to the modem consequences o f  such a process. This is mainly found in SM, pp. 15-38.
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human experience cannot produce knowledge. Thus his effort was to reunite them and restore 
the self-knowing mind. He saw a way that they are related, a form of pattern characterised by 
the recurrence of the aesthetic, the religious and the intellectual activities. These activities 
have a hierarchy where one stage is transformed into something completely new. In that 
context Collingwood’s own answer to the paradox of art was that there was indeed a 
contradiction in the claim of art to be imagination and knowledge at the same time, but:
This contradiction is not irreconcilable. On the contrary, its reconciliation is the 
whole life of thought. The very existence of the mind is a standing synthesis of intuition and 
conception, immediacy and mediation, the that and the what. But it is not at the level of art 
that the synthesis is effected (SM, p. 90).
Art begins as imagination but if it remains imagination then the claim to be 
knowledge cannot be fulfilled. When art is transformed into religion and religion into science 
and so forth, then the “synthesis of intuition and conception” can be accomplished. Such an 
explanation would not satisfy the artists, for it implies that art itself cannot achieve 
knowledge. For Collingwood art, as every other form of experience, cannot exist in isolation 
but ought to be a part of the whole, a part of the hierarchical unity of mind.
We could say, therefore, that Mink’s position is not entirely correct. Collingwood in 
SM did occupy himself with the paradox of art being imagination and knowledge at the same 
time, but he didn’t attempt to solve it by reconciling the two. He did not argue that art as such 
is knowledge. Art is imagination with a certain place within the life of the spirit and thought. 
Its contribution to the self-knowledge of the spirit is that it helps to the gradual realisation of 
thought. This is what Collingwood has said elsewhere31 too: art by being imagination comes 
before thought, but it is because of that imaginative activity that the birth of thought at some 
point occurs.
§ 7. The connection of History with Art
We can now move to those writings of Collingwood where art and history are examined 
together. Collingwood early on explored the relationship between history and art. In one of 
his early essays32 he asserts that the “historical consciousness in its ideal nature is the 
knowledge of the individual. That it aims at being knowledge differentiates it from art, which 
aims at being imagination” (Debbins, p. 45). Collingwood goes on to show that although
31 See for instance PAE.
32 R.G. Collingwood. 1924/25. ‘The Nature and Aims o f  a Philosophy o f  History’, in Proceedings o f  
the Aristotelian Society, vol. 25, pp. 157-174. (This essay has been collected in Debbins).
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history and art are different they none the less have a common element; they both have as 
object not the universal but the individual. Thus the “object of art is the imaginary individual, 
whereas the object of history is the real individual” (Debbins, p. 45). In other words the 
fundamental difference, seen through their strong similarity, is that history being knowledge 
is the pursuit of truth as opposed to imagination which does not have this function:
All history is art, because to tell a story is art, whereas to tell a true story is history; 
thus history is art, but a specification of art, art qualified by a condition (truth) which deprives 
it of a part of its character but not of all (Debbins, p. 48).
Moreover the historian is not deprived of imaginative abilities:33
In one sense, the historian must not be imaginative: in another sense, imagination is 
his most necessary possession. This is not a mere ambiguity in the word imagination. The 
historian’s imagination is precisely the same thing as the novelist’s imagination; but whereas 
the artist imagines for the sake of imagining, the historian’s imagination is a disciplined 
imagination, subordinated to the pursuit of truth (Debbins, p. 48).
Here Collingwood was liberal in his use of the word thought. We have seen 
elsewhere in his writings on art (writings that chronologically come from the same period) 
that imagination and thought are completely different things, largely unrelated or that 
imagination has a connection with thought: it does help the birth of thought but it is not 
thought itself. Here, however, we are told that there are “various forms of thought (art, 
science, history, philosophy)” (Debbins, p. 48). We also know that art is imagination and that 
“historical thinking is a concrete thinking” (Debbins, p. 45). Therefore historical thinking and 
artistic imagination are both forms of thought. At the same time the historian can use his 
imagination which constitutes a very important weapon in his arsenal towards his effort to 
achieve knowledge and attain truth. Why, then, cannot artistic imagination constitute 
knowledge? Why cannot imagination as a form of thought do what history and science do 
when, as forms of thought34 too, both aim at being knowledge? This might create confusion 
but it should be noted that in this essay, as in most of his writings of the mid 1920’s, 
Collingwood examined an area of human experience always in relation to other areas. Here 
history was considered alongside art, science and philosophy. These areas are forms of 
thought but they “are not species of a genus”35 (Debbins, p. 48). Thus their characters often
33 Collingwood makes comparison between the imagination o f  an artist and the historian elsewhere too, 
as for instance in his 1935 essay The Historical Imagination, IH, pp. 231-249, especially p. 242. He 
regarded imagination for the historian not “ornamental but structural” (IH, p. 241).
34 Collingwood says that “scientific thinking is an abstract thinking, historical thinking is a concrete 
thinking (Debbins, p. 45).
35 Collingwood makes the same claim in SM, pp. 46-50. Whereas as species o f  a genus the five forms 
o f  experience “may be indifferently taken in any order” (SM, p. 50), Collingwood instead regarded 
them as having “a natural order o f  their own” (SM, p. 50): first comes art, then religion, then science, 
then history and finally philosophy.
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overlap and contain similarities that change in relation to the context and the function that 
each one performs. For instance:
art and science are contained in history, not excluded from it: yet contained in a form 
transmuted by their subordination to the historical end. History, on the other hand, is not 
contained in this manner in art or science; the historical material of a novelist ceases to be 
history and becomes pure art by being imaginatively handled, and the historical material of a 
scientist -experiment and observation- ceases to be history by being tom from its context in 
the world of fact and regarded as so many mere instances of laws. No doubt the artist and 
scientist must in some sense be historians, just as the historian must in some sense be an artist 
and a scientist; but not in the same sense. The historian is suppressed in the artist and the 
scientist; the artist and scientist are preserved but subordinated in the historian (Debbins, pp. 
48-49).
Thus the artist within the historian might use his imagination to achieve knowledge, 
that is to perform an extra function which is questioning whether the story he unravels or 
narrates is true. That is why the artist is “subordinated in the historian”, because unlike his 
pure artistic inclination he now has to go further and ask the question about tmth. Similarly 
the artist is content when his story is just a story and the historian is “suppressed in the artist” 
because the artist is not going to take the extra step to ask whether his story is tme. Both use 
imagination, which is a form of thought, but they directed it towards different aims and they 
use it in a different way. If all the above areas had been species of a genus they would have to 
have a similar direction and use their similarities in a more uniform way.
The important point is that although Collingwood makes a distinction between 
knowledge and imagination, imagination is a form of thought and not a faculty completely 
unrelated to thought or just the initial stage of it. Art can now be seen as a cognitive activity 
with an epistemological status not yet achieved but pending further clarification.
§ 8. The German tradition and Benedetto Croce
Collingwood also presented his ideas on the relationship between art and history through his 
historical exploration and criticisms of philosophers and historians who were concerned with 
and contributed to the philosophy of history. In that respect of particular importance is his 
treatment of certain German thinkers and of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, who 
was influenced by some elements -especially that branch of idealism which attached 
importance to history as a form of knowledge- of German philosophy.36
36 The relevant passages can be found in the IH, Part IV, § 2. Germany, pp. 165-183 and § 4. Italy, pp. 
190-204. The latter, although titled ‘Italy’ is exclusively dedicated to Croce since although he “had 
behind him a certain amount o f  recent Italian philosophical thought” on the theory o f history, this work 
“he absorbed into his own work so completely that for our purposes it may be passed over” (IH, p.
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In his evaluation of Windelband’s37, the German historian of philosophy, contribution 
to the philosophy of history, Collingwood asserts that Windelband trying to divide history and 
science, brought history closer to art but he did so in a not very systematic and conclusive 
way. History was seen not as a part of the theory of knowledge but rather belonging to the 
theory of value and thus:
history ends by being extruded from the sphere of knowledge altogether, and we are 
left with the conclusion that what the historian does with the individual is not to know or 
think it, but somehow to intuit its value; an activity on the whole akin to that of the artist. But, 
once more, the relation between history and art is not systematically thought out (IH, p. 168).
The connection between history and art was also attempted by Dilthey in 1883 and 
Simmel in 1892.38 For the thought of the former Collingwood had a great admiration and he 
believed that the “best work done on the subject [i.e. philosophy of history] during this period 
[i.e. towards the end of the 19th century] was that of the lonely and neglected genius Dilthey” 
(IH, p. 171). However in the end none of those attempts, despite the many interesting and 
important points they possessed and the advancement they gave to the subject of the 
philosophy of history, produced results that, to Collingwood’s satisfaction, solved the 
problem.
Within this tradition Collingwood regarded the ideas of the Italian philosopher and 
historian Benedetto Croce. By the time Croce started occupying himself with the 
philosophical problems of a theory of history, he was in his late twenties. Up to then he had 
mainly been a literary critic, antiquarian scholar and archive historian and had already 
acquired reputation and distinction in those areas. He also had an interest in aesthetics but his 
philosophical efforts had not been systematic. From those areas of interest it came naturally to 
him “to connect the problem of history with the problem of art”.39 This problem had occupied 
his mind for sometime and “after much hesitation and a whole series of provisional solutions 
during February or March 1893, after a whole day of intense thought” (CA, p. 53) he sketched 
his essay in one go in the same evening. The manner in which that essay was written is quite
191). Collingwood has mentioned Croce’s theory o f  history and its relation with art before, as Dussen 
points out. In the 1929 lectures on the philosophy o f history “Collingwood’s treatment o f Croce closely 
corresponds with that in The Idea o f  History” (HS, p. 161). The same lectures also present the ideas o f  
the four German thinkers, see HS, p. 161. Only parts o f the 1929 lectures on the philosophy o f history 
are left and they remain unpublished.
37 Collingwood's analysis on Windelband can be found in IH, pp. 165-168.
38 About the ideas o f Simmel IH, pp. 170-171 and Dilthey IH, pp. 171-177. Collingwood also included 
Rickert IH, pp. 168-170 and says that “These four people between them started a vigorous movement 
in Germany for the study o f the philosophy o f history” (IH, p. 175). One o f  the main principles o f that 
‘school’ was the distinction between history and natural science and through the idea o f history as 
dealing with the individual they tried to connect the problem o f history with the problem o f art.
39 B. Croce. 1927. An Autobiography. Oxford Clarendon Press (Translated from the Italian by R.G. 
Collingwood), p. 53 (Hereafter abbreviated as CA).
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characteristic of the then young Croce. He produced his essay under the frenzy and inspiration 
of an artist, feeling “ease and heat... something close to my heart and coming straight from 
my heart” (CA, p. 54). The 1893 essay40 of Croce on the nature of history, on the specific 
question whether history was a science or an art, was important in many respects and attracted 
the attention of Collingwood.
In another of his essays41 Collingwood regarded the ideas of Croce as the only “really 
fertile suggestion” (p. 12) on the issue, current in the 19th century, whether history was a 
science or an art. Collingwood expressed satisfaction in Croce’s idea, in the fact that he 
“realised that the business of the artist is to ‘see’ individual men, landscapes, tunes, and so 
forth (‘intuition’), and that the business of the historian is to ‘see’ individual historical events” 
(p. 12). Croce had in fact, in his first essay on that issue, identified the two: history and art 
were the same thing. The issue of complete identity poses of course some problems, but still, 
although Croce’s suggestion “did not solve the problem ... it brought matters to a head” (p.
12).
In IH Collingwood explored in greater length Croce’s position of history as art. He 
starts from Croce’s 1893 essay where art is “the intuitive vision of individuality” (IH, p. 191) 
and the connected fact that an artist “sees and represents this individuality” (IH, p. 191). Art, 
therefore, is not “an activity of the emotions, but a cognitive activity: it is knowledge of the 
individual” (IH, p. 191)42 On the other hand Croce maintained that “history is altogether 
concerned with concrete individual facts” (IH, p. 191). As a result art and history are 
“precisely the same thing: the intuition and representation of the individual” (IH, p. 192).
This identity between history and art becomes of course absurd or paradoxical if the 
element of truth is completely ignored. Art is not concerned with truth, for all the artist does is 
“to state what he sees” (IH, p. 192). The historian apart from that he has to “assure himself 
that what he sees is the truth” (EH, p. 192). In Croce’s view this happens because “art ... 
represents or narrates the possible; history represents or narrates that which has really 
happened ... the real thus falls inside the sphere of the possible ... and thus history as narration 
of the real falls inside art as the narration of the possible” (IH, p. 192).
However the problem still exists because “art as such is pure intuition and does not 
contain thought; but in order to distinguish the real from the merely possible, one must think” 
(IH, p. 193). To call thus history intuition of the real is a contradiction since “intuition, just 
because it is intuition and not thought, knows nothing of any distinction between the real and
40 B. Croce. 1893. La Storia ridotta sotto il concetto generate d e ll’ Arte. (Reprinted in Primi Saggi, 
Laterza, 1919).
41 R.G. Collingwood. 1930. The Philosophy o f  History. Historical Association Leaflet No 79, pp 1-16 
London. (It is reprinted in Debbins, pp. 121-139).
42 It seems that Collingwood’s position as it was expressed in the “Human Nature and Human History” 
lecture o f  the same year, 1936, permeates the philosophy o f  history lectures too. Hence the acceptance 
o f  emotions as a non cognitive activity that does not constitute knowledge is not surprising.
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the imaginary” (IH, p. 193). It took Croce some time to solve this problem. Even in his 1902 
book on Aesthetic43 he identifies history with art and Collingwood points out that when Croce 
had to answer “how history differs from the pure imagination of art, he answers it in the old 
way, by saying that it distinguishes as art does not between the real and the unreal” (IH p, 
194).
In that book Croce suggested that knowledge has two forms: a) intuitive, aesthetic 
knowledge or expression, b) intellectual knowledge or concept. He denied that history (or 
historicity as he calls it) could be a third form of knowledge. He argues, instead, that 
“historicity is not form, but content: as form it is nothing but intuition or aesthetic fact” 
(Aesthetics, p. 26), i.e. identical with art. Therefore since, according to Croce, intuitive 
knowledge is Art, history “is included in the universal concept of Art” (Aesthetics, p. 27). 
Like art the domain of history is “the this and here, the individuum omnimode determinatum” 
(Aesthetics, p. 27)^, the individual is the common consideration of history and art. Croce, as 
he did in his 1893 essay, proceeds to identify differences between history and art. Art in this 
case is taken in the narrow sense, as opposed to the general concept of Art as being the 
intuitive form of knowledge. Croce argues that in the intuitive-aesthetic knowledge the spirit 
initially finds itself in a position where it cannot distinguish the real from the unreal and thus 
historical intuition from non-historical intuition. This distinction only occurs later on and then 
we have the concepts of “external and internal, of what has happened and what is desired, of 
object and subject” (Aesthetics, p. 28). Hence these concepts give form to the distinction 
between “historical and non-historical intuition, the real from the unreal, real imagination 
from pure imagination” (Aesthetics, p. 28).
The solution to the problem was given in 1909 in Croce’s book on Logic45 where the 
doctrine of the individual or historical judgment was put forward and history was “no longer 
conceived as mere intuition of the individual; it does not simply apprehend the individual, in
43 B. Croce. Estetica come scienza d e ll’ espressione e linguistica generate (1st ed. 1902, 4th ed. 1912. 
According to Brown the editions after the third are basically unchanged: M.E. Brown. 1963. ‘Croce’s 
Early Aesthetic: 1894-1912’, in Journal o f  Aesthetic and Art Criticism, XXII, pp. 29-41, endnote 23.) 
The second edition o f  the English translation is trustworthy and was made in 1922 by Collingwood 
although the name o f  Douglas Ainslie still appears as the translator: B. Croce. Aesthetic as science o f  
expression and general linguistic (Henceforth abbreviated as Aesthetics).
44 In contrast Collingwood had maintained that “historical thought is in one way like perception. (...) 
But what we perceive is always the this, the here, the now. (...) Historical thought is o f something 
which can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. Its objects are events which have finished 
happening, and conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no longer perceptible do they 
become objects of historical thought” (IH, p. 233). Thus Collingwood would disagree that the domain 
o f history is “the this and here”. However there is scope to see history as “the this and here” if we, 
perhaps, refer to history as the thing that happens in the mind o f  the historian and in that respect 
Croce’s dictum that “all history is contemporary history” can acquire its temporal dimension in the 
present. See R.G. Collingwood. 1921. ‘Croce’s Philosophy o f  History’, in The Hibbert Journal XIX, 
pp. 263-278. Reprinted in Debbins, pp. 3-22.
45 B. Croce. 1909. Logica come scienza del concetto puro. English translation by Douglas Ainslie in 
1917: B. Croce, Logic as the science o f  the pure concept. London: Macmillan.
107
HISTORY AND ART
which case it would be art; it judges the individual” (IH, p. 196). Thus the 1893 essay was 
“the seed which in opening and developing would lead ... after many years of research and 
rethinking to conceive the judgement of the individual, i.e., historical judgement, the ultimate 
and unique form of thought”.46
The importance that Collingwood attached to Croce’s theory helps to shed light on 
what he perceived himself as the function and nature of history and art at that time. 
Collingwood’s essays on Croce come from the 1930’s. The notion of history as having a 
strong epistemological status is becoming stronger and stronger. But is art following the same 
direction? I think in certain respects it does. The 1930’s were a period that art for 
Collingwood was no longer imagination. Also siding with Croce in denying that art was an 
emotional activity but instead a cognitive one, Collingwood seems to be looking for a more 
substantial place for art within the human experience. His position, as we have seen, in 1936, 
regarding the various elements of the human mind, was that emotions, feelings, sensations, 
appetites and so forth, all are associated with the non-rational mind; they don’t belong to the 
thinking mind. Art is intuition of the individual and although intuition is different to thinking 
- i f  thinking is taken to mean the activity that distinguishes the real from the imaginary- still 
art is dealing with the individual in certain ways and is thus knowledge of the individual. It is 
the kind of individual -the imaginary as opposed to the real- that distinguishes art from 
history. It seems that compared to the previous essay of Collingwood the situation has been 
turned in this direction: art as imagination was not knowledge but still was a form of thought. 
Now art as intuition is a cognitive activity, but still not thinking as such, since it doesn’t make 
a distinction between the real and the imaginary. However the intuitive grasp of the individual 
makes art knowledge.
46 B. Croce. 1996. ‘In Commemoration o f  an English Friend, a Companion in Thought and Faith’, in 
CS, vol. Ill, p. 179 (Translated from the Italian by L. Rubinoff and A. Franklin. The original 
commemoration: ‘In commemorazione di un amico inglese, compagno di pensiero e di fede’, was first 
published in 1946, Quademi della ‘Critica ’, vol. 2, pp. 60-63).
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§ 9. Art as imagination and knowledge in The Principles o f A rf1
The Principles o f Art was Collingwood’s last and most wide-ranging piece of writing on art. 
Elsewhere expression and, in a lesser degree, imagination were treated as things already 
familiar that needed no in depth analysis and definition. But in PA a systematic effort was 
made to define these concepts as closely as possible. In fact the definition of the concepts, 
that in the end build Collingwood’s theory of art, is the most painstaking and lengthy part of 
the book.
Collingwood first explored what art is not but often confused with48, and then goes on 
to maintain that art proper is expression and imagination.49 This was done, in Book I, in a 
provisional way accepting, that is, a terminology about art that is close to what most people, 
tolerably competent in art matters, think when they talk about art. This preliminary 
examination concludes that:
By creating for ourselves an imaginary experience or activity, we express our 
emotions; and this is what we call art (PA, p. 151).
Still there are more things to be done since we don’t know what imagination is, what 
emotion is and “what is the nature of the connexion between them, described by saying that 
imagination expresses emotion” (PA, p. 152) .50
By an examination of the activities of feeling and thinking51 Collingwood finds that 
there is something in between, “a special activity of mind ... and that this is what we generally 
call imagination, as distinct from sensation on the one hand and intellect on the other” (PA, p. 
171). Collingwood maintains that imagination is very important and deserves more attention, 
it is the activity “without which, according to Aristotle, intellection is impossible” (PA, p. 
171) and according to Kant it “forms the link between sensation and understanding” (PA, p. 
171) and is “‘an indispensable function’ for our knowledge of the world around us” (PA, p. 
192).
47 The aim o f  this section is not to provide a complete exposition o f Collingwood’s theory o f art, but 
only to examine how he attempted to solve the problem o f the relation between imagination and 
knowledge. For competent expositions o f Collingwood’s late philosophy o f  art see: MHD, chapter 7, 
pp. 195-238; SPT, chapter 4, pp. 119-140; Donagan, chapter V, pp. 94-133. Also M. Oakeshott. 1938. 
‘Review o f  The Principles o f  Art', in Cambridge Review, June (reprinted in CS, 1997, vol. IV, pp. 189-
192); R. Wollheim. 1972. ‘On an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood’s Aesthetic’, in Krausz, pp. 
68-78; A. Ridley. 1998. R.G. Collingwood: A Philosophy o f  Art. London: Orion Books (a review o f  
this book by J. Dilworth. 1999, in The Journal o f  Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 57, no 3, pp. 390- 
392).
48 See PA, pp. 15-104.
49 For art as expression see PA, pp. 105-124; for art as imagination, PA, pp. 125-153.
50 The subsequent discussion will be facilitated by an understanding o f the levels o f experience that 
Collingwood presented. I have given a synopsis o f them in Chapter II, § 4, b.
51 See PA, pp. 157-171.
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Traditionally imagination was confused with sensation and this confusion was not 
entirely unjustified because sensation and imagination, although different, “are closely 
related” (PA, p. 202). However what actually happens is that the “activity of consciousness ... 
converts ... crude sensation into imagination” (PA, p. 215). Consciousness and imagination 
can be regarded in certain respects as synonymous; but the difference is that consciousness 
“effects the conversion” and imagination is “that which has undergone it” and thus it is “the 
new form which feeling takes when transformed by the activity of consciousness” (PA, p. 
215). The relation between imagination and sensation is now clearer:
imagination is a distinct level of experience intermediate between sensation and 
intellect, the point at which the life of thought makes contact with the life of purely psychical 
experience (PA, p.215).
Moreover since sensation and intellect are not directly related, “it is not sensa as such 
that provide the data for intellect, it is sensa transformed into ideas of imagination by the 
work of consciousness” (PA, p. 215). Sensa is the common element between imagination and 
sensation. Thus:
From one point of view, imagination does not differ from sensation: what we imagine 
is the very same kinds of things (colours, &c.) which present themselves to us in mere 
sensation. From another point of view, it is very different through being ... tamed or 
domesticated (PA, p. 222-223).
By domestication Collingwood means that with the activity of imagination we have 
an awareness of those sensa and in some sense we exercise a control over them. As mere 
sensations our awareness of them is non existent, they just force “themselves upon us 
unawares” (PA, p. 222).
This is how Collingwood described the activity of imagination. Still the relation 
between imagination and expression needs to be established. This is the role of language 
which “comes into existence with imagination, as a feature of experience at the conscious 
level. It is here that it receives its original characteristics, which it never altogether loses, 
however much it is modified ... in adapting itself to the requirements of the intellect” (PA, p. 
225). Language is imaginative and expressive. At the level of imagination or consciousness is 
an “imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion. Intellectual language is the 
same thing intellectualized, or modified as to express thought” (PA, p. 225). Therefore art as
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imagination and expression is language52 and is generated at the level of imagination or 
consciousness.
The double function of language, however, creates some questions since:
In one sense language is wholly an activity of thought, and thought is all it can ever 
express; for the level of experience to which it belongs is that of awareness or consciousness 
or imagination, and this level has been shown to belong not to the realm of sensation or 
psychical experience, but to the level of thought. But if thought is taken in its narrower sense 
of intellect, language together with imaginative experience as such falls outside it and below 
it. Language in its original nature expresses not thought in this narrower sense, but only 
emotions (PA, p. 252).
The implication, then, is that, when language is modified and from imaginative 
becomes intellectual and expresses thought, this stage would be indifferent to art. However 
Collingwood argues that this not correct:
Even if art never expresses thought as such, but only emotion, the emotions it 
expresses are not only the emotions of a merely conscious experient, they include the 
emotions of a thinker; and consequently a theory of art must consider the question: how, if at 
all, must language be modified in order to bring the expression of these emotions within its 
scope? (PA, p. 252).
We have already seen how according to the different levels of experience and their 
structural relation, elements from the level below are retained at the level above and also 
modified in order to form the character of that level. Thus for the first level of consciousness 
or imagination the emotions of the previous psychical level are transformed and expressed 
through language. For the second level of consciousness, the intellect, language is modified as 
to express thought. However, since each level retains elements from the previous, the level of 
intellect contains emotions too. The linguistic expression of intellect’s emotions and thoughts 
is, according to Collingwood, is one and not two acts: through the expression of emotion 
thought is expressed too.53
The problem then is how art -which as imagination belongs to consciousness, the 
level of experience below intellect- can express other than psychical emotions, i.e. the 
emotions found at the level below consciousness. Because “all other emotions are generated 
at levels of experience subsequent to the emergence of consciousness, and therefore (it might 
be thought) under the eyes of consciousness. They are bom, it might seem, in the light of 
consciousness, with expressions ready-made for them at birth. There can, therefore, be no 
need to express them through works of art” (PA, p. 293). It appears that, according to the 
above line of thinking, “no work of art, if it is a genuine work of art, can contain in its
52 PA, p. 273.
53 PA, p. 267.
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subject-matter anything that is due to the work of intellect” (PA, p. 293). This is however not 
entirely accurate:
Art as such might contain nothing that is due to intellect, and yet certain works of art 
might contain much that is due to intellect, not because they are works of art, but because they 
are works of a certain kind; that is, because they express emotions of a certain kind, namely, 
emotions that can arise only as the emotional charges upon intellectual activities (PA, p. 293).
Works of art therefore do not only contain and express the emotions that came from 
the psychical level but “may also include elements drawn from other levels, in which case 
these levels, too, will contain elements of which, until we find expression for them, we are not 
conscious” (PA, p. 293). And Collingwood continues:
If we examine almost any work of art we like to choose, and consider what emotions 
it expresses, we shall find that they include some, and those not the least important, which are 
intellectual emotions: emotions which can only be felt by an intellectual being, and are in fact 
felt because such a being uses his intellect in certain ways. They are the emotional charges not 
upon a merely psychical experience, nor upon experience at the level of mere consciousness, 
but upon intellectual experience or thought in the narrower sense of the word (PA, pp. 293- 
294).
And this, Collingwood believes, is inevitable:
For even if a certain emotion is, as I put it, endowed at birth with its own proper 
expression, this is only a way of saying that the work of expression has already been done in 
its case; and if done, done by the artistic consciousness. And every emotion is, if not bom 
with the silver spoon of expression in its mouth, at least reborn in that state on the occasion of 
its second birth as idea, as distinct from impression. Since the emotional life of the conscious 
and intellectual levels of experience is far richer than that of the merely psychical level, 
therefore (...) it is only natural that the emotional subject-matter of works of art should be 
drawn mostly from emotions belonging to these higher levels (PA, p. 294).
Collingwood, in order to support his view that works of art do express intellectual 
emotions (which is the same as to say that they express thought, since the expression of 
emotions and thoughts at the level of the intellect is a single act), compares the poetic 
expression and the philosophical expression in an attempt to find in what their difference 
consists.54 It cannot be founded on any distinction “between language expressing emotion and 
language expressing thought, for all language expresses emotion” (PA, p. 296) or on a 
distinction “between language in its original form, as expressing the emotions of 
consciousness, and intellectualized language, as expressing intellectual emotions” because the 
poet not only expresses intellectual emotions but “these are what he normally expresses” (PA,
54 Collingwood had also compared philosophy and poetry in his An Essay on Philosophical Method 
(1933, Oxford Clarendon Press), pp. 199-220.
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p. 296). Other ways55 to distinguish philosophy and poetry are also found problematic. In 
essence, Collingwood argues, the distinction between philosophical and poetical or artistic 
writing56 is an illusion and “once it is realized that art and language are the same thing, this 
distinction vanishes” (PA, p. 298).
PA was Collingwood’s last effort to solve the problem of art being imagination and 
expression at the same time. Art, that is, being seen as imagination and knowledge. And 
Collingwood claims that art in indeed knowledge, because art is truth. It is to amend his 
previous position in OPA and SM and do “penance for youthful follies” (PA, p. 288, note 1) 
that he now says that art “is not indifferent to truth; it is essentially the pursuit of truth” (PA, 
p. 288). But the truth of art is of a peculiar kind:
the truth it pursues is not a truth of relation57, it is a truth of individual fact. The truths 
art discovers are those single and self-contained individualities which from the intellectual 
point of view become the ‘terms’ between which it is the business of intellect to establish or 
apprehend relations. Each of these individualities, as art discovers it, is a perfectly concrete 
individual, one from which nothing has yet been abstracted by the work of intellect. Each is 
an experience in which the distinction between what is due to myself and what is due to my 
world has not yet been made (PA, p. 288).
And therefore “Art is knowledge; knowledge of the individual” (PA, p. 289). 
Contrary to that Mink maintains that an element that must “be given up is Collingwood’s 
attempt ... to claim for art the status of knowledge” (MHD, p. 223), since “in the sense in 
which there can be second-level knowledge, we do not know our own emotions” (MHD, 
p.224). Mink refers to the idea that, because of the dialectic, at each level of experience we 
have can have, strictly speaking, knowledge of the level below, but not of the level we are. 
The lower level becomes object of the higher level and this is how we become to know it. 
Therefore at the level of imagination or consciousness an artist “becoming conscious of 
emotion by expressing it is not in any proper sense coming to know emotion” (MHD, p. 224). 
This would be attained by an act of a higher level of experience, in the case of PA, the 
intellect. I think this interpretation takes the idea of the dialectic a step too far.
In Collingwood’s view consciousness is a form of thought. What produces an artistic 
utterance “is an act of consciousness, and hence an act of thought” (PA, p. 287). In order for 
consciousness to be a form of thought it must have characteristics of thought. Truth is one of 
them, since thought is always the distinction, or the efforts to distinguish, between truth and
55 PA, pp. 296-297.
56 For Collingwood the same “applies equally to historical and scientific writing” (PA, p. 298).
57 Collingwood maintained that intellect (one o f  the two forms o f  thought, the other being 
consciousness) “is concerned with the relations between things” and its truth is a “relational truth” 
apprehended by “arguing or inferring” (PA, p. 287).
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falsehood. The artistic utterance is therefore “necessarily an attempt to state the truth” (PA, p. 
287).
Now, Collingwood thinks that, due to misapprehension, consciousness and art might 
be regarded as having nothing to do with truth. This can happen if for some reason it is 
assumed that “intellect is the only possible form of thought”, which is to say that truth can 
only be apprehended by “arguing and inferring” (this is what intellect does) and therefore to 
conclude that “whatever does not contain arguments cannot be a form of thought, and 
therefore cannot be concerned with truth” (PA, p. 287). Given that consciousness “as such, 
and therefore art as such, not being intellect, does not and cannot argue” (PA, p. 287), the 
inference will be that art is not concerned with truth. Therefore art cannot be a form of 
knowledge.
This confusion or misapprehension aside (mainly the idea that thought only argues 
and infers in the attempt to attain truth and knowledge), there is no reason why consciousness 
is not a form of thought. Therefore to each form of thought corresponds a form of knowledge: 
consciousness or art is knowledge of the individual; intellect is knowledge of the relation of 
those individualities between them. Therefore Mink’s objection can be rephrased as follows: 
the level of consciousness cannot have knowledge of the relations between those 
individualities; when they become objects of the next level, intellect apprehends or establishes 
those relations. But consciousness, and thus art, must have knowledge of those individualities. 
If the individual hasn’t been apprehended by consciousness then the job of intellect would 
seem impossible: intellect would be required to establish relations between individual things 
that have not been apprehended in their individuality, relations, that is, between unknown 
things.
Therefore art or consciousness is knowledge. But knowledge of a peculiar kind. 
Perhaps the main confusion arises from the fact that what Collingwood calls knowledge at the 
level of consciousness is something that wouldn’t be instantly recognised as knowledge by 
everyone. Some might even be reluctant to call it knowledge altogether. Collingwood was 
not. He considered the truth of art a peculiar type of truth, which is not truth of relation but 
truth of the individual. Hence the knowledge of the individual is a peculiar kind of 
knowledge. What is this knowledge and how does consciousness or art obtain it? We know 
that intellect apprehends truth and knowledge by arguing and inferring. How does 
consciousness or art apprehend them? For an answer it would help us to have a more precise 
idea of what Collingwood exactly meant by the individualities or the individual that truth 
discovers. Mink maintain that it is not clear what these individualities might be, but his view 
is that they “could be nothing other than states of psychical feeling, modified by becoming 
objects of consciousness” (MHD, p. 224). Collingwood describes it as follows:
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The individual of which art is the knowledge is an individual situation in which we 
find ourselves. We are only conscious of the situation as our situation, and we are only 
conscious of ourselves as involved in the situation. Other people may be involved in it too, 
but these, like ourselves, are present to our consciousness only as factors in the situation, not 
as persons who outside the situation have lives of their own (PA, p. 290).
Therefore knowledge of the individual is self-knowledge and consciousness is exactly 
that: self-knowledge. Collingwood makes it more clear in the following passage:
Theoretically58, the artist is a person who comes to know himself, to know his own 
emotions. This is also knowing his world, that is, the sights and sounds and so forth which 
together make up his total imaginative experience. The two knowledges are to him one 
knowledge, because these sights and sounds are to him steeped in the emotion with which he 
contemplates them: they are the language in which that emotion utters itself to his 
consciousness. His world is his language. What it says to him it says about himself; his 
imaginative vision of it is his self-knowledge (PA, p. 291).
Moreover this self-knowledge is also a form of creation and self-realisation:
But this knowing of himself is a making of himself. At first he is mere psyche, the 
possessor of merely psychical experiences or impressions. The act of coming to know himself 
is the act of converting his impressions into ideas, and so of converting himself from mere 
psyche into consciousness. The coming to know his emotions is the coming to dominate 
them, to assert himself as their master.... Moreover, his knowing of this new world is also the 
making of the new world which he is coming to know. The world he has come to know is a 
world consisting of language; a world where everything has the property of expressing 
emotion (PA, p. 291).
It is clear therefore that for Collingwood the act itself of the transformation of 
feelings into emotions is an act of knowledge. From simply being sentient, we become aware. 
As a matter of fact this knowledge seems to be the only way to make sure that the 
transformation was indeed successful. Mink accepts that this operation does occur at the level 
of consciousness. What he denies is that it constitutes knowledge. And this was 
Collingwood’s main objection: there is no reason whatsoever to assume that consciousness by 
not being intellect cannot be a form of thought, the pursuit of truth and thus a form of 
knowledge. Because consciousness can be denied the status of thought and knowledge only 
by not being seen as performing something which is a recognisable form of knowledge, that is 
something akin to the intellect. But knowledge, in Collingwood’s view, cannot be expected to 
have only one form, that of the intellect.
Hence art is not a precursor of knowledge. It is the birth of thought and knowledge. 
And Collingwood summarizing says that the aesthetic experience is:
58 Collingwood’s distinction is that theoretical is an “activity in ourselves which produces a change in 
us but none in our environment”; and practical an activity which “produces a change in our 
environment but none in ourselves” (PA, p. 289).
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a knowing of oneself and of one’s world, these two knowns and knowings being not 
yet distinguished, so that the self is expressed in the world, the world consisting of language 
whose meaning is that emotional experience which constitutes the self, and the self consisting 
of emotions which are known only as expressed in the language which is the world. It is also 
a making of oneself and of one’s world, the self which was psyche being remade in the shape 
of consciousness, and the world, which was crude sensa, being remade in the shape of 
language, or sensa converted into imagery and charged with emotional significance (PA, p. 
292).
§ 10. Conclusions
Collingwood’s early aesthetics has often been regarded as the stage where art was defined as 
pure imagination. Isolating SM and OPA and reading them without any of his other aesthetic 
writings, a clear idea that Collingwood thought only of art as imagination might indeed be 
formed. If we add to these two books the 1921 lecture on Jane Austen, the 1925 essay on 
Plato and the 1927 KCL lecture, we are presented with an even stronger case for seeing art as 
imagination.
However this interpretation becomes less definite if we start taking Collingwood’s 
other writings into consideration. In fact the very early essay “Words and Tune” and the 
published lecture on Ruskin mention the artistic effort as aiming to achieve expression. 
Moreover, in both of these writings the artistic expression is the expression of emotions or 
feelings. However brief and rudimentary the coverage of the nature of art in these essays 
might be, still they represent an outline of the idea that Collingwood was later to develop 
more fully. Art as expression of emotions or feelings was, thus, Collingwood’s initial answer 
to the question “what is art?”.
After these very early essays Collingwood develops a philosophy of art, where art is 
conceived as pure imagination. This is his position in all of his writings on art from the early 
1920’s until 1925. But from the next year the situation is different. 1926 can be seen as the 
point where expression becomes more and more important. PAE and the reviews of that year 
show the same preoccupation with all the elements that would come to form Collingwood’s 
final theory of art: imagination, expression and language. In PAE, as we have seen, 
imagination brings language into existence and thus helps the expression of thought; and this 
is art. The 1926 reviews of Collingwood show his appreciation for Croce’s aesthetics. 
Collingwood regraded Croce as the person who correctly identified the fundamental questions 
of aesthetics. Moreover the attempted answers to these questions were on the whole 
satisfactory, with imagination (or intuition) and expression being what art is mainly 
concerned with. In that context expression was synonymous to knowledge, not the expression 
of feelings or emotions.
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Then we have the 1927 KCL lecture, which appeared after a period that art as 
expression was Collingwood’s principal direction. No mention of expression is to be found 
here; instead art is once more pure imagination. This is a rather surprising position but only if 
we assume that a linear development of Collingwood’s philosophy of art is to be expected. 
But we have seen that Collingwood’s method of approaching problems does not consist of 
clear-cut stages where the new one supersedes entirely the previous. It is the effort to define 
the appropriate concepts for the specific problem. Once the appropriate concepts have been 
found then no element is superfluous, incorrect or in need of being replaced. Occasionally 
some concepts become more prominent that others, or they become dormant and do not 
participate for some time in the problem. But they are not abandoned. In that respect the 
disappearance in 1927 of expression and the return of imagination as the main function of art 
is not strange.
The 1927 lecture, however, is the last time that art is defined as just imagination. 
From now on imagination is one of the elements in the question of art, but not the sole one or 
even the most important. Actually just one year later in 1928, in Collingwood’s essay on 
Form and Content in Art, expression of emotions or feelings (still synonymous in 
Collingwood’s terminology) becomes once more the epicentre of art, whilst imagination is 
entirely absent. The 1928 essay is the last piece that Collingwood wrote on art during the 
1920’s. The writings from the early 1930’s show that imagination and expression were what 
Collingwood kept exploring and that Croce’s theory of aesthetics was still influential. The 
culmination of the theories of imagination and expression occurred in PA.
One thing needs to be said about the connection between imagination and thought in 
Collingwood’s early philosophy of art. Throughout his art writings Collingwood contrasted 
imagination and thought. In that context we find three terms that are almost synonymous: 
thought, knowledge and expression. Thought is the attempt to differentiate between truth and 
falsehood. When thought attains truth it is knowledge. Expression is the revelation of truth 
and thus knowledge. In most of these writings Collingwood only hinted at the exact relation 
between imagination and thought: in places the relationship was found to be one where 
imagination assists the birth of thought, while elsewhere, for instance in SM, the question was 
how art can be imagination and knowledge at the same time.
Of special importance are Collingwood’s essays where art and history were 
contrasted. In one of them Collingwood found history and art alike because both are 
concerned with the individual. Art was imagination and concerned with the imaginary 
individual, since imagination is indifferent to the reality or unreality of its object. History on 
the other hand was knowledge of the individual, since history asks whether its object is true. 
In the same essay Collingwood also maintains that art as imagination is a form of thought 
next to history, science and philosophy. This is a deviation from Collingwood's other
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writings, such as OP A, where he had considered imagination and thought separate things, 
imagination helping the birth of thought but isn’t thought. But if now art as imagination is a 
form of thought it follows that it pursues (like history, science and philosophy as forms of 
thought do according to Collingwood) truth. But how is this possible since imagination is 
indifferent to truth by being indifferent to the reality or unreality of its object?Collingwood’s 
answer is that although art, history, science, and philosophy are forms of thought they are not 
species of a genus. They have common characteristics but they are not directed towards the 
same aims. The historian must be imaginative but his imagination is subordinated to the 
pursuit of truth; the scientist generalises like the historian but he does it for different purpose, 
and so forth. Thus history, science and philosophy as forms of thought pursue truth and are 
knowledge. Art as a form of thought is indifferent to truth and is imagination and not 
knowledge. In this essay, therefore, Collingwood came close to connect art as imagination 
with knowledge but he reserved his final ideas for later on.
In the writings of Collingwood where he examines the relation between art and 
history through some reflections on other people, the case of Croce stands out. For Croce art 
is the intuitive vision of individuality and the artist sees and represents this individuality. 
Croce moreover identified intuition and expression (knowledge) and thus claimed for art the 
status of knowledge, knowledge of the individual. However the problem is that intuition as 
such is not thinking and cannot distinguish between the real and the imaginary. Collingwood 
in SM argued that Croce’s attempt of synthesis was problematic since it only manages to 
reduce expression to intuition.59 In Croce’s solution “the opposition vanishes and the terms 
collapse into an undifferentiated or immediate identity” (SM, p. 87). However after SM 
Collingwood came to see Croce’s theory as substantially correct. In the essays on the relation 
between art and history, Collingwood seems to accept the identification between intuition and 
expression or to put it in other terms between imagination and knowledge. Also, he often took 
Croce’s ideas as a model to judge other aesthetic theories. The main idea, therefore, after SM 
and before PA is that Collingwood was looking for a synthesis between imagination and 
knowledge. He didn’t attempt a systematic approach to that problem but through a few essays 
and comments on other people we can see how he saw that question. At one time art was 
imagination and a form of thought but not knowledge since it didn’t pursue truth. Later it was 
knowledge, although it was uncertain how intuition, by not being thought, could distinguish 
between the real and the imaginary and thus attain truth. The only thing that remained 
constant was that art’s concern was the individual.
59 Mink maintained that Collingwood’s effort to provide art with an epistemological status was “no 
doubt an uncritical reflection in his thought o f  his sympathy for Croce’s aesthetic” (MHD; p. 223). In 
the light o f  Collingwood’s criticisms o f  Croce’s theory in SM, I believe that Collingwood’s position 
was far from being uncritical.
118
HISTORY AND ART
But why does Collingwood change his views on art? The reason, I believe, is the 
difference of emphasis in his philosophy regarding the character of knowledge. In effect 
Collingwood saw knowledge in two ways. One is where the individual modes of experience, 
without themselves being knowledge, contribute to the whole which thus becomes 
knowledge. The other where any mode of experience can, individually, be a form of 
knowledge. SM is the clearest manifestation of the first way, and the reason why the idea of 
art as expression in the very early essays of Collingwood changed. SM is the first attempt of 
Collingwood to present a coherent philosophy, his philosophy of the Spirit. The united spirit 
is much more important than the individual modes of experience that make up the whole 
spirit. The confusion and disorientation of our civilisation is, according to Collingwood, a 
result of the spirit’s division. The divided spirit is a diseased spirit. The individual modes of 
experience are to be blamed for that because of their erroneous claims to be autonomous, in 
no need of the other forms of experience. In itself each mode of experience is complete, can 
attain truth and knowledge. Thus the communication with the other forms has been severed. 
But Collingwood insisted that there “are no autonomous and mutually exclusive forms of 
experience, and, what is more, it is no one’s interest to assume that there are” (SM, p. 306). 
The life of the spirit should be seen as a whole and when all modes of experience have 
contributed their character the spirit will attain self-knowledge. To re-unite the spirit was of 
primary importance for Collingwood and the way he did it was by examining the validity of 
the claims of each mode of experience (art, religion, history, science and philosophy) to be 
autonomous knowledge and showing this claim to be erroneous. In SM, Collingwood’s 
efforts with regard to art was not to show how it can be imagination and knowledge at the 
same time, but instead to show the place of art in the whole spirit. Art is always pure 
imagination and as such is the initial stage of the spirit’s process. Art assists the birth of 
thought which, later on in the life of the spirit, will become the self-knowledge of the spirit.
Art was, thus, defined as imagination within the special aim of SM: to present the 
united spirit as the only way to self-knowledge and to show that the individual modes of 
experience can only contribute to that aim, without them being autonomous forms of 
knowledge. In the subsequent writings of Collingwood art, whenever it was discussed 
separately, retained its character as imagination. But as we have seen 1926 can be considered 
the year that expression (i.e. knowledge) becomes important. It is also the year that 
Collingwood started lecturing on the philosophy of history for the first time. Around this 
time, therefore, we can place Collingwood’s preoccupation with establishing individual areas 
of human experience, such art and history, as epistemologically sound. His more systematic 
treatment of individual problems moved him away from the idea of a spirit with incomplete 
modes of experience. Now history and art can be autonomous and yield knowledge. In the 
specific case of art this meant that something had to be done in order to reconcile art as
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imagination and art as knowledge. This was one of the aims of PA.
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Chapter IV: Fairy tales, Magic and Anthropology
§ 1. Introduction
In this chapter my aim is to study the later writings of Collingwood on fairy tales, magic and 
anthropology1 since they occupy a unique position in Collingwood’s exploration of a broader 
human understanding. In his study of fairy tales Collingwood’s main concern was the 
enlargement of historical knowledge. Fairy tales are an aspect of human life and culture that, 
if approached in a proper way, can yield historical evidence and augment historical 
knowledge. The previous chapters -on psychology, on the unity of mind and on art- provide 
the context of specific philosophical ideas of Collingwood that came to bear on his arguments 
in the folklore writings. These chapters paved the way for the idea of human understanding I 
explored in this thesis by showing the problematic role of psychology, the necessary 
connection of thoughts and emotions, and the shift in Collingwood’s epistemology from the 
dialectical Forms of experience to the historical consciousness. This last chapter also testifies 
to this epistemological shift.
Collingwood’s fairy tale writings are significant in that they can be seen as an 
illustration of the effectiveness of the historical method and the possibilities of this method if 
employed in other areas of human pursuits. They are also significant in their own right 
because they are an unusual topic for philosophical reflection and because they discuss the 
elements of magic and emotions found in fairy tales, which Collingwood emphasises are tales 
of enchantment. Magic is the element that allows the student of fairy tales to understand them. 
Magic is about emotions, which thus become a motive-reason for a wide spectrum of human 
actions and utterances. The understanding of emotions is necessary in order to understand 
those utterances. Given that the fairy tale writings were composed before PA, they are an 
important step in the subsequent formulation of Collingwood’s thought: both his theories of 
art and history strongly emphasised the function of emotions in the human condition. 
Collingwood through these writings also contributes to the re-orientation of anthropology 
towards a historical perspective and he extends his concern to the general state of civilisation,
1 The main treatment o f  those writings are: HS, pp. 183-191; SPT, pp. 196-206; AHS, pp. 303-325; 
Taylor 1985, pp. 17-21; Taylor 1988, pp. 73-77; W. James. 1997. ‘Tales o f Enchantment:
Collingwood, Anthropology and the ‘Fairy Tales’ Manuscripts’, in CS, vol. IV, pp. 133-156 (Hereafter 
abbreviated as James); P. Smallwood. 2000. ‘Historical Re-enactment, Literary Transmission, and the 
Value o f  R.G. Collingwood’, in Translation and Literature, vol. 9, part 1, Edinburgh UP, pp. 3-24 
(Hereafter abbreviated as Smallwood); M.E. Rudzik. 1990. Folklore and History: An Analysis o f  an 
Unpublished Manuscript by R.G. Collingwood. PhD thesis, Toronto; S. Giusti. 1993. ‘Collingwood’s 
Unpublished Writings on Folklore’, in Storia, antropologia e scienze del linguaggio, VIII, pp. 23-41. 
See also the Editors’ Introduction, in PE: 1. Smallwood, pp. xxiii-lv; 2. James, pp. lvi-xci; 3. Boucher, 
pp. xcii-cxix.
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threatened by the extreme character of utilitarianism and the suppression of facets of the 
human experience such as art, magic and religion.
In the fairy tale writings Collingwood continued to see psychology as a problematic 
way to study the human mind. Psychological theories had been constructed and used to study 
fairy tales and magic as elements that could say something about the mind of the people who 
created them. Collingwood commented on the results of such a study and concluded that 
psychology erred because it adopted a naturalistic methodology not appropriate for a subject 
that Collingwood thought of as historical. In PE Collingwood, therefore, still contrasted 
psychology with history in the study of the human mind and once more he concluded that 
psychology is a flawed and unsatisfactory way to study the historical mind.
The unity of mind was also relevant to Collingwood’s folklore essays because it is 
through the unity of mind that the significance of emotions became clear in Collingwood’s 
later writings. In PE Collingwood asserts that the study of fairy tales as historical evidence 
entails the study of magic, as fairy tales are about magic. Magic, like art, is for Collingwood 
an emotional activity. In PE the emotional element is contrasted with the intellectual, magic 
being an activity of the emotions. But this doesn’t mean that magic as an emotional activity 
excludes thought which jeopardises the unity of mind. Collingwood’s study of fairy tales and 
magic precedes his final ideas on art and magic as found in PA, where he established more 
clearly a close connection between thoughts and emotions. The fairy tales study stands as an 
important place where emotions, through magic, were recognised as a healthy motive for 
action. At the same time the historical study of fairy tales must necessarily include the 
element o f thought and thus magic must in some sense be a thinking activity too. The unity of 
mind can, therefore, be seen as integral to Collingwood’s folklore writings.
Art too is of importance in these writings, since magic as the expression of emotions 
is a very similar - i f  not identical- activity to art. The relation between art and magic was 
worked out by Collingwood both in PE and in PA. In PE Collingwood in effect considered 
magic and art to be the same thing; both express emotion, although to be distinct from each 
other they express emotion in different ways. In PA magic is not the expression but the 
arousal o f emotions. Hence it is interesting to see the implications of these two different ways 
of perceiving magic and to contrast them with art. In that respect the epistemological claim of 
Collingwood in PA is particularly relevant. In PA art for Collingwood was knowledge of the 
individual, in effect the same things as history. Since Collingwood wanted to use fairy tales as 
a source for historical knowledge, magic, as an emotional activity and the principal feature of 
fairy tales, should be able to contribute towards that aim. I believe the way magic was treated 
in PE can sustain such a claim, but the magic of PA cannot.
In what follows I will present Collingwood’s interest in fairy tales and the way he 
linked them to magic; his idea of a method to study magic that is a hybrid between
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anthropology and history; his conception of magic; and lastly the connection between magic 
and art. Thus we will able to see how all these issues point to a wider understanding of human 
utterances, through fairy tales, magic, a novel use of anthropology and an emotional attitude 
that can yield genuine knowledge.
§ 2. Fairy tales
The choice of Collingwood to study fairy tales might seem an odd one. However for someone 
with his interests there is no sphere of human activity otiose or irrelevant to the effort of 
understanding the human mind. Let alone the fields of folklore and fairy tales, that constitute 
a unique -and vanishing- aspect of human culture.2 Certainly every study and endeavour is a 
combination of influences, inspirations, personal predilections, the sense of the direction that 
contemporary inquiries take and also what Oakeshott had characterised as “the perception of 
where in the world of contemporary speculation is the point from which advance may best be 
made”.3
Boucher argues that Collingwood’s interest in such studies has “roots in his early 
fascination with fairy tales. His favourite book as a child was Joseph Jacobs, English Fairy 
Tales” (AHS, p. 308). Smallwood locates Collingwood’s interest in the folk tales in various 
areas: a response to “the literary and critical consciousness of his time” (PE, p. xxv); the 
personal experiences of Collingwood as a child in a house where fairy tales were an important 
element and his father, W.G. Collingwood, a marvellous story teller;4 the ideas of John 
Ruskin;5 the tales and the poems of W.B. Yeats that drew from the myths and legends of 
ancient Ireland;6 the advancement of folktale scholarship at the times of Collingwood7, where 
even Benedetto Croce’s interest in the work of Giambattista Basile might have a place.8
Another reason is, I think, the nature of the fairy tales and the difficulties they present 
to the historian who wants to use them as historical evidence. This is reminiscent of
2
All his commentators agree that the folklore writings can also be considered as an answer by 
Collingwood to his concerns for a civilisation in crisis. See, for instance, PE, p. xxvii, p. lxii, p. lxiii, 
SPT, pp. 205-206. van der Dussen argues that they also show how Collingwood ‘“put into practise’ his 
ideas about history in the field o f  the social sciences, demonstrating how the methods used in these 
sciences had prevented the understanding o f so-called primitive societies” (HS, p. 183).
3 From the review (p. 84) o f  Collingwood’s IH by Oakeshott, published in English Historical Review , 
62 (1947), pp. 84-86. Oakeshott argued that this was a quality o f a genius that Collingwood possessed 
and which led him to pursue the problem o f historical knowledge (p. 84).
4 PE, p. xxv.
5 Smallwood mentions the introduction that Ruskin wrote in 1868, for an edition o f German stories 
reprinted from the brothers Grimm, where he stressed the historical value o f fairy stories: PE, p. xxvi.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. xxvii.
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Giambattista Vico’s historical method, that Collingwood held in high esteem. Like 
Collingwood, Vico wanted to expand historical knowledge and that is why he “was peculiarly 
interested in what he called the history of remote and obscure periods, that is, in the extension 
of historical knowledge” (IH, p. 67). Vico’s choice, according to Collingwood, was not 
accidental but he “studied distant and obscure periods precisely because they were distant and 
obscure; for his real interest was in historical method, and, according as the sources are scanty 
and dubious and the subject-matter strange and hard to understand, the importance of sound 
method becomes plain” (TPH, p. 6). And Vico not only studied those distant periods, but he 
studied unusual aspects of them, thus showing “how etymology, mythology and legend may 
be used as documents; instead of accepting legend and myth as fact, or rejecting them as 
fable, he attempts to interpret them as documents revealing the mind and manners of the age 
that created them” (TPH, pp. 6-7). With regard to etymology:
He shows how linguistic study can throw light on history. Etymology can show what 
kind of life a people was leading while its language was coming into existence. The historian 
is aiming at a reconstruction of the mental life, the ideas, of the people he is studying: their 
stock of words shows what their stock of ideas was; and the way in which they use an old 
word metaphorically in a new sense, when they want to express a new idea, shows what their 
stock of ideas was before that new one came into existence (IH, pp. 69-70).
And:
He makes a similar use of mythology. The gods of primitive religion represent a 
semi-poetical way of expressing the social structure of the people who invented them. Thus, 
in Greco-Roman mythology, Vico saw a representation of the domestic, economic and 
political life of the ancients. These myths were the way in which a primitive and imaginative 
mind expressed to itself what a more reflective mind would have stated in codes of law and 
morality (IH, p. 70).
Collingwood, therefore, chose fairy tales to serve both the above purposes: to suggest 
a solid method by studying a field rather alien to the historian or the philosopher; and to treat 
this unusual field as a way to attain historical knowledge.
The fairy-tale writings, however, have been seen as having a much broader scope than 
the immediate area of history. In fact his questions “may not look like ‘history’, but of course 
Collingwood is not limiting himself to the orthodox notion of what history might be. By using 
‘fairy tales’ or oral literature as a source of evidence about the human past, he is in fact 
extending the conventional scope of historical investigation beyond the material factuality of 
relics or written texts to the more intangible realm of spoken language as a vehicle for the 
transmission of social forms of experience” (James, p. 144). How Collingwood tackled his 
subject is suggestive of his originality. The organic impression his essay creates can easily 
divert from the fact that his connections are far from expected or commonplace. As, for
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instance, when he sees fairy tales linked to magic or when he approaches magic through 
anthropology and the contemporary ‘primitive’ societies and not through the historical 
literature of magic. Thus the fairy tale essay is a mosaic of diverse but well-linked themes 
which justly generate the feeling that “they go beyond the bounds of what might 
conventionally, even today, be regarded as the specific field of ‘folklore’ studies or even 
‘anthropology’” (James, p. 141). Smallwood also points to the often neglected significance of 
the folktale studies to criticism, critical history and literary theory9 and “Collingwood’s 
emphasis can be seen as consonant with the distinctive critical-prophetic atmosphere of the 
1930s, a time of revaluation of the literary-critical and literary-historical past and its relevance 
to present civilization and current human needs” (PE, pp. xxviii-xxix).
Given the breadth of Collingwood’s undertaking, certain elements and directions 
might appear omitted. Thus it has been suggested that he was “not in these essays attempting 
a comprehensive contribution to scholarly or historical knowledge of folktale and, despite his 
detailed research, only a few tales are actually named” (PE, p. xxxiii)10 and although “starting 
with fairy-tales, Collingwood did not in fact get very far with his study of this subject ... His 
analysis is really a prolegomenon to anthropology” (HS, p. 191). This position is not entirely 
accurate because Collingwood had probably progressed further both with his readings and 
with the development of his ideas but he didn’t finish his essay in a way suitable for 
publication.11 According to the plan of his book he intended his last chapters to focus on 
“fairy tales found in the British Isles, and among these to certain classes of theme which I 
think I know how to interpret” (PE, p. 131).12 If he thought he knew how to interpret them, 
then it is reasonable to assume that his analysis had a more definite character than a 
prolegomenon and his contribution to the scholarship of folktales and anthropology would 
have been more extensive than the incomplete nature of his writings allows us to think. But 
even as his study stands, I believe it exhibits evident signs of completeness; for not only does 
he identify a specific question to ask -what is the historical value of the fairy tales- but his 
process of answering it was a creative amalgam of different fields and intellectual paths. It is 
the clear and inventive conception of his endeavour that makes it something more than a 
prolegomenon.
9 See Smallwood, p. 9; PE, p. xxiv. In both these essays Smallwood explores the literary-critical 
importance o f  Collingwood’s fairy tales and places him alongside people such as T.S Eliot and F.R. 
Leavis who were pursuing similar interests.
10 Smallwood mentions various areas o f  the fairy tale scholarship that Collingwood didn’t address and 
contrasts his writings to the approaches o f folklorists such as Max Liithi and Vladimir Propp (PE, pp. 
xxxiii-xxxv).
11 There is no definite answer as to why Collingwood didn’t finish the book on fairy tales. Smallwood 
speculates that Collingwood “set them aside unpublished partly through illness, and perhaps to focus 
more completely on The Principles o f  Art" (PE, p. xxxii).
12 This is a quite clear indication that “more material than was written up or has survived was intended” 
(PE, p. 131, n. 18).
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It has also been argued that in his fairy tale study Collingwood “thought it necessary 
first to clear the ground methodologically ... As such it is in essence a transcendental analysis 
of the subject, though empirical studies13 are included in it” (HS, p. 191). His analysis is not, I 
think, transcendental if the term is taken to mean the abstract formulation of a (historical) 
method in isolation from a concrete (historical) situation (in this case fairy tales). In my 
understanding of Collingwood’s attempt, in history there is no logical priority of method over 
subject matter or the other way around. In the natural sciences the methodology is the tool 
without which the inquiry cannot proceed. The formulation of the methodology is the 
indispensable starting point and the second step is the application of the method to a specific 
field. History doesn’t have a method that conforms to the idea of the natural scientific 
method. Collingwood’s intention was to study the fairy tales of the British Isles with the task 
of “interpretation, not comparison” (PE, p. 131). The interpretation of fairy tales will, no 
doubt, be based on some principles and, as we will see in section § 3, Collingwood defined 
two such principles: not to ridicule actions and beliefs of people but try to understand them 
and to treat facts as facts and not as instances, to pay attention, that is, to the individual and 
particular character of a situation. But the interpretation of a historical fact cannot be said to 
constitute a method that has been devised in isolation with the historical situation, for we do 
not have a historical fact and then the interpretation of this fact; the interpretation (or the 
understanding) is the creation of the historical fact, which before the interpretation is just an 
undifferentiated event. In that sense Collingwood’s method is the historical attitude to every 
human action, which means that the method and the action is the same thing. A pure 
transcendental analysis of a historical methodology is, therefore, something that Collingwood 
would have found erroneous.
However versatile the effect of Collingwood’s study of fairy tales might be, his 
intention was primarily to see how they could augment historical knowledge by “suggesting 
how fairy tales may be used as historical evidence” (PE, p. 115). Defining the fairy tale 
Collingwood says that it is a story that has two essential characteristics: when it comes to 
form it is a “traditional story, handed down by oral transmission”; and regarding its content it 
doesn’t have to be “necessarily about fairies, but about faery, feerie, fays’ work, or 
enchantment: that its subject matter consists in a general way of elements arising out of the 
idea of magic” (PE, p. 115). The meaning of traditional is not only that the “authorship has 
been forgotten” (PE, p. 115) but also that these stories “constitute a social institution carefully 
preserved by the people” (PE, p. 116).
13 Collingwood throughout refers to various fairy tales but it is mainly the Cinderella story where his 
analysis is more extensive. See PE, pp. 235-259. Also for some commentary, James, pp. 148-150, PE, 
pp. lxxxiv-lxxxvi.
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This practise could, therefore, yield stories that have come to us from very old 
times.14 None the less preservation means not that the story survives without modifications, 
but that the main thread remains the same while details might change. Collingwood believes 
that the changes that occur to any story by the oral transmission over the years are a very 
important element since any “alteration in the structure, customs, and beliefs of the society 
that tells it [i.e. the story] will tend to be reflected in the story itself’ (PE, p. 117). Therefore 
by removing modifications and alterations it is possible to reach earlier versions of the story 
and hence to learn about the people of those times.15 For using fairy tales as such evidence 
Collingwood argues that two things need to be assumed and accepted: “that the themes found 
in fairy tales are organically connected with the customs and beliefs of the people who 
originated them, and that customs and beliefs are things which have a history” (PE, p. 119). 
This was not uncontested but Collingwood thought that these two principles hold good 
against any objection.16
Then Collingwood sets out to explore an issue that might create problems if not 
properly understood: that of diffusion against independent invention.17 It can be argued that, 
trying to interpret fairy tales so as to reveal historical information, for example, a story or a 
theme of a story that has originated in a certain place can give information about that place; 
but if the theme came through diffusion to that place then the information we get will be for 
the place of origin and not for the place it came to.18 After trying to show some difficulties in 
establishing whether a theme was the product of invention or diffusion19, Collingwood argues 
that such a distinction is not valid: diffusion and independent invention are “elements existing 
together in the tradition of story-telling and in every other tradition. For the problem does not 
affect fairy tales alone; it affects all parts of human civilization” (PE, p. 124).
It is the capacity of civilisation for a meaningful cultural interaction between people, 
where elements from one culture can be adopted by another under the idea that “whatever was 
borrowed was something capable of incorporation in the existing culture of the borrowers” 
(PE, p. 124). These elements have a reason that they are adopted, something like the
14 PE, p. 117.
15 Ibid., p. 118. Collingwood uses the analogy o f archaeology and its methods o f  excavation.
16 For instance Collingwood mentions the view “held by many psychologists that fairy-tale themes 
have their origin in ‘the unconscious’, and symbolize certain inward dramas that go on everywhere and 
always in the human mind” (PE, p. 119). According to such a view the individuality that could give 
historical knowledge is not present since the “same theme might spring up spontaneously in any part o f  
the world at any date” (PE, p. 119).
17 Boucher has explored this idea o f  Collingwood in relation to discussions about cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism. See AHS, pp. 305-307.
18 PE, p. 120.
19 Ibid., pp. 120-123.
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satisfaction of a need, and their incorporation is not a blind borrowing but a modification 
according to the specific need and the special character of the borrower’s culture.20
For Collingwood the world of fairy tales is the world of magic.21 It is a world that 
seems from “our scientific conception of nature, as unnatural and indeed supernatural” (PE, p. 
126). For a moment we might feel liberated from our natural constraints since in the world of 
magic and fairy tales our wishes can come true because it appears that “we could get what we 
want by merely wanting it” (PE, p. 126) and creates in us that “peculiar fascination of wish- 
fulfilment fantasies” (PE, p. 126). However by closer inspection we realise that the world of 
magic is not like that at all, it is not a lawless enjoyment of our desires and wishes. Instead the 
“land of fairy tales has laws of its own, no less exigent than the laws of nature” (PE, p. 126) 
and the people who told fairy tales “took these laws no less seriously than we take the laws of 
natural science” (PE, p. 127). Collingwood emphasises the fact that, since the magical laws of 
fairy tales are different to what we know as laws of nature, it is a common misunderstanding 
to regard magic as a form of pseudo-science.22 This idea however is erroneous since -due to 
the work of ethnologists on people “among whom magical beliefs like those recorded in fairy 
tales are current” (PE, p. 128)- we know that these people:
are very far from being stupid or devoid of scientific knowledge. They have enough 
biology to breed cattle; enough botany to grow crops; enough astronomy to work out an 
agricultural calendar; enough mineralogy and chemistry to prospect for ores, to smelt copper 
and tin, and to alloy them into bronze, or to mine and smelt and forge iron, or to find and 
work clay and fire it into pottery; enough physic to use medicinal herbs, and enough surgery 
to perform operations, sometimes delicate ones, with flint knives and deer-sinews; enough 
engineering to construct a plough or a boat; and so forth (PE, p. 128).23
It might be true that all of the above might be “accompanied by magic; but they are 
not performed by magic; they are performed by technical skill based, as all technical skill 
must be based, on scientific intelligence” (PE, p. 130). Therefore if we want profitably to 
study fairy tales, then the element of magic should not be taken as a flaw of those people to 
understand science but as a vital part of their cultural production. The magical themes 
contained in fairy tales are fragments of “customs and beliefs handed down in traditional
20 PE., p. 124.
21 Collingwood places all fairy tales within the realm o f  magic. Smallwood mentions that 
“Collingwood is less interested in all the kinds o f  fairy tales that exist, that is, than in what Max Luthi 
claims is referred to with ‘striking unanimity’ among folktale scholars as ‘ “the fairytale proper”, the 
fairytale o f  magic’ ” (PE, p. xxxiii).
22 PE, p. 127.
23 In PA Collingwood made the same claim. The people under study by the anthropologist were far 
more intelligent than he assumed, since they had “extremely complex political, legal, and linguistic 
systems” (PA, p. 59) and they also possessed an adequate knowledge o f nature, for they were able to 
perform “delicate operations in metallurgy, agriculture, stock-breeding” (PA, p. 59). This is not 
something that could have been achieved by the use o f  magic but by the application o f  scientific 
knowledge.
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stories” (PE, p. 130) and what the historian of those tales does is reconstruct “in his mind the 
life and thought of the people who have left him this sample of their work” (PE, p. 128). In 
his efforts the historian is assisted by the existence of magic in living, primitive societies. 
Thus he can discover what magic means to these people for whom these beliefs and practices 
are not mere “survivals but an essential part of everyday life” (PE, p. 128). Since the study of 
those societies traditionally falls within the scope and purview of anthropology, 
Collingwood’s student or historian of fairy tales can also be, or at least at a certain point 
should be, an anthropologist with a historical consciousness and approach. The process will 
be something like that: in order to understand fairy tales we need to understand the basic 
principle of them: that is magic. In order to understand magic, we become anthropologists 
who study and try to understand the living beliefs, practises and rituals of people who regard 
magic as an essential element of their lives and culture. Having done that we can go back and 
become historians again and see how this understanding of magic can facilitate the 
understanding of fairy tales. Therefore the phenomenon of magic needs to be understood and 
not only observed as an external condition because “[a] 11 historical knowledge involves the 
recreation in the historian’s mind of the past experience which he is trying to study” (PE, pp. 
128-129). And in order to have understanding a certain degree of familiar ground needs to 
exist:
If magic were a form of belief or custom peculiar to primitive peoples and absolutely 
foreign to the mind of civilized man, the civilized historian could never understand it (PE, p. 
129).
Attributing to magic a foreign or irrational behaviour will only result in the 
impossibility of our endeavour to understand the behaviour of primitive people and their 
magical beliefs.24 For Collingwood there is only one way to approach fairy tales 
meaningfully, in other words to understand them:
we must give an account of magic which will show that in its essence it is a thing 
familiar to ourselves, not as a spectacle, but as an experience: something which we habitually 
do, something which plays a part in our social and personal life, not as mere survival of 
savagery, but as an essential feature of civilization (PE, p. 129).
This notion of magic is something that I will explore in § 4. It is also an idea that is 
related to historical method, the only way to tackle magic effectively.
24 PE, p. 129.
129
FAIRY TALES, MAGIC AND ANTHROPOLOGY
§ 3. Fairy tales, anthropology and the historical method
The key element for understanding fairy tales is, according to Collingwood, magic. He also 
thought that the understanding of magic could be benefited by anthropology’s study of the 
various ‘primitive’, non-western societies.25 For, although Collingwood saw magic as 
something that exists in our societies, our societies tended to suppress, fear and disown it.26 
But in the societies that anthropologists study, magic was a recognised practise, a 
phenomenon not only alive but respected too. The importance of anthropology in 
Collingwood’s analysis becomes more prominent if we take into account that he developed 
his theory of magic against a background of theories and approaches, anthropology being just 
one of them. I will give a very brief description of them.27
Collingwood argued that fairy tales had been studied profitably -that is, apart from 
collection and classification the process of interpretation began- by the German philological 
school “which regarded them as ‘myths’ describing natural phenomena in poetic or 
metaphorical language” (PE, p. 130). It was the school of the “anthropological folklorists in 
the late nineteenth century” (PE, p. 130) that understood fairy tales as “organically connected 
with certain magical rituals practised by primitive societies” (PE, p. 130). However this 
school misunderstood the conception of magic and thus their answer was not entirely 
satisfactory. Lastly it was the psychological school which rightly showed that “the magical 
element in fairy tales is a symbolic expression, not of the natural phenomena surrounding 
man, but of the wishes within him” (PE, p. 130). Still psychologists erred in associating this 
magical element not with the healthy wishes of man but with pathology and mental 
derangement.28
25 Collingwood maintains that like the archaeologist who studies ancient implements is helped “by the 
ethnologist, who may be able to point out similar implements now used in a particular way by this or 
that primitive society” (PE, p. 128), similarly the person who studies fairy tales “must avail himself o f  
the same kind of help” (PE, p. 128).
26 James mentions how magic has been seen as a phenomenon counter to religion and civilisation; in 
opposition to reason, orthodoxy and authority; and even as anti-social: James, p. 146; PE, p. lxxxii. 
Collingwood saw magic and religion as very closely related although a distinction does exist: PE, p. 
229-230.
27 The details o f Collingwood’s analysis can be found in PE and PA. van der Dussen says that although 
the treatment o f  magic in PA is based on the folklore studies it “presents only one element o f them and 
it does not show the context in which they were developed” (HS, p. 183). James also suggests that 
Collingwood’s argument on magic in the folktales compared to the one in PA “is a more sustained and 
elaborate discussion than in its later published form” (PE, p. Ixxxi). In PE he critically explored three 
approaches to the study o f  fairy tales and magic: the philological o f Grimm and Muller (pp. 132-141), 
the anthropological o f  Tylor and Frazer (pp. 141-156) and the psychological o f Freud and Jung (pp. 
156-177). In PA Collingwood examined the anthropological (pp. 57-61) and the psychological (pp. 62- 
65) approaches but not the philological one since the focus in PA is magic and the philological school 
didn’t identify a magical element in fairy tales.
28 Boucher maintains that Collingwood’s emphasis on Totem and Taboo tends to ignore subsequent 
works o f  Freud (SPT, pp. 287-288, n. 43).
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Collingwood found the three approaches imperfect. The philological school failed 
even to identify the magical element of the fairy tales, while anthropology and psychology 
approached the problem both with success and failure; they realised the connection between 
magic and fairy tales, but their conception of magic was, for Collingwood, erroneous.29 Still 
he favoured the anthropological school. Collingwood thought it is the anthropologist -with a 
historical consciousness however- that could study magic effectively. For this position of 
Collingwood there is, I think, a good reason.
Magic, as Collingwood understood it, has the peculiarity that cannot only be studied 
in the library but also as a living phenomenon, through contact with other human beings. The 
historic magic of the fairy tales is in the ‘primitive’ societies a contemporary experience and, 
as a student of fairy tales and magic, the anthropologist is also a mediator between the two 
worlds. Strictly speaking between the philological and the anthropological school, the former 
was the historical one, if by historical we emphasise the prominence of written texts. But for 
the study of magic the historically orientated anthropologist of the field had an advantage 
over the library-based historian. The same applies to anthropology and psychology: the 
advantage of field anthropology, of the direct contact with other humans and their customs, 
against the library-based and detached psychological approach of magic. Of course the school 
of the anthropological folklorists, that Collingwood described, was not orientated to the field 
practise of anthropology; they were, too, library-based scholars and perhaps this might have 
been one of the reasons for their failure to understand magic. But the contemporary 
anthropological context of the 1930’s, of which Collingwood was a witness, was field 
orientated. It was, thus, the potential that Collingwood saw of the amalgamation between the 
new anthropological method and the historical consciousness to provide satisfactory answers 
to the problems of the human mind.
In that respect it is now useful to see Collingwood’s interest in and affinities with his 
contemporary anthropological context.30 Collingwood’s interest in anthropology can be traced 
early on.31 However his involvement was more pronounced in the 1930’s. It was a time when 
anthropology was turning away from the scientific positivism of the early 20th century to a
29 Boucher stresses the importance o f  metaphysics if  anthropology is to be a historical science and he 
maintains that in effect Collingwood criticised the anthropologists for failing “correctly to identify 
what was being absolutely presupposed by their subjects” (PE, p. cxv), confusing thus the absolute 
presuppositions of magic with those o f natural science.
0 For a context of some anthropological ideas see AHS, pp. 303-304, 314-316. Also SPT, pp. 196-198, 
where Boucher highlights the history o f  the general terms o f  reference for culture and civilisation. For 
information about anthropology in the 1920’s and 1930’s see James, pp. 134-140 and PE, pp. lxiii-lxx.
31 James, PE, pp. Ivii-lix. James mentions RP and other early essay o f  Collingwood, where he had been 
critical o f  anthropologists who adopted an ‘evolutionary’ framework o f  explanation, a stance that he 
kept in his later writings too. Smallwood argues that in RP Collingwood’s “analysis o f the relations 
between ritual, religion, and magic ... can be seen as reworked and reviewed in the essays [i.e. the 
folktale essays]” (PE, p. xxvii). James also points out the recognition o f  “the ‘anthropological’ qualities 
even o f  Collingwood’s published work” (James, 135) by various philosophers from the 1960’s on.
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more historical consciousness.32 Collingwood associated himself with these “newer attitudes 
and methods” (James, p. 133) of anthropology and might have exercised “some influence on 
the way it then developed, and is still developing” (James, p. 133). The anthropology of today 
seems closer to Collingwood’s historical concerns33 and the modem anthropologist “finds a 
prophetic quality in Collingwood’s vision of a ‘historical method’ exploring reflexively the 
ways in which human beings have thought and lived” (James, p. 133). Therefore 
Collingwood’s involvement with anthropology was more robust than a mere interest and his 
relevance today significant.34
Although Collingwood had a long-standing interest in anthropology35, his more 
systematic involvement occurred in the 1930’s, perhaps also as an influence of his job as 
delegate of the Oxford Clarendon Press from 1928 to 1941, where he would have had the 
chance to come across contemporary ethnographic and anthropological literature and even 
read manuscripts submitted on these subjects.36
Collingwood’s response to the anthropology of the generation before his was critical 
of the naturalistic tendencies of interpretation and of the “parochial utilitarianism in 
distancing ‘primitive’ humanity from ‘ourselves’” (PE, p. lxiii.). His conception of 
anthropology was different from people like P.R. Marret and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and 
closer to B. Malinowski and E.E. Evans-Pritchard.37 Malinowski is one of the very few names 
mentioned by Collingwood.38 Also the connection between Collingwood and Evans-Pritchard
32 James, p. 133. The positivistic attitude has been seen in the way anthropology “increasingly 
distancing itself at the time from naturalistic evolutionary models but moving rather towards ‘Comtian 
sociology’ as reformulated by Durkheim and applied explicitly by him and his colleagues to the 
evidence o f  the ethnographic record” (PE, p. lxxiv).
33 Nonetheless Collingwood’s example is also o f value in alerting us against the dangers o f naturalism, 
since “varieties of the ‘natural science’ approach in anthropology are still with us: especially the new 
biological sciences which advocate the genetic conditioning o f  behaviour, and ‘rational choice’ theories 
in philosophy, politics, economics, and sociology which give primal importance to utility and the 
individual drive to maximize wealth or power” (PE, p. Ixxxviii).
34 Boucher also emphasises the relevance o f Collingwood’s folklore studies to current problems o f  
anthropology and historical interpretation, for although he wrote “in the context o f  the practise o f  
anthropology in the first part o f  the twentieth century ... his conclusions are not merely o f  antiquarian 
interest, because the problems he identified and to which he gave answers still persist” (AHS, p. 304). 
Also PE, p. xcii. For Collingwood and the anthropology o f  today see also PE, pp. lxxxviii-xci. James 
there discusses, among other things, the attention o f  modem anthropologists, such as Talad Asad, to the 
significance o f  Collingwood’s connection between thought and emotion.
35 Although as James suggests Collingwood before the mid 1930’s “had not drawn on any 
anthropological writings or evidence in his publications or in his teaching” (James, p. 138).
36 James, p. 138; PE, pp. lxxi.
37 James, pp. 134-5; AHS, p. 317 (Boucher includes Levy Bruhl as someone whose concerns about 
anthropology were similar to Collingwood’s). Boucher also places Collingwood’s criticisms alongside 
those o f  “Wittgenstein and Oakeshott, who similarly were sceptical about anthropology’s aspiration to 
become a natural science” (AHS, p. 317). About Wittgenstein also see AHS, p. 321 and PE, p. lxvi.
38 Collingwood maintained that his present day anthropology was moving away from positivistic 
principles but that movement was almost silent with the exception o f Malinowski’s Durham lectures o f  
1936 on The Foundations o f  Faith and M orals: (PA, p. 61 and n. 1). Malinowski’s affinity with some 
o f  Collingwood’s ideas has been asserted by Boucher who maintains that Malinowski “understands 
myths in the same way as Collingwood later described Absolute Presuppositions” (AHS, p. 304).
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has been seen as particularly strong: both following similar interests and asking similar 
question and being aware of each other’s work.39 It has also been suggested that Collingwood 
felt more comfortable with the term ‘cultural’ rather than ‘social’ anthropology, ‘cultural’ 
being a broader category associated with museum archaeology and ethnology and the work of 
Edward B. Tylor.40
It was, therefore, within an anthropological climate that was changing towards a more 
historical and humanistic approach, with emphasis on first-hand fieldwork, that Collingwood 
formulated his own ideas. It has been argued that Collingwood’s ideas on anthropology can 
be found in some of his later works, for example EM, NL41, but it is in the fairy tale writings 
that he draws directly on anthropology. However, both in the fairy tale writings and in PA, 
Collingwood doesn’t present the new anthropology which he largely approved, but the 
theories of Tylor and Frazer, the school of anthropological folklorists he called ‘functional’.42 
Collingwood had justified his choice of emphasis by saying that “the controversies and 
inquiries which are occupying the minds of anthropologists today ... are of interest not for 
what they have achieved but for what may come of them; in other words, they are hardly yet 
appropriate subject matter for historical criticism” (PE, p. 133). Thus when he sees his study 
as a contribution to and not an estimate of that period43, the contribution he means is, I 
believe, to show that the new anthropology with the historical consciousness and the 
dedication to fieldwork was taking steps in the right direction to help solidify these steps. The 
field-working attitude of the anthropologist can be compared with the historian who is not 
content with the authorities but he tests the evidence for himself. Likewise the anthropologist,
Malinowski, in his 1936 The Foundations o f  Myth and Morals, thought that the function o f myth is as a 
foundation for belief.
39 See mainly PE, p. lxvii, pp. lxix-lxx, p. lxxxvii; James, pp. 136-140. It is very unlikely that Evans- 
Pritchard was aware o f  Collingwood’s anthropology writings (PE, p. lxxxvii) but he knew other aspects 
o f  Collingwood’s work and he was also positive in his review o f  the second edition o f  Roman Britain 
(James, p. 136; PE, p. lxx). Collingwood must have also been familiar with the work o f  Evans- 
Pritchard and it is almost certain to have seen the Witchcraft, Oracles and M agic among the Azande ms 
and perhaps TheNuer (PE, p Ixxii. James, pp. 138-9).
40 James, p. 134; PE, p. Ixv.
41 James, p. 135; PE, p. lxx.
42 This is an idiosyncratic use o f  the term: James, p. 143 and PE, lxxviii. The term ‘functional’ was in 
use in the 1930s “but had been promoted, mainly by Malinowski at the LSE, to mark a distinction 
between the community-based field studies he recommended and the older evolutionary and 
comparative library-based studies o f Tylor, Frazer and Marett” (James, p. 143). Collingwood used the 
term “in the sense he found explained in Penniman’s overview, where it marked a break from the 
textual scholars and the philologists on the one hand, and those on the other who sought to place 
‘myths’ in the context o f  ethnographic evidence about local ritual practise, religious or magical beliefs, 
and indeed everyday custom” (PE, p. lxxviii). Boucher points out that “the functional school to which 
Collingwood refers should be distinguished from the later attribution to Malinowski and Radcliffe- 
Brown, neither of whom were comfortable with the term” (AHS, p. 318, n. 55).
43 PE, p. 133.
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who goes to the field and establishes close contact with people, is free from formulating 
theories in the abstract.44
Let us now see how the historical method and anthropology could be used together. 
Collingwood after the critical appraisal of the various attempts to study fairy tales and magic, 
he proposes the historical method, since the problem is a historical one. Because of the 
fortunate situation of primitive societies contemporary to our own, magic can be studied as a 
living practise, empirically, and thus can be studied by the discipline of anthropology. But 
anthropology ought to adopt the historical method in its inquiries and the anthropologist must 
be aware that he is studying not a phenomenon but himself in a past condition, to realise, that 
is, that “our own civilization has come to be what it is by development out of a more primitive 
one” (PE, p. 180). This historical dimension, the fact that in a sense we can meet our own 
selves and our own past, is what makes anthropology important:
the civilized man contains a savage within him, in the special sense in which any 
historical present contains within itself its own past, and must therefore study this savage -not 
savages in the abstract, but the savage that he himself in this sense is- for the same reason for 
which all history is studied, namely to make possible a rational human life in the present day 
(PE, p. 180).
Therefore for Collingwood anthropology “is a special case of the problem of self- 
knowledge; and history is the only way in which man can know himself’ (PE, p. 180). 
Naturalistic methods cannot be applied to a historical problem because history is the 
knowledge of the individual not the attempt to find uniformity and to establish generalities 
and universal laws. Thus when these methods try to tackle a historical problem they tend “to 
slur over details, emphasize similarities at the expense of diversities, and thus reduce to a 
spurious uniformity things which may well be essentially different” (PE, p. 181). Moreover 
these methods were developed for sciences that considered legitimate and necessary not to 
pay attention to details, and therefore when applied to a “historical subject matter, the 
necessary ignoring of details becomes a neglect of essentials” (PE, p. 181). For Collingwood 
it is a fundamental mistake to approach a historical problem with naturalistic methods and as 
a result “instead of yielding historical knowledge, yield a pseudo-history which is merely a 
magnified projection of the would-be historian’s desires upon the blank screen of the 
unknown past” (PE, p. 182).
Moreover, Collingwood argues, the detachment of the subject from the object, which 
is a presupposition of the naturalistic method, in the case of the historical subject matter
44 James says that Collingwood’s study was “from the perspective o f  a philosopher whose ‘fieldwork’ 
was concerned with evidence from remote times, rather than from the living societies o f remote places” 
(James, p. 138).
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creates a problematic distance by “the false assumption ... that subject and object are external 
to each other and that each is the other’s opposite” (PE, p. 182). The anthropologist, or any 
student of the primitive man, assuming that he is the opposite of his object -the ‘savage’-  has 
“no real knowledge of his subject matter; the emotions that determine his conclusions are 
therefore emotions concerned with himself’ (PE, p. 182). Whatever he has to say about the 
primitive man is a “mere expression of emotion, not conclusions from evidence” (PE, p. 183). 
Collingwood maintains that this distinction between subject and object, between the 
anthropologist and the ‘savage’, only disguises the horror and the “horrid fascination” of the 
anthropologist for these irrational and primitive elements that he recognises within himself 
too.45 For the “historical knowledge, where the object is the subject’s past” (PE, p. 182) it is a 
familiar notion that the “savage is not outside us; he is inside us” (PE, p. 182) and if 
anthropology is to understand the beliefs and practises of the primitive people, it must change 
its emotional attitude towards them and “contemplate the life and mind of the savage without 
horror” (PE, p. 183). This, for Collingwood, can more easily be done by the field-working 
anthropologists since “in human contact with human beings, they have learned that there is no 
such thing as the abstract savage, there are only men and women, living their own lives in 
their own way and ... living them as decently and rationally as ourselves” (PE, p. 183).
The historical method that Collingwood proposes has two basic rules that he calls the 
maxim of Spinoza and the maxim of Bishop Butler. The first46 maxim is “neither to condemn 
nor to deride the feelings and actions of men, but to understand them” (PE, p. 184).47 The 
second48 maxim is that “every thing is what it is, and not another thing” (PE, p. 186). The first 
rule, Collingwood contends, will reform the anthropological practise by eradicating every 
element of contempt, ridicule, disparagement, patronage, that the anthropologist might have 
towards the people he is studying and by substituting in the vocabulary of anthropology terms 
that might have a contemptuous connotation with terms that are just descriptive.49 
Understanding in that sense will mean that the anthropologist coming across, in the course of 
his studies, something that is perplexing “must approach it in the belief that it is intelligible” 
(PE, p. 185). Attributing the unusual and the perplexing character of a custom or belief to 
“human folly or perversity is to give up the attempt to understand it” (PE, p. 185). In 
Collingwood’s opinion Spinoza’s maxim will also have another function: it will help us 
understand ourselves. Instead of fearing, condemning and denying the savage that all have
45 PE, pp. 182-183.
46 For the precise phrase o f  Spinoza see PE, p. 184, ft. 3.
47 Cf. Collingwood’s Scheme for The Principles o f  History. “A scientific society will turn on the idea 
o f  mastering  people (by money or war or the like) or alternatively serving them (philanthropy). A 
historical society will turn on the idea o f  understanding them” (HS, p. 432).
48 For the precise phrase o f  Bishop Butler see PE, p. 186, ft 5.
49 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
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within us, we must understand him as to become “no longer a thing of horror but a friend and 
helper: no savage, but the heart and root of our own civilization” (PE, p. 186).
The value of the second rule, the maxim of Bishop Butler, is that will help to 
recognise that “our study is historical, not naturalistic, in character ... that the subject matter 
about which we are thinking consists of facts taken as facts, not as facts taken merely as 
instances” (PE, p. 186). The historian, in contrast with the natural scientist who ignores 
details and peculiarities, is interested in them “because they are peculiarities, and thus reveal 
the special historical characteristics which make one period of history different from all 
others” (PE, p. 187). Collingwood provides examples of the tendency of schools of 
interpretation, that use naturalistic principles, to ignore differences and details and thus 
provide a picture of the ‘savage’ as having an illogical mind that confuses one thing with 
another and thus forces erroneous identifications between different things.50 These schools, 
therefore, by applying naturalistic principles, misunderstood the myths and rituals of the 
primitive societies. The attention to detail is a vital element in the method that Collingwood 
proposes for the study of all these things:
The method is to reconstruct, from all the evidence at our disposal, the social 
structure in which they grew up. It is thus a historical method: one proceeding not by 
abstraction and generalization, but by the reconstruction of fact in all its detail (PE, p. 193).
Thus, the historical method is, for Collingwood, “the only way in which man’s 
thought and actions can become the object of human knowledge” (PE, p. 193). By 
reconstruction51 Collingwood refers to the manner that historical knowledge is possible and 
that historians attain historical knowledge:
Because history is man’s knowledge of man, not man’s knowledge of an external 
world, history demands, or rather brings about, a peculiar intimacy in the relation between 
knower and known. The historian can only understand a thought by thinking it over again for 
himself. If there is any type of thinking which for any reason he is unable to do for himself, he 
cannot thus rethink it and cannot understand it historically (PE, p. 193).
In the case of magic and similar practises the historian ought to have “inner 
experience of these thought-forms” (PE, p. 193), otherwise they will remain for him 
unintelligible. And for Collingwood magic was something that the ‘civilised’ person, 
although not fully aware of it, does indeed possess, and it is a familiar, everyday
50 PE, pp. 188-192.
51 This term, and also the almost synonymous rethinking, is similar to what Collingwood elsewhere in 
his writings expressed by the term re-enactment. In PE the word re-enactment occurs too (p. 153, p. 
171).
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phenomenon, part of his life, his common activities and his beliefs. Collingwood’s 
programme was to show that this is not a paradoxical statement but a concrete fact.
§ 4. The phenomenon of magic
Magic is one of those terms that are ambiguous, having escaped proper definition and 
classification from the scholars and their meaning has shifted over the centuries.52 
Specifically within the anthropological discipline “people have on the whole dropped the 
term, partly because ... it seems to imply a distinctly alien mind-set” (James, p. 146). 
However magic has a peculiarity since (unlike other very technical anthropological terms of 
the early 20th century like ‘taboo’, ‘fetish’ and ‘totem’ that came into use from indigenous 
languages and they are now obsolete53) it is “an old part of religious discourse in Europe, is 
no universal timeless category, and needs to be understood in its context of use” (James, p. 
147). Therefore this ‘long and complex’ history of the term magic has left ‘residues of 
meaning’ that allow for its more liberal employment.54 This is the way that Collingwood uses 
the term magic, in a “much more diffuse and general way, drawing on some of its older layers 
of use in European history and literature” (James, p. 147; PE, pp. lxxxiii-lxxxiv).55 This usage 
of the term by Collingwood evokes a sense of what can be called ‘felt’ power.56
As we have seen Collingwood formulated his theory of magic after he examined the 
anthropological and psychological theories that saw magic either as an error in understanding 
natural laws and scientific thinking or as a form of clinical neurosis. He thought it a mistake 
to compare magic with applied science or neurosis, and as a result anthropologists and 
psychologists misunderstood the character of magic and provided theories where magic was 
in effect absent. We have also seen that Collingwood’s criticism to the anthropological 
approach was directed to the school he called ‘functional’, represented by Tylor and Frazer. 
Apart from the ‘functional’ school, other anthropologists were concerned with magic, the 
early 20th century being a time of efforts to define the term and of technical arguments among 
anthropologists about it.57 Malinowski argued that magic should be seen and understood in its
52 James, pp. 145-146.
53 Ibid., p. 147; PE, p. lxxxiv.
54 Ibid.
55 Given this peculiarity o f  the term, with its long history in Europe, it is worth considering that 
Collingwood approached magic in the anthropological way, that is, as a living practise by 
contemporary societies and not through a historical exploration. For instance Lynn Thorndike’s 
monumental study, A History o f  Magic and Experimental Science, would have been available to him 
(at least the first two volumes, covering the first 13 centuries, published in 1923).
56 James, pp. 147-148; PE, p. lxxxi, p. lxxxiv.
57 James, p. 146; PE, p. lxxxii.
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cultural context and distanced himself from Frazer and Freud.58 He saw, however, magic as “a 
failure to comprehend nature” (AHS, p. 322), as “a society’s impotence in the rational control 
of nature” (AHS, pp. 324). Evans-Pritchard was critical to Malinowski’s interpretation and 
argued that “magic, rather than ‘producing changes favourable to man in the objective world’, 
provided an explanation of misfortune and a means to combat the mystical forces that bring it 
about” (AHS, p. 304). It is with Evans-Pritchard that Collingwood’s ideas have been seen as 
having particular similarities. Evans-Pritchard’s Cairo lectures59 in 1932-3 have a lot in 
common with Collingwood’s writings on magic but also “significant differences of emphasis” 
(PE, p. lxxxiii). One of their differences is the justification of ‘primitive’ people’s rationality, 
which for Evans-Pritchard was catholic.60 Collingwood would dissent from supporting a full 
rationality in explaining all the action of the ‘savages’, magic being one of them.61
The emphasis on the total rationality of actions has often appeared against theories 
that have perceived actions and customs unfamiliar to the observer as completely irrational. 
And these ideas are not a part of the past, as Boucher has shown using the study of the 
Languedoc peasants by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, who presupposed that beliefs in 
witchcraft are false and manifest a collective form of delirium.62 Collingwood believed that 
for such serious misunderstanding to occur there must be a reason and we shouldn’t exclude 
even the possibility that “we, as ‘civilized’ people, are really terrified of magic” (PA, p. 64- 
65) and that our fear might take the “shape of a very strong disinclination to think about the 
subject in a cool and logical manner” (PA, p. 65).
Let us now see the basic elements of Collingwood’s theory of magic. Magic, in 
Collingwood’s understanding, was approached in a rationalistic, intellectual way63 that 
resulted in a failure to grasp its essence. To that endeavour he gives a different reply:
we shall do better if we seek the source of the idea not in the savage’s intellect, but in 
his emotions. And since we can understand what goes on in the savage’s mind only in so far 
as we can experience the same thing in our own, we must find our clue in emotions to whose 
reality we can testify in our own persons (PE, p. 196).
As an example to demonstrate that magic is an emotional activity, Collingwood uses 
the connection between people and material objects, linking it to the famous example of
58 AHS, p. 316.
59 For information o f  these lectures see James, pp. 136-137 and PE, pp. Ixxxii-lxxxiii.
60 James, p. 146-147; PE, p. lxxxiii.
61 AHS, p. 322.
62 Ibid., p. 322; PE, p. cxvi.
63 This doesn’t mean that magic was not a rational activity but only that the emphasis was one-sided. 
Surely magic for Collingwood was a rational phenomenon. As Boucher put it the “types o f behaviour 
that fall under the general description o f  magic must be comprehensible as rational, purposive activity” 
(AHS, p. 317).
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Tylor.64 Collingwood argues that we “all have a feeling -not an intellectual idea, but an 
emotional one” (PE, p. 196) about material things we like or have made or that signify 
something for us. Through these objects we can express our attachment to someone, to a 
situation, or even our hatred or disappointment towards certain persons.65 These emotions, 
Collingwood maintains, “have been felt semper, ubique, ab omnibus” (PE, p. 198). The basic 
principle behind this type of relationship between people and things “is the idea of certain 
material objects as ... outposts or deposits of one’s personality in the external world: an idea 
which arises spontaneously, without any theoretical or intellectual basis, from our emotional 
nature” (PE, pp. 198-199).
From this principle Collingwood contends that a theory of magic can be constructed. 
Two elements need to exist in order to have a magical ritual. These elements can exist 
independently but as such they don’t constitute magic yet; it’s only when they have a certain 
connection that the role of magic can be established. The first element is a person who has 
such an attachment to a material object so that if this object should be damaged, he will suffer 
some kind of injury, which, in Collingwood’s view, is a serious emotional injury, not to be 
ridiculed as a fictitious, unreal one.66 The second element that needs to exist is another person 
harbouring hostile emotions towards the first person and by damaging the object itself (being 
aware o f the relationship between it and the person he hates) or an effigy of that person he 
will express or release his hostile emotions.67 These two elements when combined in a certain 
situation “become genuinely magical” (PE, p. 200). This occurs when the act of hatred is 
“performed in a society where ... the established habits ... are such that the victim knows or 
fears that the agent is acting in this way, and consequently sustains injury in the shape of 
mortification and whatever consequences that implies” (PE, p. 200). Collingwood argues that 
this is a “complete magic act; not a mere harmless release of emotion, but an actual assault 
upon the victim”, since the victim “loses confidence in himself, forfeits the respect of others, 
and may develop the symptoms of disease” (PE, p. 200). In that situation the “agent’s belief 
that he is really injuring the victim ... is ... well founded: because the victim is emotionally 
vulnerable, the injury he sustains is a genuine one” (PE, p. 200).
Collingwood concludes that this specific example of magic -the connection between 
ourselves and some object and the harm we sustain through the magical damaging of the
64 Collingwood refers to that example both in PE, pp. 195-196 and in PA, pp. 59-61.
65 PE, pp. 196-198.
66 PE, p. 199. Collingwood, as in PA, attaches a very important role to the consequences that such an 
emotional situation might have for a person. It is a real injury since it can often produce “as a symptom 
some physiological disturbance hardly different from the symptom o f  organic disease” (PE, p. 199).
67 Ibid.
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object- is not the only one that has an emotional basis; that magic is emotional “is true not of 
one type of magic only, but of all magic” (PE, p. 201).68
Having, thus, constructed a theory of magic that applies to primitive societies, 
Collingwood investigates whether magic is also present in civilised societies. Because 
although both ‘savages’ and ‘civilised’ people share the emotional element that makes magic 
possible, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the expression of these emotions through magical 
practises is still a living practise within civilised societies. In fact it seems that in our 
civilisation magic is “the exception rather than the rule” (PE, p. 205). This however is odd 
since magic “is an expression of emotion, and grows up naturally and inevitably from its 
emotional roots” (PE, p.205), thus what exists in primitives societies should exist among 
civilised too. Collingwood argues that what indeed has happened is not that magic is absent 
from our societies, but that the emotional element has been suppressed by the utilitarian 
attitude, “the habit of justifying every act, every custom, every institution, by showing its 
utility ... the only kind of value that a thing can have” (PE, p. 206), that our civilisation for 
several centuries had been cultivating. Things not easily justified within the utilitarian spirit 
are treated with suspicion and this is particularly obvious in activities where the emotional 
element is dominant. This is the reason, Collingwood contends, why art and religion are 
“things not altogether respectable” (PE, p. 206) in our societies; this is the reason why the 
savage and his magical practises as “the systematic and organized expression of emotion” 
(PE, p. 207) frighten the civilised man: in them he sees something familiar but he has 
convinced himself he is not allowed to embrace it. In the end the civilised man faces a 
situation where the utilitarian principles are so dominant that they disguise the truth about our 
lives and our emotional states: magic, instead of being something alien, incomprehensible and 
the mistake of an unscientific mind, is a way to “resolve emotional conflicts in the agent and 
so readjust him to the practical life for which these conflicts render him unfitted” (PE, p. 208). 
And this way to resolve our emotional conflicts is a real, living, everyday phenomenon of our 
civilisation.69 Magic and its emotional element “can be verified as existing, and even 
sometimes as giving rise to definite customs, in and among ourselves” (PE, p. 221).
68 To justify his claim Collingwood gives various examples and his own interpretation; see PE, pp. 
201-205.
69 Collingwood provides various examples o f  civilised habits and manners that support a magical 
character. These are not unusual or marginal cases, but recognisable manifestations o f  our ordinary 
lives: washing our hands before meals, our clothing and hats, our attitude towards tools and machines 
etc. See PE, pp. 208-221.
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§ 5. Magic and Art
a. Magic and Art in the Folktale writines
We have seen so far that Collingwood’s interest in fairy tales as historical evidence 
necessitates the understanding of magic, since magic is the essential element of fairy tales. 
We have also seen that the study of magic can be better pursued by anthropology, since magic 
is a living phenomenon in the societies anthropologists study. We have also seen the 
rudiments of Collingwood’s theory of magic and his understanding of magic as the expression 
of emotions. This brings us to the significant issue of magic’s relation with art and the role of 
emotions in human understanding.
Having defined magic as expression of emotion, Collingwood observes that the 
“expression of emotion as such is the essential business of art” (PE, p. 225).70 He contends 
that art and magic are indeed related, a relation that can be testified in palaeolithic cave art, 
medieval architecture and other areas where the religious or the magical motive -for 
Collingwood argues that religion and magic are closely related too- can be found behind the 
artistic work.71 Why art and magic are thus related can be explained by the fact that they are 
“to this extent the same thing, that each is essentially the expression of emotion” (PE, p. 226). 
Of course magic and art are different too, since “[a]ll magic is art, but all art is not magic” 
(PE, p. 226). Magic uses artistic works (such as songs, dances, drawings etc.) for its purposes, 
but these works don’t have to be -and usually are not- good works of art, since what they 
need to serve is the magical element and not the aesthetic one.72 Thus magic is “a special 
modification of art ... a special way of expressing emotion” (PE, p. 227). The difference is 
not only that magic as an expression of emotion is a bad or mediocre form of art. Magic is art 
in that it uses artistic ways for certain purposes and although the generic purpose -expression 
of emotion- is the same, art and magic differ in the specific purpose, in the way that each one 
expresses emotion.
For art the expression of an emotion is the discharge of it through the work of art, 
achieving, thus, a feeling of alleviation or catharsis.73 Magic doesn’t want such catharsis, the 
expression of emotion should not discharge it but “crystallize” it so that it can be later 
discharged through action.74 Collingwood argues that these two different ways to express 
emotion correspond to two different ways we can consider an emotion: “in itself, as a peculiar
70 Collingwood was properly to define art as the expression o f  emotion in the PA. The reference here, 
in a work written before 1938, indicates that his ideas about art and emotion were already established.
71 PE, p. 226.
72 Ibid., p. 226-227.
73 Ibid., p. 227.
74 Ibid., p. 228.
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and self-contained experience; or ... in its relation to practical life, as a motive for acting in a 
particular manner” (PE, p. 228). Art considers an emotion in the first way, magic in the 
second:
The artist ... expresses his feelings75 as self-contained experiences: the question 
which interests him is what these experiences are, and his construction or enjoyment of a 
work of art is the creation or discovery of a form of expression which serves to answer that 
question. ... [In magic] feelings are expressed not as pure experiences, not simply because 
they are feelings we discover in ourselves on a certain type of occasion ... but as the motives 
instigating us to act in a certain type of way (PE, p. 228).
b. Magic and Art in the Principles o f Art
Collingwood explored the connection between magic and art was in PA as well. In PA, 
however, magic was not the expression but the arousal of emotion, the evocation of certain 
emotion “for their practical value” (PA, p. 57). The expression of emotion was reserved only
for art. Collingwood presented his theory of magic against the anthropological theory that
linked magic to science, or pseudo science, and the psychological theory that linked magic to 
neurosis. Against those theories Collingwood proposed that the “only profitable way of 
theorizing about magic is to approach it from the side of art” (PA, p. 65). He detected that 
unlike magic and science or magic and the pathological condition of neurosis “the similarities 
between magic and art are both strong and intimate. Magical practises invariably contain, not 
as peripheral elements but as central elements, artistic activities like dances, songs, drawing, 
or modelling” (PA, p. 65). If magic is akin to art, its methods do not constitute art proper but 
what Collingwood has designated as craft. This because magic has an aim, a preconceived 
end, to the accomplishment of which all the above elements (dance, songs etc.) are used. And 
for magic this end “is the arousing of emotions” (PA, p. 65). Collingwood argues that even if 
it is nor very obvious that magic’s aim is “always and solely the arousing of certain emotions” 
(PA, p. 66) there are non the less cases that it is clear such as in the tribal war-dances or the 
various agricultural rituals of peasant societies.76 Moreover Collingwood believes that there is 
an element of control and manipulation so that the emotions “aroused by magical acts are not 
discharged by those acts. It is important for the practical life of the people concerned that this 
should not happen; and magical practises are magical precisely because they have been so 
designed that it shall not happen. The contrary is what happens: these emotions are focused 
and crystallized, consolidated into effective agents in practical life” (PA, p. 66). And
75 Collingwood here still uses emotion and feeling interchangeably. Later in the PA and the NL he will 
make a distinction between them.
76 PA, p. 66.
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Collingwood goes on to say that this character of magic -the practises that aim to arouse 
emotions- clearly observed in certain instances, is the character of magic in general; magic 
doesn’t have any other function if not the arousing of emotions:
I am suggesting that these emotional effects, partly on the performers themselves, 
partly on others favourably or unfavourably affected by the performance, are the only effects 
which magic can produce, and the only ones which, when intelligently performed, it is meant 
to produce. The primary function of all magical acts, I am suggesting, is to generate in the 
agent or agents certain emotions that are considered necessary or useful for the work of 
living; their secondary function is to generate in others, friends or enemies of the agent, 
emotions useful or detrimental to the lives of these others (PA, pp. 66-67).
For Collingwood the emotional element is something very strong indeed and for 
everyone who understands “the effect which our emotions have on the success or failure of 
our enterprises, and in the production or cure of diseases, it will be clear that this theory of 
magic amply accounts for its ordinary everyday employment in connexion with the ordinary 
everyday activities of the people who believe in it” (PA, p. 67). The emotional effect when 
considered in its negative form, that is as aiming to damage morale, it can potentially have 
dramatic consequences to the extent that it “might produce diseases of various kinds and even 
death” (PA, p. 67).
When it comes to the question of how the magical practises produce these special 
emotional effects Collingwood’s answer is, by representation:77
A situation is created ... representing the practical situation upon which emotion is to 
be directed. It is essential to the magical efficacy of the act that the agent shall be conscious of 
this relation, and shall recognize what he is doing as a war-dance, a plough-ritual, or the like. 
This is why, on first approaching the ritual, he must have it explained to him, either by word 
of mouth (which may take the form of initiatory instruction, or of an explanatory speech or 
song forming part of the ritual itself) or by such close mimicry that mistake is impossible (PA,
p. 68).
This is an interesting point, the fact that a certain, or a strong, degree of familiarity, of 
understanding and of acceptance needs to be present in order for the magical practises to have 
the desired effects. It might be argued that the anthropologists or their informants or any other 
outside the initiated circle, when witnessing the magical rituals did not -or could not- share 
the emotional elements that the participants, knowing more of the meaning of the ceremony, 
did.78 For the anthropologist himself the ritual would be devoid of meaning and wouldn’t 
have any effect on him.
77 For more about representation see PA, pp. 42-56.
78 At least not on purpose. The same or similar emotion might have been evoked accidentally, that is 
not for the same purpose. It is a more interesting idea the possibility o f  the initiated and the outsider to 
have experienced the same or similar emotion for the same purpose. I take that as something not too far
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One more question needs to be asked about Collingwood’s theory of magic in PA. 
The production or evocation of the emotion is specific; Collingwood mentions that magic’s 
function is the representation and evocation of “some emotions rather than others” (PA, p. 
69). The specific practical activity, towards which we want to direct the effects of the 
emotion, requires specific emotion or emotions. We might assume that for a battle the 
emotions of courage, fearlessness and so forth need to be evoked and not that of happiness, 
fear and so on. How are we to evoke a specific emotion, instead of any other emotion, that a 
specific practical activity requires? I believe an answer can be better given from what 
Collingwood says in PE. There the distinction between art and magic was that art apprehends 
emotions as a pure experience, while magic apprehends emotions as a motive for action and 
not as an experience, not simply as something that “we discover in ourselves on a certain type 
of occasion” (PE, p. 228). This happens precisely because if we were to apprehend an 
emotion as a pure experience then for the purposes of a war we could not have been certain 
that a war dance would bring forward our fearlessness and bravery since it “might very well 
have expressed79 our fear of wounds and death” (PE, p.229). Thus the purpose of the magic is 
to make this distinction clear by initiation and instruction and by the appropriate ceremonies 
to make sure that the proper emotions for the situation will be evoked. The ultimate proof of 
the efficacy of the magical ritual will be the warrior’s bravery in the battle, the farmer’s 
enthusiasm in cultivating his land and so forth.
We might also consider the situation where the emotion that ought to be evoked is 
already present in the agent. In the case, for instance, of a generally fearless warrior it appears 
that there is no need to evoke in him the emotion of courage before the war. In that case no 
harm is done by performing the ritual anyway. Besides it might be argued that most magical 
practises have a collective character and those members of the group that might already be in 
the emotional state that the magical ceremony wants to arouse, should still partake in the 
ritual for the sake of solidarity within the group. Through participation, the collective spirit is 
reinforced and the stronger ones might serve as a good example for the weaker.
c. Some considerations
Summarising then Collingwood, in PA, saw magic as “a representation where the emotion 
evoked is an emotion valued on account of its function in practical life, evoked in order that it 
may discharge that function, and fed by the generative or focusing magical activity into the
fetched, in which case a stronger emotional unity could be attributed to humans. Collingwood has 
explored something along these lines in the PE.
79 Expression was Collingwood’s context in PE. However the evocation o f  an emotion faces the same 
danger too.
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practical life that needs it” (PA, p. 68). The value of magic and the theory Collingwood 
developed in order to explain it, have not a limited application. They are not, that is, only 
concerned to explain a phenomenon that anthropologists observed in ‘savage’ societies or a 
disturbing remnant in the low strata of civilised societies. Moreover Collingwood’s view frees 
magic from any negative connotation within the above context, let alone from the 
psychological associations between magic and the pathological condition of neurosis. Instead 
Collingwood believes that:
magic is a necessity for every sort and condition of man, and is actually found in 
every healthy society. A society which thinks, as our own thinks, that it has outlived the need 
for magic, is either mistaken in that opinion, or else it is a dying society, perishing for lack of 
interest in its own maintenance (PA, p. 69).
This is the theory of magic Collingwood presented in PA. In that book it was within 
the context of art that he did so. Magic can be contrasted with art because of the use of artistic 
activities in magical practises and ceremonies. Also they were contrasted because both art and 
magic are concerned with emotion. Thus there was enough scope for magic and art to be 
treated together. However in the case of art the emotion is expressed while in the case of 
magic is aroused. The difference between arousing and expressing emotion can lead to a 
distinction between art proper and pseudo-art. In that context magic is a form of pseudo-art.
In PE Collingwood contrasted art and magic on similar grounds. Magic uses artistic 
ways for its purposes and both are concerned with emotion. However the difference was not 
as sharp as in PA: both activities were the expression of emotion. The difference was that in 
art the expression of emotion is discharged and thus effects a catharsis, while in magic it 
should not be discharged by the expression as such but used to be discharged later in some 
practical activity. Magic in this context was art but a special modification of art, a different 
way o f expressing emotion. In PE art and magic are more closely connected than in PA.
The different contexts within which Collingwood developed his idea about magic are 
important in understanding the difference of emphasis. In PE he explored how fairy tales can 
be used as historical evidence and thus be able to provide us with historical knowledge. The 
main element of fairy tales being, in Collingwood’s interpretation, magic then magic in PE 
can bee seen within a historical context, that is as something that can give historical 
knowledge by informing us about the mind of the people who created fairy tales. We should 
not forget that this was the main objective in Collingwood’s study of magic: the 
understanding of fairy tales. The historically minded anthropologist should study and 
understand the living societies where magic is still an everyday phenomenon. Then this 
understanding will facilitate an understanding of the people who created and told fairy tales.
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In PA, in contrast, Collingwood’s aim was to distinguish between art and forms that 
were often confused with art. Magic was one of them, since the use of artistic ways (dances, 
songs, modelling) for purposes that involve emotions could very well create a confusion as to 
whether magic is art or not. Collingwood’s painstaking analysis was, therefore, to show how 
this confusion, if studied carefully, could be dispelled. First he showed that the presence of 
artistic activities as such couldn’t indicate that something is or isn’t art: all forms of pseudo- 
art do use artistic activities, and in some cases so well that can be practically indistinguishable 
from art proper. It is the use of these activities that will tell us whether they serve an artistic or 
a non artistic purpose: if they are used as means to a preconceived end then they constitute 
craft and not art proper; and magic is a craft, since the artistic element of the magical 
ceremonies has a purpose that has been defined in advance. Second thing that Collingwood 
showed was that art proper was an emotional activity and since other forms of pseudo art 
involve the emotional element, the distinction was the way the emotion would come forward: 
in the case of art proper it was by expressing it, in the case of non art it was by arousing it. 
Magic belongs to the latter category, since the ceremonies were performed with the 
preconceived purpose of generating specific emotions in the participants. And as a pseudo-art 
magic cannot have a genuine claim to be knowledge, unlike art proper whose aim is the 
attainment of knowledge through the expression of emotions.
One point of criticism of Collingwood’s theory is that magic apart from being an 
emotional activity -o r emotive- is also instrumental in the sense that “the participants also 
regard their rites as effective means of achieving such ends as making rain or making the 
crops grow”.80 This is erroneous. The only instrumental function that magic can have is to 
assist with the conduct of the practical aspects of life by generating the appropriate emotions 
for the occasion: a war dance will boost the morale of the warriors so to fight more 
successfully; but it will not substitute the actual fighting of the battle. If this occurs then we 
do not have magic but the perversion of it. Collingwood is clear about this distinction both in 
the PA and PE. He says for instance that there are cases that ‘savages’:
believe, or seem to believe, that magic can do things which we ‘civilized’ men 
believe to be impossible, like making rain or stopping earthquakes. I am quite prepared to 
think that they do entertain such beliefs; savages are no more exempt from human folly than 
civilized men, and are no doubt equally liable to the error of thinking that they, or the persons 
they regard as their superior, can do what in fact cannot be done. But this error is not the 
essence of magic; it is a perversion of magic (PA, 67-68).
80 H. Saari. 1998. ‘R.G. Collingwood’s Emotivist Theory o f  M agic’, in CS, vol. V, pp. 90-108 
(Hereafter abbreviated as Saari), p. 96. Saari bases his analysis and criticism o f  Collingwood’s theory 
mainly on PA.
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In PE8! Collingwood refers to this perversion more extensively and argues that “it is 
this perversion of magic to which, when we speak of magic, we sometimes exclusively refer” 
(PE, p. 231). For Collingwood this perversion is:
the false belief that when we have expressed the emotions instigating a certain course 
of action we have as good as done the corresponding action itself: the belief that the fruits of 
action can be enjoyed by means of merely expressing our desire for them (PE, p. 231).
When this perversion arises the magical ceremonies act as a substitute and not as a 
preparation for the action; magic becomes pseudo science in that people believe they can 
achieve their ends by absurd means; and people are persuaded that by magic they can do 
things that cannot be done at all, like manipulating natural phenomena.82
Another criticism of Collingwood’s theory of magic is that he incorrectly sees the 
arousal and the expression of emotion, in those involved in the ceremonies, as two things that 
exclude each other, where in fact in most cases of magic the two exist together.83 This cannot 
be correct because in expressing an emotion we don’t know what this emotion is until it is 
expressed. The arousal of emotion is the deliberate arousal of a certain emotion and not of 
another, in which case there would be the danger of arousing the wrong emotion for the 
occasion and the subsequent course of action would be disastrous. Moreover there is an 
evident conflict between expressing and arousing and emotion: the expression of the emotion 
has a liberating effect on us and its expression is not followed by a further action. But 
arousing an emotion is not the end of our business but the beginning: the emotion should lead 
us to further action. If the expression was also the function of a magical ceremony then there 
would the danger of “discharging, through an act of aesthetic creation, the feelings which 
ought to remain alive as motives to practical action” (PE, p. 233). Therefore the expression of 
an emotion would result in discharging and will create the illusion of us having achieved our 
aims. This, for Collingwood, is also the perversion of magic.
Lastly an interesting point is how and if magic -as an emotional activity- is related to 
thought. In PE Collingwood indeed contrasts the emotional aspect of magic with the
81 PE, pp. 230-234.
82 Ibid., p. 231. There is however one case o f magic, Collingwood contends, that the ritual itself could 
be enough to achieve the result without any other form o f  action. This is when the magical activities are 
directed to another human being: by the expression o f  hostile emotions through the magical ceremonies 
the emotions o f that person will suffer as well (PE, p. 232).
83 Saari, pp. 100-103. The difference o f  how magic is conceived in PE -expression o f  emotions- and 
PA -  arousal o f  emotion- might create certain confusion. However since Saari’s account is based on 
PA, I consider his argument problematic, given that the distinction, in PA, between expression and 
arousal in fundamental. In PE magic’s ‘expression’ cannot be the same as what Collingwood meant by 
‘expression’ in PA; Collingwood in PE didn’t distinguish between expression and arousal but only 
argued that magic and art express emotions in a different way.
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intellectual principles according to which the anthropologist and the psychologist approached 
magic unsuccessfully. Does this mean that magic is only an emotional activity and has 
nothing to do with thought? This is certainly not the case in PA, where Collingwood 
propounded a theory of mind, where thoughts and emotions are intimately connected. 
Therefore when Collingwood refers to art and magic as activities that pertain to emotions, this 
cannot mean that they are not related to thought.84 Moreover as I have tried to show in chapter 
II, the unity of mind was present in most of Collingwood’s writings, with the exception of IH. 
Although this connection is not overtly present in the folklore writings, Collingwood does say 
that the historian of the fairy tales must reconstruct the ‘life and thought’ or the 
‘experience’85, and it has been argued that in this “movement from ‘thought’ to ‘experience’ 
(as potentially including emotion) the subject matter of history has opened up” (PE, p. xli) 
and that “Collingwood seems to open a way for the re-enactment of emotions in their 
interdependence of ‘thought’” (Smallwood, p. 15).86
I think it is fair to argue that the exact relation between thoughts and emotions and the 
applicability of the doctrine of re-enactment was something not very well developed in PE. 
The unfinished state of these writings might be one reason. Most important, however, is that 
the folklore writings should be seen as a part of Collingwood effort to expand historical 
understanding. Fairy tales, in order to provide historical evidence, must be a product of the 
thinking mind, the implication being that magic cannot be an activity devoid of an intellectual 
element.
§ 6. Conclusions
Collingwood’s writings on fairy tales can be seen in certain respects -and outside his 
archaeological studies- as a work very close to what might be considered proper history. 
Fairy tales for Collingwood are a manifestation of the human mind and as such they can be 
used as historical evidence and enlarge our historical knowledge and understanding. I believe 
that one of the main reasons that Collingwood chose fairy tales was because of the difficulties 
they present to the serious historical study. In that respect he is similar to Giambattista Vico, 
who studied distant and obscure periods of history and difficult subjects in order to advance 
the historical knowledge and method.
84 I think Saari is right when he argues that “Collingwood does not make explicit in his discussion o f  
magic that magical rites also express thoughts” (Saari, p. 107, n. 3).
85 For instance PE, p. 128, p. 129.
86 Dray has similarly suggested that the idea o f re-enactment in connection with “forms o f  human 
experience other than action-appetites, emotions, or beliefs, for example” (Dray, p. 324) is something 
o f  a ‘loose end’ and that a “useful source in this connection might be what is said about understanding 
in the writings on folklore” (Dray, p. 324, n .l).
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Fairy tales had been the focus of attention and systematic study since the early 19th 
century and Collingwood investigated three attempts of interpretation: the German 
philological school of Grimm and Muller, the anthropological school of Tylor and Frazer and 
the psychological school of Freud and Jung. He found that all three contributed to the study of 
fairy tales but their conclusions were not altogether satisfactory. For Collingwood the main, 
and common in all three schools, mistake was the methods they adopted, which were heavily 
influenced by positivistic and naturalistic principles. The problem of these methods was that 
they were prone to generalisations and treated their subject as an external phenomenon to be 
observed in the same way as the phenomena in nature. As a solution to this problem 
Collingwood proposed the use of the historical method which favours the attention to 
individual facts and the understanding of the subject not as a phenomenon outside us but as an 
experience we commonly share in our capacity as humans.
Collingwood believed that in order to understand fairy tales we need to study and 
understand magic since magic was the basic ingredient of fairy tales. The anthropological and 
psychological schools saw the connection between fairy tales and magic but gave, 
Collingwood argued, an incorrect account of magic either as an error in the understanding and 
application of natural science or as a form of neurosis. Therefore if such an idea of magic was 
to be applied in fairy tales it would no doubt result in considering the makers of fairy tales as 
people whose concept of the world was naive, absurd and deranged. However anthropology 
was regarded by Collingwood a valuable ally of the historical method in the study of magic. 
This help was not to come from the ‘anthropological folklorists’ that Collingwood criticised, 
but from his contemporary anthropology, which was dedicated to fieldwork and to close 
contact with the people under study. Collingwood knew from his archaeological work that the 
use of analogy, if used intelligently, could assist the archaeologist. The ethnographic record 
could point to similarities between archaeological artefacts and those found in the ‘primitive’ 
societies that the ethnologist studies. The study of magic can follow the same principle. As an 
activity that is present in various societies -in  many respects different than the modem 
western ones- can be effectively studied by the field anthropologist who possesses the 
historical consciousness that Collingwood propounded. This study and understanding of 
magic will help the student of fairy tales too. Moreover magic cannot only be found in 
‘primitive’ but among modem societies as well. The anthropologist can more easily study 
magic in primitive societies, where it is something accepted and openly practised. In modem 
societies, however, magic wouldn’t be readily recognised not because, as Collingwood 
argues, it is genuinely absent but because it has been suppressed. But for the resourceful and 
acute observer the manifestations of magic in a modem society are plentiful.
The ubiquity, Collingwood thinks, is a result of magic’s character. Magic, as an 
emotional activity, doesn’t perform a function necessary only to certain societies and
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civilisations, but facilitates an emotional response to our lives that is vital for all. That is why 
magic can be found everywhere. When modem societies renounce magic as obsolete and 
unfamiliar they do considerable harm to their emotional well being, while the ‘primitive’ 
people by embracing magic make possible the healthy expression of their emotions.
Collingwood’s theory of magic as the expression of emotions brought magic very 
close to art. In PE they are almost the same thing, they only differ in the way they express 
emotion: magic’s expression is a motive for further action, art’s expression is a self-contained 
experience with no further end. In PA, however, magic is not art proper but an activity which, 
due to the similarities with art proper, is often confused with it. Art proper is the expression of 
emotions and through this expression art becomes knowledge: the knowledge of the 
individual, in effect the same things as history. Magic now is not the expression but the 
arousal of emotions. It seems that the distinction that Collingwood made in PA between art 
and non art entails the distinction between knowledge and non knowledge. The expression of 
emotion is an intentional process87 but also a process that cannot beforehand tell which 
emotion will be expressed. Only by expressing the emotion we come to know it. Magic -and 
for that purpose also amusement (pseudo-art)- arouses specific emotions for ends that have 
been pre-conceived. The arousal of emotions is intentional but it is also known what kind of 
emotions we need or desire to arouse. If the wrong emotion is aroused then the end result will 
not have been achieved.
I believe it is not entirely clear what the difference is between Collingwood’s two 
ways to define magic: magic as expression of emotions in PE, magic as arousal of emotions in 
PA. Both have in common that there is a practical motive involved in the expression or the 
arousal of the emotion and thus the emotion to be expressed or aroused has to be specific. It 
could be argued, therefore, that magic in PE (expression of emotions) is effectively the same 
thing as magic in PA (arousal of emotions) and since magic in PA is not knowledge, the same 
applies to magic in PE. But to argue like that is, I think, rather misleading and reads back to 
PE concepts articulated in PA. The difference in the meaning occurs because Collingwood 
uses his theory of magic in two different contexts, for two quite different purposes.
Magic in PA is utilitarian while art is not and arouses specific emotions while art does 
not. On the other hand the arousal of emotion in magic is different to the arousal of emotion 
in pseudo-art or amusement. Magic stimulates emotions with the intention to help our 
everyday life affairs and thus has a practical, useful function. But the excitement of emotion 
by amusement is not useful but only enjoyable and acts as a substitute for the release of real 
life emotions. Magic, as formulated in PE, is a more detailed and comprehensive theory with
87 Boucher argues that the emotions that magic expresses must be put “into the category o f the 
criteriological human sciences, that is, thought as a self-critical and self-referential activity, setting 
itself purposes and devising ways to enact them” (AHS, p. 324).
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the aim to help us understand fairy tales. Fairy tales, Collingwood asserts, can be used as 
historical evidence and augment our historical knowledge. Thus magic, the essence of fairy 
tales, cannot fall short of being a form of knowledge.
For the same reason magic cannot exclude thought and the folklore writings can be 
seen as a manifestation of mind’s unity. Collingwood’s reference to magic in PE as an 
emotional and not an intellectual activity, rather alerts against the intellectualism of the 
anthropological and psychological interpretations of magic. The intellectualism was the 
distance created between the ‘civilised’ student and the ‘savage’ and the subsequent inability 
of the former to understand the customs and beliefs of the latter. Collingwood maintains that 
the historian of fairy tales, through his understanding of magic, will come to know and 
understand the whole life, the thought and the experience of the people who created those 
fairy tales. Therefore the historian by understanding magic will understand much more than 
the emotional element in it: he will understand the mind of those people. And a mind without 
thought doesn’t exist.
The folklore writings are a clear manifestation of how Collingwood perceived human 
understanding to be: every appearance of the unified mind. He suggested an unusual area -  
fairy tales- to enlarge our historical knowledge and he also realised how fairy tales and magic 
can convey the fundamental place of the emotional element in human actions. It is also of 
note that Collingwood chose fairy tales, a human utterance most civil and urbane. In the realm 
of fairy tales the mind finds itself not surrounded by fantasies but by possibilities to construct 
and comprehend its world.
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In my thesis I have argued about the central role of human understanding in Collingwood’s 
philosophy. To do so I have examined four major areas: the role of psychology, the unity of 
mind, the role of art and the case of fairy tales as a source of historical knowledge. The way I 
see these areas linked in an overall theme relates to how they construct a coherent idea of 
human understanding. I contend, therefore, that the contribution and originality of my study 
consists in connecting these areas in such a way as to recognise human understanding as a 
shift from the knowledge of the united spirit to the knowledge of the historical consciousness. 
The historical consciousness is the highest form of human understanding. In consequence we 
should understand Collingwood very differently from writers who placed human 
understanding within a naturalistic framework, reduced mind into matter and attempted to 
explain it in terms of methods developed for the sciences of matter. Also Collingwood’s 
approach is very different to that of the social sciences that -heavily influenced by the 
scientific methods- regarded human activities, utterances, conduct and so forth, as instances 
of more general laws, instances that fall within wider patterns of explanation. Instead, 
Collingwood’s philosophy and human understanding give emphasis to the mental aspect that 
is not reduced to a mere physical and material dimension and the historical consciousness 
presents the individual as the only concrete fact.1
What the above attempts have in common is the belief in uniformity of human 
behaviour which is due to an alleged common human nature. If all the parameters of human 
nature can be found then everything will be understood and become a matter of safe 
predictions. It seems, therefore, that the naturalistic and the social science's models neglect 
the historical element of man. They neglect the idea of understanding as an ongoing, 
unfolding and surprising process, a process of constant creation and discovery. Instead, these 
models promote ideas of regulation, prediction and so forth. The desire for catholic
1 These are elements that can also be found in the works o f  the Italian Idealists. For Collingwood’s 
relationship with the Italian idealism see: J. Connelly. 1995. ‘Art Thou the Man: Croce, Gentile or de 
Ruggiero?’, in PHC, pp. 92-114; B.A. Haddock. 1999. ‘Collingwood, Croce and the characterization o f  
historical knowledge’, in Humanitas. Studi in memoria di Antonio Verri. Vol. I. A cura di Antonio 
Quarta e Paolo Pellegrino. Mario Congedo editore, pp. 355-368; H.S. Harris. 1995. ‘Croce and Gentile 
in Collingwood’s New Leviathan', in PHC, pp. 115-129; R. Peters. 1995. ‘Croce, Gentile and 
Collingwood on the Relation between History and Philosophy’, in PHC, pp. 152-167; C.G. Reda. 1995. 
‘Considerations on Collingwood and Italian Thought’, in CS, vol. II, pp. 213-232. Collingwood also 
translated some o f de Ruggiero’s works in English: G. de Ruggiero. 1921. Modem Philosophy.
London, Allen and Unwin, (translated by R.G. Collingwood with A.H. Hannay); G. de Ruggiero. 1931. 
‘Science, History and Philosophy’, in Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6, pp. 166-179.
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knowledge and understanding of man becomes synonymous with the desire to foresee out of 
an excessive fear of the future uncertainty and an absurd preoccupation with control.
My thesis examined Collingwood's philosophy as a system and as a form of dialectic 
of different forms of experience. Therefore my interpretation was closer to the ones, such as 
Mink's and RubinofFs, that emphasise these two elements and consider SM a very important 
book for Collingwood's philosophy. What we found in Collingwood, I believe, is a dialectic 
where the various forms of experience move from the united spirit to the consciousness of 
history. All forms of experience operate within history, become autonomous and in order to 
do so must also be forms of knowledge. Thus interpretations, like Mink's, that deny the status 
of knowledge for art are different from mine. The idea of dialectic, since it requires seeing a 
philosophy as a system, is at odds with readings that favour a strict periodisation and 
categorisation of writings, and approach them selectively. Knox and Donagan both adopted 
such schemes, attached little attention to SM and as a result their interpretations, I think, 
suffer. My interpretation also deviated from Dray's. He maintained that -whether 
Collingwood's philosophical writings are considered parts of a single system that needs to be 
understood or as attempts, perhaps even unsuccessful, at elaborating such a system- particular 
issues such as history have been obscured by this preoccupation with larger questions. Dray 
points out Mink's and Rubinoffs books as such attempts and he argues that the latter book 
“develops a quasi-Hegelian interpretation” (Dray, pp. 3-4) of Collingwood. Whether 
Collingwood's philosophy can be interpreted along Hegelian lines is not something that 
should concern us here, but that Collingwood's philosophy is a system is in my opinion 
beyond doubt. The particular issue of history, that Dray mentions, certainly became of 
paramount importance for Collingwood, but it is not history for history's sake that informed 
his writings. History was after all just one of the forms of experience in SM. Collingwood 
was, instead, preoccupied with explaining experience and this is why his philosophy is a 
system. In the end it was through history that he sought to explain the whole of experience: 
experience can be only understood historically and history is nothing but the manifestations of 
the various forms of experience.
With psychology, I began in the negative by showing what Collingwood considered 
an erroneous attempt to understand man as mind. The problem with psychology, as 
Collingwood understood it, was that it came to study the human mind (and thus compete with 
philosophy) having adopted the methods of the natural sciences, which were orientated 
towards a materialistic approach with any area of investigation. But man in his capacity as 
mind, Collingwood argued, is not matter and thus cannot be studied by a naturalistic science. 
Psychology, instead, is limited to studying man as body, the physical organism, alongside
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with other sciences (such as physiology) that study man as a material entity. More specifically 
Collingwood recognised the study of feelings as the appropriate subject matter for 
psychology.
That the psychology of feeling became possible was the result of how Collingwood 
developed his understanding of the mind. His early ideas regarded the mind as a unity of 
immediacy and mediation, that is, of sensation/feeling and thought. He understood the way 
we experience as an undivided whole. We can distinguish elements within experience but 
these distinctions are abstractions and if we assume that the elements of the mind can be 
divided we are mistaken. Therefore to study the mind means to study a unity. His main works 
that presented this view of the mind were RP and SM. The implication of the unity of mind 
for psychology was that if the claim to study the mind as matter was mistaken, then 
psychology altogether should be proclaimed erroneous. And I have tried to show that this is 
how we should interpret Collingwood’s early position on psychology. However in the late 
1920’s and more clearly in IH, Collingwood developed a different philosophy of mind and as 
a consequence the psychology of feelings became possible. In the philosophy of history 
lectures of 1928 he claimed that history, as the study of the mind, should only concern itself 
with thought in the widest sense, which includes all the conscious elements of the mind. Thus 
by leaving out the unconscious elements Collingwood sees now the mind as something that 
can be divided. In IH the division of the mind is also present in the form of rational and 
irrational elements, the latter including emotions too.
I have tried to show that the view of the divided mind was the outcome of the 
introduction of the re-enactment doctrine and that it must be seen as an aberration in 
Collingwood’s philosophy of mind. For the unity of mind found in Collingwood’s early 
philosophy re-appears after the interim of 1928 and IH in all his later writings, where 
emotions are important to the understanding of human actions and belong to the concerns of 
history, the study, that is, of the mind as a whole consisting of thoughts and emotions. Thus 
the initial unity of mind is later completely restored, but for the elements that became the 
subject matter of psychology. In PA Collingwood refers to these elements as the psychical 
level o f experience that includes feelings but not emotions, although an emotional charge is 
involved. In NL the situation is more complicated since feelings are an apanage of mind and 
within the province of the sciences of the mind and not the sciences of body or matter. But 
feelings are sometimes connected to the psychological sense of the term body. Hence a 
certain ambiguity exists as to the absolute boundaries of feelings in NL, but in this book the 
unity o f mind has a very close connection with the unity of mind that Collingwood advocated 
in his early writings, where feelings-sensations, emotions and thoughts formed an undivided 
whole.
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So far we have seen that psychology, as the science of thought, fails to provide human 
understanding; and that the unity of mind shows the way, how our experience should be 
studied if we want to attain understanding. But experience can also be studied as something. 
The unity of mind in SM is a unity of experience in its immediacy and its mediation. But it is 
also a dialectic unity of the spirit’s forms. Thus apart from the general character of experience 
as a unity of sensation, feeling, thought (immediacy-mediation), experience has also forms 
that retain the general character of experience: each form is the synthesis of sensation, feeling 
and thought. The forms that the character of experience takes were, in SM, art, religion, 
science, history and philosophy. Collingwood considered the claim that each form of 
experience is knowledge, but argued that alone each is incomplete and cannot yield 
knowledge. It is only through their gradual, dialectic connection that the spirit is finally 
united, all the different forms of experience become identical and knowledge is attained.
The character of art that Collingwood defined in SM was Croce’s focus of criticism in 
an otherwise positive review of that book.2 For he agreed that Collingwood’s position was 
irrefutable when it comes to religion, history and science, but thought his position regarding 
art fallacious. The preoccupation of Croce with art or Poetry was also to become 
Collingwood’s preoccupation. And it was art that Collingwood explored in relation to an 
epistemological autonomy. Gradually his theory of knowledge propounded in SM, the 
dialectic of the various forms of experience, gave way to a theory of knowledge that was 
constructed around the historical consciousness, history as the only way to know the mind. 
The various forms of experience now operate within history and are not incomplete forms of 
knowledge but autonomous and epistemologically valid in their own respect. Collingwood 
mainly explored history and art as forms of experience, and science and -to  a greater extent- 
religion do not receive similar attention. But as in SM, where the number of the forms of 
experience was not important, so now the ways that the mind can know itself do not require a 
detailed classification. All we need to know is that -as in the case of fairy tales where the 
historical mind knows itself through the activity of story telling- all the ways or forms of 
experience are expressions and manifestations of the historical consciousness.
For Collingwood the understanding of man is very important since it comes first and 
upon it rests all other aspects of human life, society and civilisation. To know man is a 
condition for constructing a civilised life. Collingwood was also convinced that the attainment 
of knowledge and understanding of man is possible and any uncertainties that question this 
assumption did not concern his thought. The deep scepticism and relativism that other 
philosophies put forward was the attitude that Collingwood found harmful. In EM he insisted
'J
“■ B. Croce. 1996. ‘Review o f  R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis or The Map o f Knowledge’, in CS, 
vol. Ill, pp. 188-193 (translated by Lionel Rubinoff and Alan Franklin: published in Critica, 1925, vol. 
23, pp. 55-59).
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upon the value of truth and argued against scepticism and relativism, criticising psychology 
for not using criteria of judgement when studying thought.
Collingwood's views on human understanding are still relevant today. His 
pronouncements ring true in an intellectual atmosphere that reproduces almost the same perils 
for civilisation that Collingwood had recognised in his own times to exist. Various post 
modem interpretations that question truth, fixed meaning and objective knowledge, and 
modem versions of materialism have real similarities with Collingwood's definition of 
irrationalism. These interpretations are suspicious towards tmth and criteria of judgement and 
their attempt to understand man poses problems. Moreover they are based on principles that 
strongly oppose humanistic thought, the belief in human rationality.
Against such interpretations Collingwood's arguments come to suggest, first, that the 
pursuit of truth is not something that thought can dispense with. The various distinctions 
between tmth and falsehood, good and evil and so forth is the essence of thought and mles 
or criteria are used in establishing one (tmth, good etc.) and avoiding the other (falsehood, 
evil etc.). The second thing that Collingwood suggests is that knowledge is only partially 
what natural sciences provide. In fact knowledge and understanding of man as mind and not 
body cannot be provided at all by the methods of the natural sciences. If we believe so we 
have misunderstood the nature of our inquiry, which is not naturalistic but historical. In 
Collingwood's analysis history epitomises human understanding. The historical approach 
recognises man in his individuality and analyses the unique, historical situation.
This thesis brought together material with a view to presenting Collingwood's ideas as 
an essentially sincere and thoughtful way to understanding and action. His perception of 
understanding and action are, furthermore, permeated with the general concept of duty and 
our obligation towards tmth as fundamental conditions of a civilised life. At times, perhaps 
more often than desired, when these concepts seem to succumb under trends that welcome the 
convenient, the profitable and the utilitarian, Collingwood's assertions appear germane but 
demanding, a reminder that civilisation is never at ease.
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